Narrative:

While operating a flight into pit, I received the ATIS from pit at around 45 mi from pittsburg airport. We began our checklists and arrival preparations with an approach briefing for the ILS runway 28R. Our vectors from pit approach seemed normal and gave us no indication that we had set up for the wrong approach. We were given vectors to mmj (112.0) and then 100 degree heading and 6000 ft MSL. We were cleared down to 4000 ft MSL then heading of 190 degrees, then 250 degrees, 170 KTS, and 4000 ft until established clear for the ILS. I read back heading, speed, altitude, and 'cleared for the ILS runway 28R.' ATC corrected me for ILS runway 28L. My first officer (PF) flipped the pages on his approach plates and switched frequency. The localizer for the autoplt was already locked to runway 28R and appeared to be capturing. We set the missed approach altitude into the altitude pre-selector, which broke the altitudes mode. My first officer began a descent to recapture the GS, which appeared to be below the aircraft. The autoplt did not appear to be holding the localizer or recapturing the GS, so he made a decision to execute a missed approach. At the same time ATC instructed us to fly heading 280 degrees and climb and maintain 3000 ft. We completed the missed approach procedure and received vectors for another approach to ILS runway 28L. We rebriefed for the ILS to runway 28L, and upon reading the frequency, he realized that he had put in the frequency for the ILS to runway 32 on the previous approach. This caused the localizer to appear unreliably left of course, and the GS lower than the aircraft. We completed the next approach normally and landed at pit. We called the TRACON supervisor. We were told that no paperwork or information was needed from us. As I reflect on this event, I realized that as a crew, several times during this event we could have changed the outcome by making a wiser decision, such as, requesting a delayed vector so we had more time to follow appropriate procedures, like fully briefing the approach. Apparently, we allowed ourselves to be rushed, therefore, we seriously erred by dialing in the wrong frequency and flying the wrong approach. Even though I was not the PF, as the captain, I realized that ultimately, it is my responsibility. I have learned a great lesson. Supplemental information from acn 573927: we realized that in our efforts to expedite a failed approach attempt, we had put in the wrong frequency for the ILS. Looking back on the flight as well as the chain of events that led to the resulting lower than safe altitudes that the aircraft had reached, there were several points along the route, that could and should have led us to different actions as a crew. I feel that as the PF, I should have recognized the situation, and requested delay vectors from ATC.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DSCNT BELOW SAFE ALT AND A MISSED APCH PERFORMED BY A SF340 FO AFTER REALIZING THAT ACFT WAS BELOW THE CORRECT ALT AFTER A LAST MIN CHANGE IN APCH TO RWY 28L AT PIT, PA.

Narrative: WHILE OPERATING A FLT INTO PIT, I RECEIVED THE ATIS FROM PIT AT AROUND 45 MI FROM PITTSBURG ARPT. WE BEGAN OUR CHKLISTS AND ARR PREPARATIONS WITH AN APCH BRIEFING FOR THE ILS RWY 28R. OUR VECTORS FROM PIT APCH SEEMED NORMAL AND GAVE US NO INDICATION THAT WE HAD SET UP FOR THE WRONG APCH. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO MMJ (112.0) AND THEN 100 DEG HDG AND 6000 FT MSL. WE WERE CLRED DOWN TO 4000 FT MSL THEN HDG OF 190 DEGS, THEN 250 DEGS, 170 KTS, AND 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED CLR FOR THE ILS. I READ BACK HDG, SPD, ALT, AND 'CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 28R.' ATC CORRECTED ME FOR ILS RWY 28L. MY FO (PF) FLIPPED THE PAGES ON HIS APCH PLATES AND SWITCHED FREQ. THE LOC FOR THE AUTOPLT WAS ALREADY LOCKED TO RWY 28R AND APPEARED TO BE CAPTURING. WE SET THE MISSED APCH ALT INTO THE ALT PRE-SELECTOR, WHICH BROKE THE ALTS MODE. MY FO BEGAN A DSCNT TO RECAPTURE THE GS, WHICH APPEARED TO BE BELOW THE ACFT. THE AUTOPLT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE HOLDING THE LOC OR RECAPTURING THE GS, SO HE MADE A DECISION TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. AT THE SAME TIME ATC INSTRUCTED US TO FLY HDG 280 DEGS AND CLB AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. WE COMPLETED THE MISSED APCH PROC AND RECEIVED VECTORS FOR ANOTHER APCH TO ILS RWY 28L. WE REBRIEFED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 28L, AND UPON READING THE FREQ, HE REALIZED THAT HE HAD PUT IN THE FREQ FOR THE ILS TO RWY 32 ON THE PREVIOUS APCH. THIS CAUSED THE LOC TO APPEAR UNRELIABLY L OF COURSE, AND THE GS LOWER THAN THE ACFT. WE COMPLETED THE NEXT APCH NORMALLY AND LANDED AT PIT. WE CALLED THE TRACON SUPVR. WE WERE TOLD THAT NO PAPERWORK OR INFO WAS NEEDED FROM US. AS I REFLECT ON THIS EVENT, I REALIZED THAT AS A CREW, SEVERAL TIMES DURING THIS EVENT WE COULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME BY MAKING A WISER DECISION, SUCH AS, REQUESTING A DELAYED VECTOR SO WE HAD MORE TIME TO FOLLOW APPROPRIATE PROCS, LIKE FULLY BRIEFING THE APCH. APPARENTLY, WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BE RUSHED, THEREFORE, WE SERIOUSLY ERRED BY DIALING IN THE WRONG FREQ AND FLYING THE WRONG APCH. EVEN THOUGH I WAS NOT THE PF, AS THE CAPT, I REALIZED THAT ULTIMATELY, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY. I HAVE LEARNED A GREAT LESSON. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 573927: WE REALIZED THAT IN OUR EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE A FAILED APCH ATTEMPT, WE HAD PUT IN THE WRONG FREQ FOR THE ILS. LOOKING BACK ON THE FLT AS WELL AS THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE RESULTING LOWER THAN SAFE ALTS THAT THE ACFT HAD REACHED, THERE WERE SEVERAL POINTS ALONG THE RTE, THAT COULD AND SHOULD HAVE LED US TO DIFFERENT ACTIONS AS A CREW. I FEEL THAT AS THE PF, I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE SIT, AND REQUESTED DELAY VECTORS FROM ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.