Narrative:

During the third leg of a scheduled mission, our LJ35 was returning to ZZZ from rnd. Past the pnh VORTAC approximately XA45Z, an area of lightning was observed in both forward quadrants ahead of the aircraft. This area of WX was not displayed on the aircraft's WX radar but was confirmed with fort worth efas 'flight watch' on the high altitude frequency. Requests were made with different center controllers to maneuver past this WX. We were granted a climb to a higher altitude initially (FL390) followed by turns to the west and the north. During this period of maneuvering, we complied with controller instructions and were generally granted requested deviations. While the aircraft approached an intense area of lightning, we asked for a turn to the north to avoid the WX. We advised center that we were turning 10 degrees right. I felt it would be unsafe to continue on my present heading due to the area of severe WX. ATC advised that we were unable to turn north. They instructed us to proceed direct brk VOR which was, in our opinion, unsafe due to the WX. We did not accept this clearance due to the WX. According to the center shift supervisor, our intention to deviate 10 degrees right is on the ATC tapes. We had been monitoring an apparent traffic conflict with an aircraft from our 9-11 O'clock position that was converging. A TA was issued by the TCASII system as the aircraft air carrier Y passed in front of us. We were subsequently given an immediate left turn and a descent to FL350. I considered this an unacceptable vector as it put us directly into an area of intense lightning. The controller instructed that we could turn back north. Looking at the tapes to determine fault. The traffic that passed in front of us passed within 3.3 mi. He said we clipped the back end of that traffic's 'bubble' and had deviated without clearance. I held on the phone for 30 mins while they examined more radar data and by the end of the evening his comment was 'it looks like it wasn't your fault.' he advised that we could call him the following evening to discuss the matter. The director of operations was in the office that evening and was briefed immediately following our conversation. I contacted the shift supervisor later and he advised that in their opinion the 10 degree right turn had caused the loss of separation. He confirmed our communication that we were deviating north and said he understood the need to keep the aircraft safe from the WX. He advised us that the controller was new and just checked out. He said he did not understand our deviation to the north and did not fully understand the peril our aircraft was placed by proceeding direct brk. The subsequent immediate left turn and descent was for converging traffic from our 12 O'clock position. The supervisor was very professional and appeared to understand our position. He advised us in his opinion, it would have been better to transmit 'deviating 10 right emergency.' the supervisor said he understood our need to keep the aircraft safe from WX and had the separation been greater than 4 mi this incident would have been closed out informally. He was sympathetic to our position and said he understood our responsibility to keep the aircraft from dangerous WX. He advised us that his report would be forwarded to his quality assurance representative, and then forwarded to the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MIL LJ35 FLC ATTEMPTING TO AVOID SEVERE WX AT FL390 MAY HAVE CONFLICTED WITH AN ACR ACFT.

Narrative: DURING THE THIRD LEG OF A SCHEDULED MISSION, OUR LJ35 WAS RETURNING TO ZZZ FROM RND. PAST THE PNH VORTAC APPROX XA45Z, AN AREA OF LIGHTNING WAS OBSERVED IN BOTH FORWARD QUADRANTS AHEAD OF THE ACFT. THIS AREA OF WX WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON THE ACFT'S WX RADAR BUT WAS CONFIRMED WITH FORT WORTH EFAS 'FLT WATCH' ON THE HIGH ALT FREQ. REQUESTS WERE MADE WITH DIFFERENT CTR CTLRS TO MANEUVER PAST THIS WX. WE WERE GRANTED A CLB TO A HIGHER ALT INITIALLY (FL390) FOLLOWED BY TURNS TO THE W AND THE N. DURING THIS PERIOD OF MANEUVERING, WE COMPLIED WITH CTLR INSTRUCTIONS AND WERE GENERALLY GRANTED REQUESTED DEVS. WHILE THE ACFT APCHED AN INTENSE AREA OF LIGHTNING, WE ASKED FOR A TURN TO THE N TO AVOID THE WX. WE ADVISED CTR THAT WE WERE TURNING 10 DEGS R. I FELT IT WOULD BE UNSAFE TO CONTINUE ON MY PRESENT HDG DUE TO THE AREA OF SEVERE WX. ATC ADVISED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO TURN N. THEY INSTRUCTED US TO PROCEED DIRECT BRK VOR WHICH WAS, IN OUR OPINION, UNSAFE DUE TO THE WX. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THIS CLRNC DUE TO THE WX. ACCORDING TO THE CTR SHIFT SUPVR, OUR INTENTION TO DEVIATE 10 DEGS R IS ON THE ATC TAPES. WE HAD BEEN MONITORING AN APPARENT TFC CONFLICT WITH AN ACFT FROM OUR 9-11 O'CLOCK POS THAT WAS CONVERGING. A TA WAS ISSUED BY THE TCASII SYS AS THE ACFT ACR Y PASSED IN FRONT OF US. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN AN IMMEDIATE L TURN AND A DSCNT TO FL350. I CONSIDERED THIS AN UNACCEPTABLE VECTOR AS IT PUT US DIRECTLY INTO AN AREA OF INTENSE LIGHTNING. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED THAT WE COULD TURN BACK N. LOOKING AT THE TAPES TO DETERMINE FAULT. THE TFC THAT PASSED IN FRONT OF US PASSED WITHIN 3.3 MI. HE SAID WE CLIPPED THE BACK END OF THAT TFC'S 'BUBBLE' AND HAD DEVIATED WITHOUT CLRNC. I HELD ON THE PHONE FOR 30 MINS WHILE THEY EXAMINED MORE RADAR DATA AND BY THE END OF THE EVENING HIS COMMENT WAS 'IT LOOKS LIKE IT WASN'T YOUR FAULT.' HE ADVISED THAT WE COULD CALL HIM THE FOLLOWING EVENING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. THE DIRECTOR OF OPS WAS IN THE OFFICE THAT EVENING AND WAS BRIEFED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR CONVERSATION. I CONTACTED THE SHIFT SUPVR LATER AND HE ADVISED THAT IN THEIR OPINION THE 10 DEG R TURN HAD CAUSED THE LOSS OF SEPARATION. HE CONFIRMED OUR COM THAT WE WERE DEVIATING N AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO KEEP THE ACFT SAFE FROM THE WX. HE ADVISED US THAT THE CTLR WAS NEW AND JUST CHKED OUT. HE SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND OUR DEV TO THE N AND DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PERIL OUR ACFT WAS PLACED BY PROCEEDING DIRECT BRK. THE SUBSEQUENT IMMEDIATE L TURN AND DSCNT WAS FOR CONVERGING TFC FROM OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS. THE SUPVR WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL AND APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND OUR POS. HE ADVISED US IN HIS OPINION, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO XMIT 'DEVIATING 10 R EMER.' THE SUPVR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR NEED TO KEEP THE ACFT SAFE FROM WX AND HAD THE SEPARATION BEEN GREATER THAN 4 MI THIS INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CLOSED OUT INFORMALLY. HE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO OUR POS AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM DANGEROUS WX. HE ADVISED US THAT HIS RPT WOULD BE FORWARDED TO HIS QUALITY ASSURANCE REPRESENTATIVE, AND THEN FORWARDED TO THE FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.