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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 590952 |
Time | |
Date | 200308 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-500 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other |
Qualification | technician : powerplant technician : airframe |
ASRS Report | 590952 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : #2 aff system inoperative other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure contributing factor : non availability of parts performance deficiency : installation performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
During the preflight for aircraft X, the flight crew was resetting the standby 'att' dc yellow cap circuit breaker when the circuit breaker stem broke. We did not have a circuit breaker locally available, and it was decided that we would rob a circuit breaker from the aircraft and 'DF/cf' the inoperative system. It was determined by another controller to rob the #2 ADF dc circuit breaker, as he thought that was the deactivated ADF system on the aircraft, and would have no impact on the operation. When I talked with the mechanic, I didn't question which circuit breaker was used, and carried forward the item to have the #2 ADF circuit breaker replaced at the first available opportunity. It was later discovered that te #2 ADF is the operable ADF, and I should have deferred the #2 ADF per the MEL.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-500 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH #2 ADF SYS INOP DUE TO ROBBING THE CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR ANOTHER SYS.
Narrative: DURING THE PREFLT FOR ACFT X, THE FLT CREW WAS RESETTING THE STANDBY 'ATT' DC YELLOW CAP CIRCUIT BREAKER WHEN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER STEM BROKE. WE DID NOT HAVE A CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCALLY AVAILABLE, AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT WE WOULD ROB A CIRCUIT BREAKER FROM THE ACFT AND 'DF/CF' THE INOP SYS. IT WAS DETERMINED BY ANOTHER CTLR TO ROB THE #2 ADF DC CIRCUIT BREAKER, AS HE THOUGHT THAT WAS THE DEACTIVATED ADF SYS ON THE ACFT, AND WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE OP. WHEN I TALKED WITH THE MECH, I DIDN'T QUESTION WHICH CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS USED, AND CARRIED FORWARD THE ITEM TO HAVE THE #2 ADF CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACED AT THE FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY. IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT TE #2 ADF IS THE OPERABLE ADF, AND I SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED THE #2 ADF PER THE MEL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.