Narrative:

The first officer for the trip is also the company chief pilot. Approximately 1 yr ago, the company I had worked for merged with first officer's company. Due to the diversity of the fleet as a result of the merger, first officer had only recently become qualified in the aircraft we were flying on this trip. Since I was more experienced in the aircraft and more experienced in international operations, I was designated as PIC for the trip. I had only flown 1 domestic trip with first officer prior to this trip. This trip was an opportunity for first officer to evaluate me on an international flight. The flight plan for the leg from london luton (eggw) to paris le bourget (lfpb) had been prefiled by our flight planning service. The filed first fix was detling (det). I briefed first officer on the departure procedure that I believed we would receive based on the filed en route fix. The departure that I briefed was the detling 4C. I also discussed the possibility of being cleared for the compton 4C departure, but I decided to load the detling 4C departure into the FMS. As we were cleared onto the runway to line up and wait, the local controller issued our ATC clearance. Since I was taxiing the aircraft, my attention was not completely focused on listening to the clearance. As first officer was copying the clearance, I heard the controller say '4 charlie,' but I did not distinctly hear the procedure name. First officer read back the clearance as 'cleared for the 4 charlie departure,' but did not include the procedure name. At this time, I was keyed in on the detling 4C departure. After takeoff, we contacted london control and flew the detling 4C procedure as programmed in the FMS. When we made a turn to the southeast, london control asked us to report our heading. When we did, he instructed us to make a right turn to heading 270 degrees. While in the turn, he asked us to confirm that we had been assigned the compton departure. First officer then looked down at the clearance he had written. He had written 'compton 4C.' looking back on what happened, I realize that I set the trap for myself, and then stuck my head into the noose. I convinced myself that we were certain to get the detling departure. Even though the clearance was not to be issued until we were taxiing, I could have asked the ground controller which departures were in use at the time so as to be more in tune with the flow. I heard '4 charlie,' and assumed that it must be the detling 4C. First officer was not comfortable with non united states ATC procedures, but I assumed he had heard and read back the clearance accurately. I should have insisted that we confirm the ATC clearance prior to takeoff. In the future, I will make it a habit that both pilots listen to the clearance together, confirm it with each other and then with the controller. Also, I will not allow my desire to impress my supervisor get in the way of good communication and cockpit procedure. Perhaps it should be considered if it is prudent to have identical suffix codes on different named procedures. For example, if the detling departure had suffixes 4B, 4C, etc, and the compton suffixes were 5B, 5C, etc, it might add 1 more clue that could prevent a similar mishap.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC HAD A TRACK DEV IN EGTT CLASS B AFTER THE CREW BEGAN FLYING THE WRONG SID.

Narrative: THE FO FOR THE TRIP IS ALSO THE COMPANY CHIEF PLT. APPROX 1 YR AGO, THE COMPANY I HAD WORKED FOR MERGED WITH FO'S COMPANY. DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF THE FLEET AS A RESULT OF THE MERGER, FO HAD ONLY RECENTLY BECOME QUALIFIED IN THE ACFT WE WERE FLYING ON THIS TRIP. SINCE I WAS MORE EXPERIENCED IN THE ACFT AND MORE EXPERIENCED IN INTL OPS, I WAS DESIGNATED AS PIC FOR THE TRIP. I HAD ONLY FLOWN 1 DOMESTIC TRIP WITH FO PRIOR TO THIS TRIP. THIS TRIP WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FO TO EVALUATE ME ON AN INTL FLT. THE FLT PLAN FOR THE LEG FROM LONDON LUTON (EGGW) TO PARIS LE BOURGET (LFPB) HAD BEEN PREFILED BY OUR FLT PLANNING SVC. THE FILED FIRST FIX WAS DETLING (DET). I BRIEFED FO ON THE DEP PROC THAT I BELIEVED WE WOULD RECEIVE BASED ON THE FILED ENRTE FIX. THE DEP THAT I BRIEFED WAS THE DETLING 4C. I ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING CLRED FOR THE COMPTON 4C DEP, BUT I DECIDED TO LOAD THE DETLING 4C DEP INTO THE FMS. AS WE WERE CLRED ONTO THE RWY TO LINE UP AND WAIT, THE LCL CTLR ISSUED OUR ATC CLRNC. SINCE I WAS TAXIING THE ACFT, MY ATTN WAS NOT COMPLETELY FOCUSED ON LISTENING TO THE CLRNC. AS FO WAS COPYING THE CLRNC, I HEARD THE CTLR SAY '4 CHARLIE,' BUT I DID NOT DISTINCTLY HEAR THE PROC NAME. FO READ BACK THE CLRNC AS 'CLRED FOR THE 4 CHARLIE DEP,' BUT DID NOT INCLUDE THE PROC NAME. AT THIS TIME, I WAS KEYED IN ON THE DETLING 4C DEP. AFTER TKOF, WE CONTACTED LONDON CTL AND FLEW THE DETLING 4C PROC AS PROGRAMMED IN THE FMS. WHEN WE MADE A TURN TO THE SE, LONDON CTL ASKED US TO RPT OUR HDG. WHEN WE DID, HE INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE A R TURN TO HDG 270 DEGS. WHILE IN THE TURN, HE ASKED US TO CONFIRM THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE COMPTON DEP. FO THEN LOOKED DOWN AT THE CLRNC HE HAD WRITTEN. HE HAD WRITTEN 'COMPTON 4C.' LOOKING BACK ON WHAT HAPPENED, I REALIZE THAT I SET THE TRAP FOR MYSELF, AND THEN STUCK MY HEAD INTO THE NOOSE. I CONVINCED MYSELF THAT WE WERE CERTAIN TO GET THE DETLING DEP. EVEN THOUGH THE CLRNC WAS NOT TO BE ISSUED UNTIL WE WERE TAXIING, I COULD HAVE ASKED THE GND CTLR WHICH DEPS WERE IN USE AT THE TIME SO AS TO BE MORE IN TUNE WITH THE FLOW. I HEARD '4 CHARLIE,' AND ASSUMED THAT IT MUST BE THE DETLING 4C. FO WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH NON UNITED STATES ATC PROCS, BUT I ASSUMED HE HAD HEARD AND READ BACK THE CLRNC ACCURATELY. I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT WE CONFIRM THE ATC CLRNC PRIOR TO TKOF. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL MAKE IT A HABIT THAT BOTH PLTS LISTEN TO THE CLRNC TOGETHER, CONFIRM IT WITH EACH OTHER AND THEN WITH THE CTLR. ALSO, I WILL NOT ALLOW MY DESIRE TO IMPRESS MY SUPVR GET IN THE WAY OF GOOD COM AND COCKPIT PROC. PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IF IT IS PRUDENT TO HAVE IDENTICAL SUFFIX CODES ON DIFFERENT NAMED PROCS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE DETLING DEP HAD SUFFIXES 4B, 4C, ETC, AND THE COMPTON SUFFIXES WERE 5B, 5C, ETC, IT MIGHT ADD 1 MORE CLUE THAT COULD PREVENT A SIMILAR MISHAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.