Narrative:

Report 15 mi from the airport cleared direct to the airport we were told to maintain 250 KTS. We were given a vector that put us on the right downwind for runway 2C about 1 mi outside of runway 2R. At the approach end of runway 2R, the tower gave us the option to be #3 for the center or #1 for the right. The captain chose to be #1 for the right side. Up to that point, we were still maintaining 250 KTS as assigned. The captain set the power levers to about 70% RPM and made a right turn to final. When we rolled out, we were on approximately a 4 mi final. As we rolled out, in order to continue to slow, the captain pulled the power levers to idle and deployed the spoilers. Tower advised us that there was a vehicle on the runway and that he should be clearing momentarily. Almost simultaneously, we noticed a left generator light that was on, then we noticed the left engine had gone to 10% and the turbine temperature was falling rapidly. We recognized that the left engine had flamed out. The spoilers were retracted and we lowered the gear and set flaps 20 degrees. By this time, we were approximately a 3 mi final. We advised the tower of the situation, and he asked if we were declaring an emergency. The vehicle was still on the runway, and we did not have enough time to appropriately trouble-shoot the problem, and we were in a great position to continue the landing. So, we declared an emergency, just in case there was a problem that we had overlooked and asked that the vehicle on the runway get off of the runway immediately. The vehicle cleared the runway, and we landed without further incident. In order to asses the airworthiness of the aircraft before continuing the trip, which was intended to conclude at our maintenance base ZZZ. We looked in the front and rear of the engine, saw no signs of damage, turned the compressor blades by hand with no abnormal resistance, checked the oil and found it to be exactly where it should be, and saw no leaks anywhere around the cowling. I stood outside with the lineman and a fire extinguisher, while the captain tried to start the engine. After one successful attempt by the captain to start the engine with a tailwind, we had the aircraft turned around, and the captain tried again to start the engine. It started, but the oil pressure did not respond by 20% RPM, so he shut it down and called our maintenance facility. After discussing the problem, they decided to try it again with a power cart. The engine started and responded appropriately. We concluded that the engine had just flamed out. Upon reaching ZZZ, we were on a right downwind for runway 25, the aircraft was gear up and flaps zero degrees at 76% power. He called for flaps 8 degrees, then flaps 20 degrees and gear down abeam the approach end of the runway. Once the gear was down, he proceeded to set the power to approximately 85%. The right engine responded, the left engine did not. He pushed the left throttle to the stop, it did not respond. Pulled the throttle to idle, it did not respond. He then proceeded to cut off, the engine still did not respond. We advised the tower of the situation as we were turning to final, and said that we needed to go around the pattern one more time to secure the engine, and that at that time, we would not be declaring an emergency. As we continued on the upwind, we began the engine fire in flight checklist and completed all the items by the end of the downwind leg except for firing the fire extinguisher bottles. We landed single engine and taxied in without further incident. Upon a maintenance examination the next day, the throttle cable was found to have separated from the fuel governor. The engines had been reinstalled following a hot section, and the throttle cable had not been safety wired properly. The FAA was notified, and the maintenance facility self-disclosed the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LEAR 25D ON 2 APCH PROCS HAD THE L ENG FLAME OUT, CAUSED BY THE THROTTLE CABLE DISCONNECTING FROM FUEL CTL INPUT ARM.

Narrative: RPT 15 MI FROM THE ARPT CLRED DIRECT TO THE ARPT WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR THAT PUT US ON THE R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 2C ABOUT 1 MI OUTSIDE OF RWY 2R. AT THE APCH END OF RWY 2R, THE TWR GAVE US THE OPTION TO BE #3 FOR THE CTR OR #1 FOR THE R. THE CAPT CHOSE TO BE #1 FOR THE R SIDE. UP TO THAT POINT, WE WERE STILL MAINTAINING 250 KTS AS ASSIGNED. THE CAPT SET THE PWR LEVERS TO ABOUT 70% RPM AND MADE A R TURN TO FINAL. WHEN WE ROLLED OUT, WE WERE ON APPROX A 4 MI FINAL. AS WE ROLLED OUT, IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO SLOW, THE CAPT PULLED THE PWR LEVERS TO IDLE AND DEPLOYED THE SPOILERS. TWR ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS A VEHICLE ON THE RWY AND THAT HE SHOULD BE CLRING MOMENTARILY. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE NOTICED A L GENERATOR LIGHT THAT WAS ON, THEN WE NOTICED THE L ENG HAD GONE TO 10% AND THE TURBINE TEMP WAS FALLING RAPIDLY. WE RECOGNIZED THAT THE L ENG HAD FLAMED OUT. THE SPOILERS WERE RETRACTED AND WE LOWERED THE GEAR AND SET FLAPS 20 DEGS. BY THIS TIME, WE WERE APPROX A 3 MI FINAL. WE ADVISED THE TWR OF THE SIT, AND HE ASKED IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER. THE VEHICLE WAS STILL ON THE RWY, AND WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO APPROPRIATELY TROUBLE-SHOOT THE PROB, AND WE WERE IN A GREAT POS TO CONTINUE THE LNDG. SO, WE DECLARED AN EMER, JUST IN CASE THERE WAS A PROB THAT WE HAD OVERLOOKED AND ASKED THAT THE VEHICLE ON THE RWY GET OFF OF THE RWY IMMEDIATELY. THE VEHICLE CLRED THE RWY, AND WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN ORDER TO ASSES THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ACFT BEFORE CONTINUING THE TRIP, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO CONCLUDE AT OUR MAINT BASE ZZZ. WE LOOKED IN THE FRONT AND REAR OF THE ENG, SAW NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE, TURNED THE COMPRESSOR BLADES BY HAND WITH NO ABNORMAL RESISTANCE, CHKED THE OIL AND FOUND IT TO BE EXACTLY WHERE IT SHOULD BE, AND SAW NO LEAKS ANYWHERE AROUND THE COWLING. I STOOD OUTSIDE WITH THE LINEMAN AND A FIRE EXTINGUISHER, WHILE THE CAPT TRIED TO START THE ENG. AFTER ONE SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT BY THE CAPT TO START THE ENG WITH A TAILWIND, WE HAD THE ACFT TURNED AROUND, AND THE CAPT TRIED AGAIN TO START THE ENG. IT STARTED, BUT THE OIL PRESSURE DID NOT RESPOND BY 20% RPM, SO HE SHUT IT DOWN AND CALLED OUR MAINT FACILITY. AFTER DISCUSSING THE PROB, THEY DECIDED TO TRY IT AGAIN WITH A PWR CART. THE ENG STARTED AND RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY. WE CONCLUDED THAT THE ENG HAD JUST FLAMED OUT. UPON REACHING ZZZ, WE WERE ON A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 25, THE ACFT WAS GEAR UP AND FLAPS ZERO DEGS AT 76% PWR. HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 8 DEGS, THEN FLAPS 20 DEGS AND GEAR DOWN ABEAM THE APCH END OF THE RWY. ONCE THE GEAR WAS DOWN, HE PROCEEDED TO SET THE PWR TO APPROX 85%. THE R ENG RESPONDED, THE L ENG DID NOT. HE PUSHED THE L THROTTLE TO THE STOP, IT DID NOT RESPOND. PULLED THE THROTTLE TO IDLE, IT DID NOT RESPOND. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO CUT OFF, THE ENG STILL DID NOT RESPOND. WE ADVISED THE TWR OF THE SIT AS WE WERE TURNING TO FINAL, AND SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO GO AROUND THE PATTERN ONE MORE TIME TO SECURE THE ENG, AND THAT AT THAT TIME, WE WOULD NOT BE DECLARING AN EMER. AS WE CONTINUED ON THE UPWIND, WE BEGAN THE ENG FIRE IN FLT CHKLIST AND COMPLETED ALL THE ITEMS BY THE END OF THE DOWNWIND LEG EXCEPT FOR FIRING THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER BOTTLES. WE LANDED SINGLE ENG AND TAXIED IN WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON A MAINT EXAMINATION THE NEXT DAY, THE THROTTLE CABLE WAS FOUND TO HAVE SEPARATED FROM THE FUEL GOVERNOR. THE ENGS HAD BEEN REINSTALLED FOLLOWING A HOT SECTION, AND THE THROTTLE CABLE HAD NOT BEEN SAFETY WIRED PROPERLY. THE FAA WAS NOTIFIED, AND THE MAINT FACILITY SELF-DISCLOSED THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.