Narrative:

WX extended from west of sps to mlc. I was working sps high altitude sector (ZFW sector 47), dfw arrival sector. Numerous aircraft were deviating through and around the WX and needed routing changes. Aircraft from the north landing iah had been routed through the west half of my sector and into west texas. Dfw departures to northwest united states destinations normally routed through my sector had been routed around it, however, iah departures were still coming that way. Dfw departures with destinations to the north departed west and came through my sector, looking to cut mileage off their rertes. When I was able to give these shortcuts, it required changing them from wbound to eastbound altitudes. Dfw arrs from turki-high (ZFW sector 93) had been rted to jen, but I was getting several dfw arrs from points north and from amarillo high (ZAB sectors 97 and 98). Aircraft #2 checked on with concerns about fuel on his lengthy routing to houston. We were allowed to give him a routing over millsap (mqp) and I did so with a climb to FL330 and clearance to deviate for WX. Even though all dfw traffic from sector 93 had been rted south, sector 93 gave me aircraft #1 landing ads. An E135 had departed okc, destination iah. Instead of being rted to west texas, with other iah traffic, he was allowed to depart south and was a slow clber around sps, sbound through the WX. I wanted to get aircraft #1 below aircraft #2 because the sbound aircraft over sps and several aircraft from the southeast were going to hinder aircraft #1 descent into ads. I asked aircraft #1 to turn 10 degrees right and descend to FL290. He asked if he could delay his descent 4 mins. I told him it was now or in 10 mins. He said he would turn and start his descent. My attention was taken to another situation in my sector and when I finished, conflict alert had activated. Aircraft #2 coming upon an area of WX had turned hard right. Aircraft #1 had only gone down 1700 ft in the 2 1/2 mins since taking his clearance. I issued traffic to aircraft #1 and told him to expedite through FL310. I issued traffic to and attempted to turn aircraft #2 but he was unable due to WX. I turned aircraft #1 30 degrees right and then to a 170 degree heading. Separation was lost, getting as close as 3.8 mi and 500 ft. Contributing factors: 1) WX. 2) excessive rertes for WX caused fuel concerns. 3) aircraft allowed to get where they shouldn't be (didn't get rertes others were getting). Human performance: I had spent 30-45 mins working the handoff position for this sector before taking the radar position. I had watched the previous controller fail to start arrs down in a timely manner which had caused problems for the receiving controller. I had made a mental note to get arrs down early. I knew I must force aircraft #2 below aircraft #1 because of their slow converging and subsequent diverging. I knew with the 10 degree right turn I would still have convergence, but in 4 mins I should still have about 8 mi lateral and could take more action if necessary. I mistakenly thought I needed 4000 ft to get aircraft #2 below aircraft #1 instead of 6000 ft. The slow descent by aircraft #2 and the hard turn by aircraft #1 to avoid WX led to the deterioration of the situation. Both actions were predictable. I should have limited the deviations of aircraft #1 and given aircraft #2 a time to be below FL310.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZFW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL330 DURING WX RERTES AND DEVS.

Narrative: WX EXTENDED FROM W OF SPS TO MLC. I WAS WORKING SPS HIGH ALT SECTOR (ZFW SECTOR 47), DFW ARR SECTOR. NUMEROUS ACFT WERE DEVIATING THROUGH AND AROUND THE WX AND NEEDED ROUTING CHANGES. ACFT FROM THE N LNDG IAH HAD BEEN ROUTED THROUGH THE W HALF OF MY SECTOR AND INTO WEST TEXAS. DFW DEPS TO NW UNITED STATES DESTS NORMALLY ROUTED THROUGH MY SECTOR HAD BEEN ROUTED AROUND IT, HOWEVER, IAH DEPS WERE STILL COMING THAT WAY. DFW DEPS WITH DESTS TO THE N DEPARTED W AND CAME THROUGH MY SECTOR, LOOKING TO CUT MILEAGE OFF THEIR RERTES. WHEN I WAS ABLE TO GIVE THESE SHORTCUTS, IT REQUIRED CHANGING THEM FROM WBOUND TO EBOUND ALTS. DFW ARRS FROM TURKI-HIGH (ZFW SECTOR 93) HAD BEEN RTED TO JEN, BUT I WAS GETTING SEVERAL DFW ARRS FROM POINTS N AND FROM AMARILLO HIGH (ZAB SECTORS 97 AND 98). ACFT #2 CHKED ON WITH CONCERNS ABOUT FUEL ON HIS LENGTHY ROUTING TO HOUSTON. WE WERE ALLOWED TO GIVE HIM A ROUTING OVER MILLSAP (MQP) AND I DID SO WITH A CLB TO FL330 AND CLRNC TO DEVIATE FOR WX. EVEN THOUGH ALL DFW TFC FROM SECTOR 93 HAD BEEN RTED S, SECTOR 93 GAVE ME ACFT #1 LNDG ADS. AN E135 HAD DEPARTED OKC, DEST IAH. INSTEAD OF BEING RTED TO WEST TEXAS, WITH OTHER IAH TFC, HE WAS ALLOWED TO DEPART S AND WAS A SLOW CLBER AROUND SPS, SBOUND THROUGH THE WX. I WANTED TO GET ACFT #1 BELOW ACFT #2 BECAUSE THE SBOUND ACFT OVER SPS AND SEVERAL ACFT FROM THE SE WERE GOING TO HINDER ACFT #1 DSCNT INTO ADS. I ASKED ACFT #1 TO TURN 10 DEGS R AND DSND TO FL290. HE ASKED IF HE COULD DELAY HIS DSCNT 4 MINS. I TOLD HIM IT WAS NOW OR IN 10 MINS. HE SAID HE WOULD TURN AND START HIS DSCNT. MY ATTN WAS TAKEN TO ANOTHER SIT IN MY SECTOR AND WHEN I FINISHED, CONFLICT ALERT HAD ACTIVATED. ACFT #2 COMING UPON AN AREA OF WX HAD TURNED HARD R. ACFT #1 HAD ONLY GONE DOWN 1700 FT IN THE 2 1/2 MINS SINCE TAKING HIS CLRNC. I ISSUED TFC TO ACFT #1 AND TOLD HIM TO EXPEDITE THROUGH FL310. I ISSUED TFC TO AND ATTEMPTED TO TURN ACFT #2 BUT HE WAS UNABLE DUE TO WX. I TURNED ACFT #1 30 DEGS R AND THEN TO A 170 DEG HDG. SEPARATION WAS LOST, GETTING AS CLOSE AS 3.8 MI AND 500 FT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WX. 2) EXCESSIVE RERTES FOR WX CAUSED FUEL CONCERNS. 3) ACFT ALLOWED TO GET WHERE THEY SHOULDN'T BE (DIDN'T GET RERTES OTHERS WERE GETTING). HUMAN PERFORMANCE: I HAD SPENT 30-45 MINS WORKING THE HDOF POS FOR THIS SECTOR BEFORE TAKING THE RADAR POS. I HAD WATCHED THE PREVIOUS CTLR FAIL TO START ARRS DOWN IN A TIMELY MANNER WHICH HAD CAUSED PROBS FOR THE RECEIVING CTLR. I HAD MADE A MENTAL NOTE TO GET ARRS DOWN EARLY. I KNEW I MUST FORCE ACFT #2 BELOW ACFT #1 BECAUSE OF THEIR SLOW CONVERGING AND SUBSEQUENT DIVERGING. I KNEW WITH THE 10 DEG R TURN I WOULD STILL HAVE CONVERGENCE, BUT IN 4 MINS I SHOULD STILL HAVE ABOUT 8 MI LATERAL AND COULD TAKE MORE ACTION IF NECESSARY. I MISTAKENLY THOUGHT I NEEDED 4000 FT TO GET ACFT #2 BELOW ACFT #1 INSTEAD OF 6000 FT. THE SLOW DSCNT BY ACFT #2 AND THE HARD TURN BY ACFT #1 TO AVOID WX LED TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE SIT. BOTH ACTIONS WERE PREDICTABLE. I SHOULD HAVE LIMITED THE DEVS OF ACFT #1 AND GIVEN ACFT #2 A TIME TO BE BELOW FL310.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.