Narrative:

After training for about 2 hours and having done 5 touch-and-go lndgs at ZZZ airport, we decided to do one more landing before returning to base. As I turned to downwind, I began the 'before landing checklist' and pulled carburetor heat and closed the cowl flaps. At this time, I interrupted the checklist to call a position report midfield downwind, and my instructor pulled back the throttle and told me to begin setting up for an emergency landing on the runway. I did not return to the checklist, but immediately began calculating distance to runway and best airspeed. While my instructor guided me, I set up on final approach and feared only to hear and feel the tail strike the ground, followed quickly by the rest of the airplane. The propeller struck several times, and the engine stopped. My instructor pulled the mixture, and I shut off the magneto switch and master switch. We saw smoke in the cockpit and evacuate/evacuationed the aircraft. I believe this situation occurred because of complacency. My previous lndgs that day had gone well, and I was in an over confident frame of mind. I interrupted my prelndg checklist to give a position report, because I wanted this approach and landing to be perfect. I missed elements of the prelndg checklist and did not rechk the gear on final as I had been taught. There was a lot to do in a short time, and instead of relying on checklists, I tried to aviate, navigation, and communication all at once, which led to items being missed. I was complacent, because I was in the role of the student, and in the past, when I had made mistakes, my instructor corrected them before they could develop into problems. The lessons I have learned from this event are that every landing is crucial, and not one is inherently routine. Checklists are the only way to make sure nothing has been missed, and, once begun, each one must be completed before the next phase of flight can proceed. Although I was the student flying with my instructor, that does not absolve me of the duty I have to be aware of my situation at all times. It is possible for 2 pilots to become distraction at the same time, and I will not forget this. Supplemental from acn 571730: as my student reached the landing gear portion of the checklist, he noticed that there was an abnormal situation (the gear did not extend) and began to trouble-shoot the situation. My student repositioned the landing gear lever, which did not fix the problem, and then noticed the landing gear circuit breaker was not 'in' as it should be and pushed it back in, which activated the landing gear hydraulic. I informed him that I planned for the simulated gear malfunction, instructed him to exit the traffic pattern to mitigate the problem. After the gear malfunction was mitigated, we returned to the traffic pattern for a normal landing. I requested that my student execute the procedure again to prove it was not just a lucky landing. I planned on simulating the engine failure after my student started the 'before landing checklist' at the point he lowered the landing gear. My student made a position report, however, at mid-field downwind, where I had expected him to lower his landing gear, and without thinking further, I simulated the failed engine. Where my student would normally be executing the 'before landing checklist,' he then had to perform the emergency checklist in addition. While supervising the emergency procedure, I was also critiquing the flight path my student was taking. He planned on making the normal rectangular pattern. I advised that he turn the aircraft directly to the end of the runway so we would not run out of usable altitude. At the same time, I had not noticed that my student had skipped half of the landing checklist, and I had not doublechked the gear extension on base and final as I had made a habit of doing. I also did not notice the audible gear warning horn that sounds when the aircraft is in the landing confign without the landing gear deployed. In my mind, complacency was at the root of the problem. I have learned that complacency can occur in any situation, but more so in a normal situation when the pilots are in a so-called 'comfort zone.' 2 experienced pilots failed to execute the landing checklist and double or triple check the gear extension. Itonly took a slight distraction for only a few seconds of 2 competent pilots that led to the unfortunate outcome of the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182RG PLTS HAVE GEAR UP LNDG AT ZZZ.

Narrative: AFTER TRAINING FOR ABOUT 2 HRS AND HAVING DONE 5 TOUCH-AND-GO LNDGS AT ZZZ ARPT, WE DECIDED TO DO ONE MORE LNDG BEFORE RETURNING TO BASE. AS I TURNED TO DOWNWIND, I BEGAN THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' AND PULLED CARB HEAT AND CLOSED THE COWL FLAPS. AT THIS TIME, I INTERRUPTED THE CHKLIST TO CALL A POS RPT MIDFIELD DOWNWIND, AND MY INSTRUCTOR PULLED BACK THE THROTTLE AND TOLD ME TO BEGIN SETTING UP FOR AN EMER LNDG ON THE RWY. I DID NOT RETURN TO THE CHKLIST, BUT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CALCULATING DISTANCE TO RWY AND BEST AIRSPD. WHILE MY INSTRUCTOR GUIDED ME, I SET UP ON FINAL APCH AND FEARED ONLY TO HEAR AND FEEL THE TAIL STRIKE THE GND, FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY THE REST OF THE AIRPLANE. THE PROP STRUCK SEVERAL TIMES, AND THE ENG STOPPED. MY INSTRUCTOR PULLED THE MIXTURE, AND I SHUT OFF THE MAGNETO SWITCH AND MASTER SWITCH. WE SAW SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND EVACED THE ACFT. I BELIEVE THIS SIT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF COMPLACENCY. MY PREVIOUS LNDGS THAT DAY HAD GONE WELL, AND I WAS IN AN OVER CONFIDENT FRAME OF MIND. I INTERRUPTED MY PRELNDG CHKLIST TO GIVE A POS RPT, BECAUSE I WANTED THIS APCH AND LNDG TO BE PERFECT. I MISSED ELEMENTS OF THE PRELNDG CHKLIST AND DID NOT RECHK THE GEAR ON FINAL AS I HAD BEEN TAUGHT. THERE WAS A LOT TO DO IN A SHORT TIME, AND INSTEAD OF RELYING ON CHKLISTS, I TRIED TO AVIATE, NAV, AND COM ALL AT ONCE, WHICH LED TO ITEMS BEING MISSED. I WAS COMPLACENT, BECAUSE I WAS IN THE ROLE OF THE STUDENT, AND IN THE PAST, WHEN I HAD MADE MISTAKES, MY INSTRUCTOR CORRECTED THEM BEFORE THEY COULD DEVELOP INTO PROBS. THE LESSONS I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT ARE THAT EVERY LNDG IS CRUCIAL, AND NOT ONE IS INHERENTLY ROUTINE. CHKLISTS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE SURE NOTHING HAS BEEN MISSED, AND, ONCE BEGUN, EACH ONE MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE NEXT PHASE OF FLT CAN PROCEED. ALTHOUGH I WAS THE STUDENT FLYING WITH MY INSTRUCTOR, THAT DOES NOT ABSOLVE ME OF THE DUTY I HAVE TO BE AWARE OF MY SIT AT ALL TIMES. IT IS POSSIBLE FOR 2 PLTS TO BECOME DISTR AT THE SAME TIME, AND I WILL NOT FORGET THIS. SUPPLEMENTAL FROM ACN 571730: AS MY STUDENT REACHED THE LNDG GEAR PORTION OF THE CHKLIST, HE NOTICED THAT THERE WAS AN ABNORMAL SIT (THE GEAR DID NOT EXTEND) AND BEGAN TO TROUBLE-SHOOT THE SIT. MY STUDENT REPOSITIONED THE LNDG GEAR LEVER, WHICH DID NOT FIX THE PROB, AND THEN NOTICED THE LNDG GEAR CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS NOT 'IN' AS IT SHOULD BE AND PUSHED IT BACK IN, WHICH ACTIVATED THE LNDG GEAR HYD. I INFORMED HIM THAT I PLANNED FOR THE SIMULATED GEAR MALFUNCTION, INSTRUCTED HIM TO EXIT THE TFC PATTERN TO MITIGATE THE PROB. AFTER THE GEAR MALFUNCTION WAS MITIGATED, WE RETURNED TO THE TFC PATTERN FOR A NORMAL LNDG. I REQUESTED THAT MY STUDENT EXECUTE THE PROC AGAIN TO PROVE IT WAS NOT JUST A LUCKY LNDG. I PLANNED ON SIMULATING THE ENG FAILURE AFTER MY STUDENT STARTED THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' AT THE POINT HE LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR. MY STUDENT MADE A POS RPT, HOWEVER, AT MID-FIELD DOWNWIND, WHERE I HAD EXPECTED HIM TO LOWER HIS LNDG GEAR, AND WITHOUT THINKING FURTHER, I SIMULATED THE FAILED ENG. WHERE MY STUDENT WOULD NORMALLY BE EXECUTING THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST,' HE THEN HAD TO PERFORM THE EMER CHKLIST IN ADDITION. WHILE SUPERVISING THE EMER PROC, I WAS ALSO CRITIQUING THE FLT PATH MY STUDENT WAS TAKING. HE PLANNED ON MAKING THE NORMAL RECTANGULAR PATTERN. I ADVISED THAT HE TURN THE ACFT DIRECTLY TO THE END OF THE RWY SO WE WOULD NOT RUN OUT OF USABLE ALT. AT THE SAME TIME, I HAD NOT NOTICED THAT MY STUDENT HAD SKIPPED HALF OF THE LNDG CHKLIST, AND I HAD NOT DOUBLECHKED THE GEAR EXTENSION ON BASE AND FINAL AS I HAD MADE A HABIT OF DOING. I ALSO DID NOT NOTICE THE AUDIBLE GEAR WARNING HORN THAT SOUNDS WHEN THE ACFT IS IN THE LNDG CONFIGN WITHOUT THE LNDG GEAR DEPLOYED. IN MY MIND, COMPLACENCY WAS AT THE ROOT OF THE PROB. I HAVE LEARNED THAT COMPLACENCY CAN OCCUR IN ANY SIT, BUT MORE SO IN A NORMAL SIT WHEN THE PLTS ARE IN A SO-CALLED 'COMFORT ZONE.' 2 EXPERIENCED PLTS FAILED TO EXECUTE THE LNDG CHKLIST AND DOUBLE OR TRIPLE CHK THE GEAR EXTENSION. ITONLY TOOK A SLIGHT DISTR FOR ONLY A FEW SECONDS OF 2 COMPETENT PLTS THAT LED TO THE UNFORTUNATE OUTCOME OF THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.