Narrative:

Sna WX, clear with good visibility and calm wind. We were on an IFR release, no alternate. On approach into sna, at 3000 ft MSL and within 15 mi of the airport we extended flaps 1 and got an EICAS flap leading edge asymmetry warning and a flap leading edge warning light. We notified socal approach and requested vectors so that we could work on the problem. They began vectoring us, climbed us to 5000 ft MSL and ultimately to 7000 ft MSL. We began the leading edge asymmetry checklist, and upon reviewing it and realizing that it required less than full flaps and a reference speed additive. I decided that the 5700 ft runway at sna was not a good idea. I immediately asked the first officer to contact dispatch and tell them that we needed to divert and find out if they preferred ont or lax. At this time, it was very busy in our cockpit. First officer was on the #2 radio communicating with dispatch, and I was handling the flying and ATC communications. After a few short mins, I asked first officer what was happening. First officer informed me that dispatch was attempting to patch us through to the matre controller. I asked why, and he said that they had asked him if we had contacted them yet, he told them we hadn't, and they suggested that we needed to do some kind of airborne trouble-shooting before making any diversion decisions and began trying to patch us through to them. We were on an IFR release, and though fuel wasn't an issue yet, ATC had asked again for our intentions, and in my opinion, the la basin is no place to do airborne trouble-shooting. I instructed first officer to tell them we were going to land at lax, but because they were trying to patch us through to the matre center, he could not reach them. I told first officer to forget dispatch come back into the loop and tell ATC we wanted to land at lax. We tried again later to contact dispatch, but could not get through. Ultimately, we asked lax operations to let them know we were landing there. During the time first officer had been trying to get a decision out of dispatch, ATC had issued several instructions, and first officer and I had also been communicating between us. The cockpit, as I said, was a very busy place. ATC suddenly told us to make an immediate left turn to 250 degrees. (I think.) I immediately initiated the turn, and while in the turn, we got a TCASII TA. The other aircraft, I believe another air carrier flight, had us in sight, and we did not get any TCASII RA's. We completed the turn and without further difficulty, proceeded to be vectored to a runway 25L visual landing at lax. The ATC made no big deal about the requirement for an immediate left turn, and we did not discuss the requirement for it. It is, however, very possible with all that was happening that I missed or miss set a required heading assignment from ATC. The la basin is probably one of the worst places in the world to have to make a last min destination change, run a system malfunction checklist, communicate with dispatch, airport operations, re-program the computers, ACARS, the radios get out approach plates, and so on. If I miss-set or missed a heading assignment in our very busy cockpit, it is something that will haunt me for avery long time. An 'immediate' turn request from ATC is a serious thing. I feel that our dispatch should not have tried or suggested that we talk to maintenance before making a decision to divert. My request was for them to join in my decision as to which of 2 airports to divert to, given our flap problem. The added time and confusion created by having first officer tied up on the other radio did not help. After completing the necessary checklists, we landed without incident at lax. We had not declared an emergency. Lax maintenance ultimately replaced some kind of a flap sensor control box, and we flew to sna. There are other facets and factors related to this flight, all of which influenced our workload in the cockpit, but the crux of what happened is reported herein. For what it's worth, on our preflight to leave sna, we discovered that there were 2 flap write-ups on the status page. This took an hour to work off before we could get underway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CREW HAD LEADING EDGE SLAT EICAS WARNING WHILE ON FINAL APCH FOR SNA.

Narrative: SNA WX, CLR WITH GOOD VISIBILITY AND CALM WIND. WE WERE ON AN IFR RELEASE, NO ALTERNATE. ON APCH INTO SNA, AT 3000 FT MSL AND WITHIN 15 MI OF THE ARPT WE EXTENDED FLAPS 1 AND GOT AN EICAS FLAP LEADING EDGE ASYMMETRY WARNING AND A FLAP LEADING EDGE WARNING LIGHT. WE NOTIFIED SOCAL APCH AND REQUESTED VECTORS SO THAT WE COULD WORK ON THE PROB. THEY BEGAN VECTORING US, CLBED US TO 5000 FT MSL AND ULTIMATELY TO 7000 FT MSL. WE BEGAN THE LEADING EDGE ASYMMETRY CHKLIST, AND UPON REVIEWING IT AND REALIZING THAT IT REQUIRED LESS THAN FULL FLAPS AND A REF SPD ADDITIVE. I DECIDED THAT THE 5700 FT RWY AT SNA WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA. I IMMEDIATELY ASKED THE FO TO CONTACT DISPATCH AND TELL THEM THAT WE NEEDED TO DIVERT AND FIND OUT IF THEY PREFERRED ONT OR LAX. AT THIS TIME, IT WAS VERY BUSY IN OUR COCKPIT. FO WAS ON THE #2 RADIO COMMUNICATING WITH DISPATCH, AND I WAS HANDLING THE FLYING AND ATC COMS. AFTER A FEW SHORT MINS, I ASKED FO WHAT WAS HAPPENING. FO INFORMED ME THAT DISPATCH WAS ATTEMPTING TO PATCH US THROUGH TO THE MATRE CTLR. I ASKED WHY, AND HE SAID THAT THEY HAD ASKED HIM IF WE HAD CONTACTED THEM YET, HE TOLD THEM WE HADN'T, AND THEY SUGGESTED THAT WE NEEDED TO DO SOME KIND OF AIRBORNE TROUBLE-SHOOTING BEFORE MAKING ANY DIVERSION DECISIONS AND BEGAN TRYING TO PATCH US THROUGH TO THEM. WE WERE ON AN IFR RELEASE, AND THOUGH FUEL WASN'T AN ISSUE YET, ATC HAD ASKED AGAIN FOR OUR INTENTIONS, AND IN MY OPINION, THE LA BASIN IS NO PLACE TO DO AIRBORNE TROUBLE-SHOOTING. I INSTRUCTED FO TO TELL THEM WE WERE GOING TO LAND AT LAX, BUT BECAUSE THEY WERE TRYING TO PATCH US THROUGH TO THE MATRE CTR, HE COULD NOT REACH THEM. I TOLD FO TO FORGET DISPATCH COME BACK INTO THE LOOP AND TELL ATC WE WANTED TO LAND AT LAX. WE TRIED AGAIN LATER TO CONTACT DISPATCH, BUT COULD NOT GET THROUGH. ULTIMATELY, WE ASKED LAX OPS TO LET THEM KNOW WE WERE LNDG THERE. DURING THE TIME FO HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET A DECISION OUT OF DISPATCH, ATC HAD ISSUED SEVERAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND FO AND I HAD ALSO BEEN COMMUNICATING BTWN US. THE COCKPIT, AS I SAID, WAS A VERY BUSY PLACE. ATC SUDDENLY TOLD US TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO 250 DEGS. (I THINK.) I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED THE TURN, AND WHILE IN THE TURN, WE GOT A TCASII TA. THE OTHER ACFT, I BELIEVE ANOTHER ACR FLT, HAD US IN SIGHT, AND WE DID NOT GET ANY TCASII RA'S. WE COMPLETED THE TURN AND WITHOUT FURTHER DIFFICULTY, PROCEEDED TO BE VECTORED TO A RWY 25L VISUAL LNDG AT LAX. THE ATC MADE NO BIG DEAL ABOUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMMEDIATE L TURN, AND WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE REQUIREMENT FOR IT. IT IS, HOWEVER, VERY POSSIBLE WITH ALL THAT WAS HAPPENING THAT I MISSED OR MISS SET A REQUIRED HDG ASSIGNMENT FROM ATC. THE LA BASIN IS PROBABLY ONE OF THE WORST PLACES IN THE WORLD TO HAVE TO MAKE A LAST MIN DEST CHANGE, RUN A SYS MALFUNCTION CHKLIST, COMMUNICATE WITH DISPATCH, ARPT OPS, RE-PROGRAM THE COMPUTERS, ACARS, THE RADIOS GET OUT APCH PLATES, AND SO ON. IF I MISS-SET OR MISSED A HDG ASSIGNMENT IN OUR VERY BUSY COCKPIT, IT IS SOMETHING THAT WILL HAUNT ME FOR AVERY LONG TIME. AN 'IMMEDIATE' TURN REQUEST FROM ATC IS A SERIOUS THING. I FEEL THAT OUR DISPATCH SHOULD NOT HAVE TRIED OR SUGGESTED THAT WE TALK TO MAINT BEFORE MAKING A DECISION TO DIVERT. MY REQUEST WAS FOR THEM TO JOIN IN MY DECISION AS TO WHICH OF 2 ARPTS TO DIVERT TO, GIVEN OUR FLAP PROB. THE ADDED TIME AND CONFUSION CREATED BY HAVING FO TIED UP ON THE OTHER RADIO DID NOT HELP. AFTER COMPLETING THE NECESSARY CHKLISTS, WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AT LAX. WE HAD NOT DECLARED AN EMER. LAX MAINT ULTIMATELY REPLACED SOME KIND OF A FLAP SENSOR CTL BOX, AND WE FLEW TO SNA. THERE ARE OTHER FACETS AND FACTORS RELATED TO THIS FLT, ALL OF WHICH INFLUENCED OUR WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT, BUT THE CRUX OF WHAT HAPPENED IS RPTED HEREIN. FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, ON OUR PREFLT TO LEAVE SNA, WE DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE 2 FLAP WRITE-UPS ON THE STATUS PAGE. THIS TOOK AN HR TO WORK OFF BEFORE WE COULD GET UNDERWAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.