Narrative:

On tuesday afternoon at approximately XA55, a twin baron was given an IFR clearance to depart from indianapolis, in (ind) to madisonville, ky (2i0). I was given instructions to taxi to runway 32 with specific intersection crossings. Prior to reaching runway 32, indianapolis ground control asked to see if I was ready to go in the next few moments or if I would require a run-up. I chose and requested to complete my before takeoff checks prior to departure. I was then told to taxi off on taxiway M3 and complete the run-up procedures while giving way to other traffic, and to contact him when I was ready. The instructions were acknowledged and completed. Just after completing the run-up, I began cross checking and adjusting the appropriate navigational aids in preparation for departure. I then asked the non-flying pilot to notify indianapolis tower that we were ready to 'go' on runway 32. He transmitted the request and was told to taxi 'up to and hold short of runway 32.' at this point, he misinterpreted the 'hold short' clearance as a 'position and hold.' due to my lack of attention at this time, I did not catch the 'complete' clearance that was given to us. I misinterpreted the clearance myself and began to taxi onto the runway to hold (I should have caught and challenged the discrepancy at this point). During my taxi, I noticed a small corporate jet on about a 3-4 mile final (at least that is what it appeared to be). The arriving aircraft was not close enough to alarm me of a discrepancy at the time. I have operated in airports where departure and arrival aircraft were abundant. Therefore, I was aware of the traffic and even made mention to the non-flying pilot to expect an immediate departure, but it was of no concern at this time. Nevertheless, I kept visual orientation of the arriving aircraft at all times while ready and expecting a takeoff clearance. During this time the aircraft began approaching and questioned the controller to verify that they were still clear to land on runway 32. The controller verified and acknowledged it. At this point I made an immediate callback to the controller and advised her that we were 'position and hold on runway 32.' while still keeping a visual on the approaching aircraft, I was ready to take any necessary action at that point to avoid an incursion. Both myself and the other aircraft knew what was about to occur and he opted to go around at the same time he was told to do so by the tower controller. I on the other hand was ready to taxi clear off of the approach end of the runway toward the left side. Situational awareness was a big key in the mishap, but unfortunately, it did not take long for me to realize that I had fallen victim to our national airspace system's major incident contributor: runway incursion. The approaching corporate aircraft went around, circled, and attempted the landing approach once again. We were then cleared for takeoff without further incident. During the en route phase, I contacted the controling agency (evansville approach) and requested the contact number for the indianapolis tower. Upon landing at our destination at madisonville, ky, I quickly attempted to contact the controller that was involved in the incident to get some feedback and or apologize for any miscommunication. Unfortunately, they had completed their shift change and could not be reached. I then left the information to a working controller and was advised that someone would contact me as soon as they looked into the matter. We then departed madisonville, ky and headed back to our home base at paducah, ky (pah) where I was given a replied message from the operation supervisor at the indianapolis tower. I quickly replied back and began to get some feedback on what had happened and to apologize for any miscommunication on either part. Contributing factor in incident: misinterpretation of takeoff clearance instructions. Lessons learned: never assume and anticipate a departure clearance. Ask for reply or readback if in doubt.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BEECH B58 BARON PLT MISTAKENLY TAXIED IN TO POSITION AND HELD CAUSING A CPR JET TO GAR.

Narrative: ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON AT APPROX XA55, A TWIN BARON WAS GIVEN AN IFR CLRNC TO DEPART FROM INDIANAPOLIS, IN (IND) TO MADISONVILLE, KY (2I0). I WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO RWY 32 WITH SPECIFIC INTERSECTION CROSSINGS. PRIOR TO REACHING RWY 32, INDIANAPOLIS GND CTL ASKED TO SEE IF I WAS READY TO GO IN THE NEXT FEW MOMENTS OR IF I WOULD REQUIRE A RUN-UP. I CHOSE AND REQUESTED TO COMPLETE MY BEFORE TAKEOFF CHECKS PRIOR TO DEP. I WAS THEN TOLD TO TAXI OFF ON TXWY M3 AND COMPLETE THE RUN-UP PROCS WHILE GIVING WAY TO OTHER TFC, AND TO CONTACT HIM WHEN I WAS READY. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLETED. JUST AFTER COMPLETING THE RUN-UP, I BEGAN CROSS CHKING AND ADJUSTING THE APPROPRIATE NAVIGATIONAL AIDS IN PREPARATION FOR DEP. I THEN ASKED THE NON-FLYING PLT TO NOTIFY INDIANAPOLIS TWR THAT WE WERE READY TO 'GO' ON RWY 32. HE TRANSMITTED THE REQUEST AND WAS TOLD TO TAXI 'UP TO AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32.' AT THIS POINT, HE MISINTERPRETED THE 'HOLD SHORT' CLRNC AS A 'POSITION AND HOLD.' DUE TO MY LACK OF ATTENTION AT THIS TIME, I DID NOT CATCH THE 'COMPLETE' CLRNC THAT WAS GIVEN TO US. I MISINTERPRETED THE CLRNC MYSELF AND BEGAN TO TAXI ONTO THE RWY TO HOLD (I SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT AND CHALLENGED THE DISCREPANCY AT THIS POINT). DURING MY TAXI, I NOTICED A SMALL CORPORATE JET ON ABOUT A 3-4 MILE FINAL (AT LEAST THAT IS WHAT IT APPEARED TO BE). THE ARRIVING ACFT WAS NOT CLOSE ENOUGH TO ALARM ME OF A DISCREPANCY AT THE TIME. I HAVE OPERATED IN ARPTS WHERE DEP AND ARR ACFT WERE ABUNDANT. THEREFORE, I WAS AWARE OF THE TFC AND EVEN MADE MENTION TO THE NON-FLYING PILOT TO EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE DEP, BUT IT WAS OF NO CONCERN AT THIS TIME. NEVERTHELESS, I KEPT VISUAL ORIENTATION OF THE ARRIVING ACFT AT ALL TIMES WHILE READY AND EXPECTING A TAKEOFF CLRNC. DURING THIS TIME THE ACFT BEGAN APCHING AND QUESTIONED THE CTLR TO VERIFY THAT THEY WERE STILL CLR TO LAND ON RWY 32. THE CTLR VERIFIED AND ACKNOWLEDGED IT. AT THIS POINT I MADE AN IMMEDIATE CALLBACK TO THE CTLR AND ADVISED HER THAT WE WERE 'POSITION AND HOLD ON RWY 32.' WHILE STILL KEEPING A VISUAL ON THE APCHING ACFT, I WAS READY TO TAKE ANY NECESSARY ACTION AT THAT POINT TO AVOID AN INCURSION. BOTH MYSELF AND THE OTHER ACFT KNEW WHAT WAS ABOUT TO OCCUR AND HE OPTED TO GO AROUND AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS TOLD TO DO SO BY THE TWR CTLR. I ON THE OTHER HAND WAS READY TO TAXI CLR OFF OF THE APCH END OF THE RWY TOWARD THE L SIDE. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS A BIG KEY IN THE MISHAP, BUT UNFORTUNATELY, IT DID NOT TAKE LONG FOR ME TO REALIZE THAT I HAD FALLEN VICTIM TO OUR NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM'S MAJOR INCIDENT CONTRIBUTOR: RWY INCURSION. THE APCHING CORPORATE ACFT WENT AROUND, CIRCLED, AND ATTEMPTED THE LNDG APCH ONCE AGAIN. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TAKEOFF WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. DURING THE ENRTE PHASE, I CONTACTED THE CTLING AGENCY (EVANSVILLE APCH) AND REQUESTED THE CONTACT NUMBER FOR THE INDIANAPOLIS TWR. UPON LNDG AT OUR DEST AT MADISONVILLE, KY, I QUICKLY ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE CTLR THAT WAS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT TO GET SOME FEEDBACK AND OR APOLOGIZE FOR ANY MISCOMMUNICATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR SHIFT CHANGE AND COULD NOT BE REACHED. I THEN LEFT THE INFO TO A WORKING CTLR AND WAS ADVISED THAT SOMEONE WOULD CONTACT ME AS SOON AS THEY LOOKED INTO THE MATTER. WE THEN DEPARTED MADISONVILLE, KY AND HEADED BACK TO OUR HOME BASE AT PADUCAH, KY (PAH) WHERE I WAS GIVEN A REPLIED MESSAGE FROM THE OP SUPVR AT THE INDIANAPOLIS TWR. I QUICKLY REPLIED BACK AND BEGAN TO GET SOME FEEDBACK ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TO APOLOGIZE FOR ANY MISCOMMUNICATION ON EITHER PART. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN INCIDENT: MISINTERPRETATION OF TAKEOFF CLRNC INSTRUCTIONS. LESSONS LEARNED: NEVER ASSUME AND ANTICIPATE A DEP CLRNC. ASK FOR REPLY OR READBACK IF IN DOUBT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.