Narrative:

The airplane, a piper seneca, was to be flown from mn to ok for repairs. Since I start training in that aircraft for a far 135 operation on a later date, I was instructed to ride along on the flight. The PIC had low time and had never flown on a long-cross country flight such as this. He flew the first leg and asked me if I was interested in flying the second leg, which I decided to do. His inexperience was obvious, and I soon found his direction to be useless. On takeoff, I accidentally switched off 1 magneto instead of a fuel pump. Approximately 10 seconds later, I noticed the right engine was not performing very well at all. I asked the other pilot if he saw anything wrong with the engine, and he became very frightened and was unable to respond. I then assumed that we did, in fact, have a real power failure and began heading back toward the airport. I informed ATC that we had an engine-out and an emergency was declared. On the downwind, I began an engine-failure troubleshooting procedure and found the magneto switch in the off position. I then checked the magneto back on, and we were able to continue the flight as planned. I feel that something that contributed to this occurrence was a feeling of apathy toward the PIC. Another contributing factor was the magneto switch guards that had been removed from the aircraft. A third factor, was the PIC's continuous talking during the entire takeoff. The magneto was switched off while I was responding to something he was telling me about the landing gear system. Putting more emphasis on concentrating during initial phases of flight, and not removing safety equipment from the aircraft were certainly contributing factors and could be prevented by using common sense and following appropriate maintenance procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA34 FLC HAS LOSS OF PWR ON R ENG DURING TKOF FROM KOMA.

Narrative: THE AIRPLANE, A PIPER SENECA, WAS TO BE FLOWN FROM MN TO OK FOR REPAIRS. SINCE I START TRAINING IN THAT ACFT FOR A FAR 135 OP ON A LATER DATE, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO RIDE ALONG ON THE FLT. THE PIC HAD LOW TIME AND HAD NEVER FLOWN ON A LONG-XCOUNTRY FLT SUCH AS THIS. HE FLEW THE FIRST LEG AND ASKED ME IF I WAS INTERESTED IN FLYING THE SECOND LEG, WHICH I DECIDED TO DO. HIS INEXPERIENCE WAS OBVIOUS, AND I SOON FOUND HIS DIRECTION TO BE USELESS. ON TKOF, I ACCIDENTALLY SWITCHED OFF 1 MAGNETO INSTEAD OF A FUEL PUMP. APPROX 10 SECONDS LATER, I NOTICED THE R ENG WAS NOT PERFORMING VERY WELL AT ALL. I ASKED THE OTHER PLT IF HE SAW ANYTHING WRONG WITH THE ENG, AND HE BECAME VERY FRIGHTENED AND WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND. I THEN ASSUMED THAT WE DID, IN FACT, HAVE A REAL PWR FAILURE AND BEGAN HEADING BACK TOWARD THE ARPT. I INFORMED ATC THAT WE HAD AN ENG-OUT AND AN EMER WAS DECLARED. ON THE DOWNWIND, I BEGAN AN ENG-FAILURE TROUBLESHOOTING PROC AND FOUND THE MAGNETO SWITCH IN THE OFF POS. I THEN CHKED THE MAGNETO BACK ON, AND WE WERE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT AS PLANNED. I FEEL THAT SOMETHING THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE WAS A FEELING OF APATHY TOWARD THE PIC. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE MAGNETO SWITCH GUARDS THAT HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ACFT. A THIRD FACTOR, WAS THE PIC'S CONTINUOUS TALKING DURING THE ENTIRE TKOF. THE MAGNETO WAS SWITCHED OFF WHILE I WAS RESPONDING TO SOMETHING HE WAS TELLING ME ABOUT THE LNDG GEAR SYS. PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON CONCENTRATING DURING INITIAL PHASES OF FLT, AND NOT REMOVING SAFETY EQUIP FROM THE ACFT WERE CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND COULD BE PREVENTED BY USING COMMON SENSE AND FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE MAINT PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.