Narrative:

I was coerced into flying a transport category aircraft beyond a 16 hour duty day, with inoperative equipment into severe WX conditions. Though I was too fatigued to safely fly, I was pressured by my captain into repositioning the aircraft under part 91 operations. We had flown 4 legs already, with long 'situation' periods between flts, for a total of 5.8 hours. I had flown 23.2 hours thus far over the course of the 4 days. Between legs 4 and 5, we were scheduled to situation in burlington, vt (bvt), when we arrived and turned our airplane over to an outbound crew, that evening, when we would depart for ZZZ. There are no crew rest facilities in bvt, so the crew is expected to wander the airport with their bags for over 2 1/2 hours. Informed the captain that we would have to take off no later than XA30 local to arrive in ZZZ and remain legal for part 121 operations. At XC00 local, ATC informed us of an additional 1 hour ground stop. Dispatch was notified, and the flight was cancelled. Dispatch told us that we were to wait out the ground stop, and fly the aircraft to ZZZ under a part 91 repositioning flight. I agreed to take a nap in the back of the aircraft while a decision was made with dispatch (they were scrambling themselves due to the WX). Once a decision was made, we would discuss our options as a crew (go/no-G0) and act accordingly. I was awakened shortly thereafter, to be told that we were going to launch for ZZZ. At this point, the boarding stairs had been pulled, the ground crew was signaling for engine start, the clearance had been received and the paperwork completed. Still groggy, I once again voiced my concerns of fatigue to the captain, who was anxious to get going. Under pressure from him and the flight attendant (it's ok, I had a nap, I feel fine, I'll do everything, you just situation there and work the radios), I reluctantly agreed to go. On the taxi out, it was clear that the captain had neglected even his normal preflight duties, as both the v-spds and the FMS had not been programmed (captain duties, both). Furthermore, the captain was confused on the route of taxi (I had to direct his taxi) -- it was clear that I would be doing much more than sitting and working the radios. We departed for ZZZ, a scheduled 1 hour 31 min flight, 15 hours and 10 mins into our duty day. We launched with an inoperative thrust reverser, into sensitive airspace at night and into an area of severe thunderstorms. I brought up the accident in little rock on the taxi out, and got a dirty look. En route, the captain removed his headset and read the paper, it is too noisy to talk in the erj cockpits without headphones, so we did not talk. I drank coffee and concentrated on staying alert and monitoring the aircraft. The captain missed a descent clearance, which I caught before ATC did. We arrived in ZZZ without talking beyond the recitation of checklists, without incident. On arrival, there was no place to park, so we waited on the ramp. The captain's flight home, which we had clearly been pushing to make, left without him. When we finally shut the aircraft down, we had been on duty for 17 hours and 40 mins, and I was exhausted. Though the flight arrived uneventfully, I believe that the operation was unsafe. Some contributing factors: 1) the captain has a history of altercations with the chief pilot, and had been demoted to first officer for an extended period due to a serious operational error. He is scared of the chief pilot. 2) the captain is procedurally sloppy (I had been warned about him by other capts) and easily distraction, particularly when he is hungry, when food takes complete precedence -- even in-flight. His inattention to the aircraft and his duties increases the load on his crew. 3) the office of the chief pilot at this airline rules by intimidation. Pilots exercising prudent judgement (precautionary lndgs for fuel leaks and cargo doors opening after takeoff) are routinely harassed by the chief pilot, and can expect a disciplinary meeting at headquarters. At this meeting, they can expect a hostile reception, and will be provoked into a verbal altercation. If they take the bait and argue, they can expect to be dismissed immediately on the grounds of insubordination. People areflying tired and they are likely to continue doing so until someone in corporate or in the FAA wakes up and realizes that being legal is not the same thing as being safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO TELLS OF OVER SCHEDULING OF FLT CREWS AT HIS ACR. IF PART 121 IS TO BE EXCEEDED, THE COMPANY GOES TO A REPOSITION OR FERRY OP UNDER PART 91.

Narrative: I WAS COERCED INTO FLYING A TRANSPORT CATEGORY ACFT BEYOND A 16 HR DUTY DAY, WITH INOP EQUIP INTO SEVERE WX CONDITIONS. THOUGH I WAS TOO FATIGUED TO SAFELY FLY, I WAS PRESSURED BY MY CAPT INTO REPOSITIONING THE ACFT UNDER PART 91 OPS. WE HAD FLOWN 4 LEGS ALREADY, WITH LONG 'SIT' PERIODS BTWN FLTS, FOR A TOTAL OF 5.8 HRS. I HAD FLOWN 23.2 HRS THUS FAR OVER THE COURSE OF THE 4 DAYS. BTWN LEGS 4 AND 5, WE WERE SCHEDULED TO SIT IN BURLINGTON, VT (BVT), WHEN WE ARRIVED AND TURNED OUR AIRPLANE OVER TO AN OUTBOUND CREW, THAT EVENING, WHEN WE WOULD DEPART FOR ZZZ. THERE ARE NO CREW REST FACILITIES IN BVT, SO THE CREW IS EXPECTED TO WANDER THE ARPT WITH THEIR BAGS FOR OVER 2 1/2 HRS. INFORMED THE CAPT THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OFF NO LATER THAN XA30 LCL TO ARRIVE IN ZZZ AND REMAIN LEGAL FOR PART 121 OPS. AT XC00 LCL, ATC INFORMED US OF AN ADDITIONAL 1 HR GND STOP. DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED, AND THE FLT WAS CANCELLED. DISPATCH TOLD US THAT WE WERE TO WAIT OUT THE GND STOP, AND FLY THE ACFT TO ZZZ UNDER A PART 91 REPOSITIONING FLT. I AGREED TO TAKE A NAP IN THE BACK OF THE ACFT WHILE A DECISION WAS MADE WITH DISPATCH (THEY WERE SCRAMBLING THEMSELVES DUE TO THE WX). ONCE A DECISION WAS MADE, WE WOULD DISCUSS OUR OPTIONS AS A CREW (GO/NO-G0) AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. I WAS AWAKENED SHORTLY THEREAFTER, TO BE TOLD THAT WE WERE GOING TO LAUNCH FOR ZZZ. AT THIS POINT, THE BOARDING STAIRS HAD BEEN PULLED, THE GND CREW WAS SIGNALING FOR ENG START, THE CLRNC HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND THE PAPERWORK COMPLETED. STILL GROGGY, I ONCE AGAIN VOICED MY CONCERNS OF FATIGUE TO THE CAPT, WHO WAS ANXIOUS TO GET GOING. UNDER PRESSURE FROM HIM AND THE FLT ATTENDANT (IT'S OK, I HAD A NAP, I FEEL FINE, I'LL DO EVERYTHING, YOU JUST SIT THERE AND WORK THE RADIOS), I RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GO. ON THE TAXI OUT, IT WAS CLR THAT THE CAPT HAD NEGLECTED EVEN HIS NORMAL PREFLT DUTIES, AS BOTH THE V-SPDS AND THE FMS HAD NOT BEEN PROGRAMMED (CAPT DUTIES, BOTH). FURTHERMORE, THE CAPT WAS CONFUSED ON THE RTE OF TAXI (I HAD TO DIRECT HIS TAXI) -- IT WAS CLR THAT I WOULD BE DOING MUCH MORE THAN SITTING AND WORKING THE RADIOS. WE DEPARTED FOR ZZZ, A SCHEDULED 1 HR 31 MIN FLT, 15 HRS AND 10 MINS INTO OUR DUTY DAY. WE LAUNCHED WITH AN INOP THRUST REVERSER, INTO SENSITIVE AIRSPACE AT NIGHT AND INTO AN AREA OF SEVERE TSTMS. I BROUGHT UP THE ACCIDENT IN LITTLE ROCK ON THE TAXI OUT, AND GOT A DIRTY LOOK. ENRTE, THE CAPT REMOVED HIS HEADSET AND READ THE PAPER, IT IS TOO NOISY TO TALK IN THE ERJ COCKPITS WITHOUT HEADPHONES, SO WE DID NOT TALK. I DRANK COFFEE AND CONCENTRATED ON STAYING ALERT AND MONITORING THE ACFT. THE CAPT MISSED A DSCNT CLRNC, WHICH I CAUGHT BEFORE ATC DID. WE ARRIVED IN ZZZ WITHOUT TALKING BEYOND THE RECITATION OF CHKLISTS, WITHOUT INCIDENT. ON ARR, THERE WAS NO PLACE TO PARK, SO WE WAITED ON THE RAMP. THE CAPT'S FLT HOME, WHICH WE HAD CLRLY BEEN PUSHING TO MAKE, LEFT WITHOUT HIM. WHEN WE FINALLY SHUT THE ACFT DOWN, WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR 17 HRS AND 40 MINS, AND I WAS EXHAUSTED. THOUGH THE FLT ARRIVED UNEVENTFULLY, I BELIEVE THAT THE OP WAS UNSAFE. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE CAPT HAS A HISTORY OF ALTERCATIONS WITH THE CHIEF PLT, AND HAD BEEN DEMOTED TO FO FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD DUE TO A SERIOUS OPERROR. HE IS SCARED OF THE CHIEF PLT. 2) THE CAPT IS PROCEDURALLY SLOPPY (I HAD BEEN WARNED ABOUT HIM BY OTHER CAPTS) AND EASILY DISTR, PARTICULARLY WHEN HE IS HUNGRY, WHEN FOOD TAKES COMPLETE PRECEDENCE -- EVEN INFLT. HIS INATTENTION TO THE ACFT AND HIS DUTIES INCREASES THE LOAD ON HIS CREW. 3) THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PLT AT THIS AIRLINE RULES BY INTIMIDATION. PLTS EXERCISING PRUDENT JUDGEMENT (PRECAUTIONARY LNDGS FOR FUEL LEAKS AND CARGO DOORS OPENING AFTER TKOF) ARE ROUTINELY HARASSED BY THE CHIEF PLT, AND CAN EXPECT A DISCIPLINARY MEETING AT HEADQUARTERS. AT THIS MEETING, THEY CAN EXPECT A HOSTILE RECEPTION, AND WILL BE PROVOKED INTO A VERBAL ALTERCATION. IF THEY TAKE THE BAIT AND ARGUE, THEY CAN EXPECT TO BE DISMISSED IMMEDIATELY ON THE GNDS OF INSUBORDINATION. PEOPLE AREFLYING TIRED AND THEY ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE DOING SO UNTIL SOMEONE IN CORPORATE OR IN THE FAA WAKES UP AND REALIZES THAT BEING LEGAL IS NOT THE SAME THING AS BEING SAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.