Narrative:

On the morning of feb/wed/03, I was preparing to depart dec on an IFR flight plan to ZZZ. The tower had just opened for operations at XA00, about half an hour before my flight began. After I started the engine, I listened and copied down the ATIS and called ground to pick up my IFR clearance. At approximately XA27, I contacted ground for taxi instructions, and was told to taxi to runway 36. I acknowledged, and started to taxi to runway 36, and started to take off. I had not received a clearance to taxi onto the runway or to take off. As soon as I added power, I heard the ground controller call me first on the ground frequency and then on the tower frequency. As soon as I heard this, I realized what I had done, and immediately reduced power to idle, and applied heavy braking. I apologized to the controller, there was no traffic conflict, and the controller advised me to 'position and hold on runway 36.' moments later, I was cleared for takeoff and departed without further incident. I believe there were many contributing factors that led to the described incident. 1) I was in a hurry, because the flight was already running over an hour late. 2) I was tired and didn't sleep well the night before. 3) the morning before, I had flown into the same airport when the tower was closed. I may have gotten confused as to whether this airport was controled or uncontrolled. 4) the design of the airport may have also contributed to the runway incursion. The departure ends of runway 36 and runway 6 meet to form a 'V.' as you taxi out from the south cargo ramp at dec to runway 36, it is somewhat difficult to see where runway 36 begins. Corrective actions that may help prevent a similar incident from occurring again are: 1) on the ATIS, there should be a remark something to the effect of 'IFR departures contact clearance on 123.45, VFR departures contact ground on 132.45, etc...' this may have triggered me to remember that this is a controled airport. 2) flashing yellow hold short lights positioned at the hold short line may have alerted me to hold short of the runway. These are more visible than the painted lines on the pavement, especially when there is little light. 3) if the ground controller had told me to 'taxi and hold short of runway 36,' instead of simply 'taxi to runway 36,' and if I read back 'taxi and hold short,' I may have remembered to stop short of the runway and call the tower. And finally, 4) if I hadn't had such a severe case of cranial rectumitis that morning, I may have never done such a stupid thing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C208 PLT ENTERED RWY AND BEGAN TKOF WITHOUT CLRNC AT DEC.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF FEB/WED/03, I WAS PREPARING TO DEPART DEC ON AN IFR FLT PLAN TO ZZZ. THE TWR HAD JUST OPENED FOR OPS AT XA00, ABOUT HALF AN HR BEFORE MY FLT BEGAN. AFTER I STARTED THE ENG, I LISTENED AND COPIED DOWN THE ATIS AND CALLED GND TO PICK UP MY IFR CLRNC. AT APPROX XA27, I CONTACTED GND FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, AND WAS TOLD TO TAXI TO RWY 36. I ACKNOWLEDGED, AND STARTED TO TAXI TO RWY 36, AND STARTED TO TAKE OFF. I HAD NOT RECEIVED A CLRNC TO TAXI ONTO THE RWY OR TO TAKE OFF. AS SOON AS I ADDED PWR, I HEARD THE GND CTLR CALL ME FIRST ON THE GND FREQ AND THEN ON THE TWR FREQ. AS SOON AS I HEARD THIS, I REALIZED WHAT I HAD DONE, AND IMMEDIATELY REDUCED PWR TO IDLE, AND APPLIED HVY BRAKING. I APOLOGIZED TO THE CTLR, THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT, AND THE CTLR ADVISED ME TO 'POS AND HOLD ON RWY 36.' MOMENTS LATER, I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND DEPARTED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THERE WERE MANY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT LED TO THE DESCRIBED INCIDENT. 1) I WAS IN A HURRY, BECAUSE THE FLT WAS ALREADY RUNNING OVER AN HR LATE. 2) I WAS TIRED AND DIDN'T SLEEP WELL THE NIGHT BEFORE. 3) THE MORNING BEFORE, I HAD FLOWN INTO THE SAME ARPT WHEN THE TWR WAS CLOSED. I MAY HAVE GOTTEN CONFUSED AS TO WHETHER THIS ARPT WAS CTLED OR UNCTLED. 4) THE DESIGN OF THE ARPT MAY HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE RWY INCURSION. THE DEP ENDS OF RWY 36 AND RWY 6 MEET TO FORM A 'V.' AS YOU TAXI OUT FROM THE S CARGO RAMP AT DEC TO RWY 36, IT IS SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT TO SEE WHERE RWY 36 BEGINS. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS THAT MAY HELP PREVENT A SIMILAR INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN ARE: 1) ON THE ATIS, THERE SHOULD BE A REMARK SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'IFR DEPS CONTACT CLRNC ON 123.45, VFR DEPS CONTACT GND ON 132.45, ETC...' THIS MAY HAVE TRIGGERED ME TO REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CTLED ARPT. 2) FLASHING YELLOW HOLD SHORT LIGHTS POSITIONED AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE MAY HAVE ALERTED ME TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. THESE ARE MORE VISIBLE THAN THE PAINTED LINES ON THE PAVEMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS LITTLE LIGHT. 3) IF THE GND CTLR HAD TOLD ME TO 'TAXI AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 36,' INSTEAD OF SIMPLY 'TAXI TO RWY 36,' AND IF I READ BACK 'TAXI AND HOLD SHORT,' I MAY HAVE REMEMBERED TO STOP SHORT OF THE RWY AND CALL THE TWR. AND FINALLY, 4) IF I HADN'T HAD SUCH A SEVERE CASE OF CRANIAL RECTUMITIS THAT MORNING, I MAY HAVE NEVER DONE SUCH A STUPID THING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.