Narrative:

On climb out from a departure from the ont airport, we were vectored off the assigned published departure, for an undisclosed reason. After flying the assigned heading for approximately 5 mins, we were cleared direct a fix not on our filed route. The unfiled fix we were then directed to was the las vegas VOR. I asked the first officer what the 3 letter identify for the fix was, and he replied that it was lvs. I remember the controller saying las vegas, nv, and asked the first officer to verify the 3 letter identify, and he again replied it was lvs. I entered the identify in the FMS and the FMS said las vegas. I then pressed 'accept.' the command bars commanded a slight right turn from our previously assigned vector which appeared to correspond to direction of flight for our intended destination. With these context clues all adding up, I did not suspect or perceive any problem. A few mins later, the controller requested an approximately 50 degree left turn, to which I complied. The controller asked if we were proceeding direct daggett VOR (previously assigned departure procedure route). The first officer replied, 'negative, we were cleared direct las vegas.' the controller responded, 'you must have been proceeding direct las vegas, NM.' to which the startled first officer replied, 'we were proceeding direct lvs as requested.' the controller said then, 'please fly direct l-a-south, las vegas, nv' to which the first officer replied 'direct l-a-south, las vegas, nv.' the first officer then remarked to the controller, 'I thought you had cleared us direct lvs' and apologized for the confusion. The controller then said 'it was las vegas, nv...just be a little more careful next time.' the tone of communication was conciliatory by both parties. Procedural factors that led to this dysfunction: there are 2 high altitude vors named 'las vegas.' the controller did not issue the 'left-a-south' 3 letter identify, and the first officer did not read back a 3 letter identify to verify the assigned fix. Human factors that led to this dysfunction: I was hand flying the aircraft and was unable to verify the 3 letter identify the first officer supplied me with on the en route chart. Over dependence on the automation of the FMS caused a false sense of security. The first officer and I thoroughly discussed the scenario at altitude during the remainder of our trip to our destination. We discussed the factors that led to this scenario, and feel confident a situation such as this will certainly not happen to us again. While we feel confident this would not happen to us again, I believe that having 2 high altitude VOR's with the same name creates an unnecessary potential for future problems for other flight crew's. Human factors played in on both our part and the controller's part for this dysfunction to have occurred -- there is no doubt about it. But had there not been 2 VOR's with the same name, this would have never happened. I would hope that the FAA would consider renaming one of those VOR's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV OCCURS AFTER THE PIC OF A CPR FA20 ACCEPTS A REVISED RTE CLRNC, INPUTTING THE FO'S SUGGESTION OF LVS, NM, INTO THE VMC VERSUS LAS, NV.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM A DEP FROM THE ONT ARPT, WE WERE VECTORED OFF THE ASSIGNED PUBLISHED DEP, FOR AN UNDISCLOSED REASON. AFTER FLYING THE ASSIGNED HDG FOR APPROX 5 MINS, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT A FIX NOT ON OUR FILED RTE. THE UNFILED FIX WE WERE THEN DIRECTED TO WAS THE LAS VEGAS VOR. I ASKED THE FO WHAT THE 3 LETTER IDENT FOR THE FIX WAS, AND HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS LVS. I REMEMBER THE CTLR SAYING LAS VEGAS, NV, AND ASKED THE FO TO VERIFY THE 3 LETTER IDENT, AND HE AGAIN REPLIED IT WAS LVS. I ENTERED THE IDENT IN THE FMS AND THE FMS SAID LAS VEGAS. I THEN PRESSED 'ACCEPT.' THE COMMAND BARS COMMANDED A SLIGHT R TURN FROM OUR PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED VECTOR WHICH APPEARED TO CORRESPOND TO DIRECTION OF FLT FOR OUR INTENDED DEST. WITH THESE CONTEXT CLUES ALL ADDING UP, I DID NOT SUSPECT OR PERCEIVE ANY PROB. A FEW MINS LATER, THE CTLR REQUESTED AN APPROX 50 DEG L TURN, TO WHICH I COMPLIED. THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT DAGGETT VOR (PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED DEP PROC RTE). THE FO REPLIED, 'NEGATIVE, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT LAS VEGAS.' THE CTLR RESPONDED, 'YOU MUST HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING DIRECT LAS VEGAS, NM.' TO WHICH THE STARTLED FO REPLIED, 'WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT LVS AS REQUESTED.' THE CTLR SAID THEN, 'PLEASE FLY DIRECT L-A-S, LAS VEGAS, NV' TO WHICH THE FO REPLIED 'DIRECT L-A-S, LAS VEGAS, NV.' THE FO THEN REMARKED TO THE CTLR, 'I THOUGHT YOU HAD CLRED US DIRECT LVS' AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION. THE CTLR THEN SAID 'IT WAS LAS VEGAS, NV...JUST BE A LITTLE MORE CAREFUL NEXT TIME.' THE TONE OF COM WAS CONCILIATORY BY BOTH PARTIES. PROCEDURAL FACTORS THAT LED TO THIS DYSFUNCTION: THERE ARE 2 HIGH ALT VORS NAMED 'LAS VEGAS.' THE CTLR DID NOT ISSUE THE 'L-A-S' 3 LETTER IDENT, AND THE FO DID NOT READ BACK A 3 LETTER IDENT TO VERIFY THE ASSIGNED FIX. HUMAN FACTORS THAT LED TO THIS DYSFUNCTION: I WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT AND WAS UNABLE TO VERIFY THE 3 LETTER IDENT THE FO SUPPLIED ME WITH ON THE ENRTE CHART. OVER DEPENDENCE ON THE AUTOMATION OF THE FMS CAUSED A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. THE FO AND I THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED THE SCENARIO AT ALT DURING THE REMAINDER OF OUR TRIP TO OUR DEST. WE DISCUSSED THE FACTORS THAT LED TO THIS SCENARIO, AND FEEL CONFIDENT A SIT SUCH AS THIS WILL CERTAINLY NOT HAPPEN TO US AGAIN. WHILE WE FEEL CONFIDENT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN TO US AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT HAVING 2 HIGH ALT VOR'S WITH THE SAME NAME CREATES AN UNNECESSARY POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE PROBS FOR OTHER FLC'S. HUMAN FACTORS PLAYED IN ON BOTH OUR PART AND THE CTLR'S PART FOR THIS DYSFUNCTION TO HAVE OCCURRED -- THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. BUT HAD THERE NOT BEEN 2 VOR'S WITH THE SAME NAME, THIS WOULD HAVE NEVER HAPPENED. I WOULD HOPE THAT THE FAA WOULD CONSIDER RENAMING ONE OF THOSE VOR'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.