Narrative:

On jul/sun/94 at XA35 hours, I performed a gear up landing in a piper arrow subsequent to a power-off 180 degree approach. 4 days previous, I had done my first 2 short approachs as a commercial student, beginning the maneuver midfield on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, as per my flight school's SOP, by 1) picking my landing point, extending the gear and doing the before landing checklist, and then 2) pulling power when abeam the landing point. This day, traffic in the pattern and in the vicinity of the airport was heavier and, though originally cleared for the short approach and #1 to land, I had to extend on downwind beyond the end of the runway by roughly 1/2 - 1 mi for 2 other landing aircraft -- one, a de havilland that had entered downwind lower and inside of us, the second, an rv that had entered base just as I was about to turn base, and had made its initial call to tower from that position. The de havilland was cleared to land ahead of us and made a short approach to give us room. I was told 2 days later that the rv had also landed ahead of us, though I missed this radio call and only remember thinking on short final that the 'yellow de havilland sure looked white as it was taxiing off the runway.' there were 3 of us in the aircraft, me flying -- my instructor and a second instructor in the back seat. We were all talking while looking for traffic and I just don't remember hearing that the rv was cleared in ahead of us. The short approach was begun by my flight instructor pulling power to idle after we were cleared for a touch-and-go. (I had originally assumed that I had pulled power.) since we were beyond a normal position for rectangular base and final legs, I made a left turn and aimed straight for the numbers. I was landing on runway 7L, winds were reported as 120 degrees at 5 KTS. I also put in full flaps as it seemed to me that we were high. My instructor immediately questioned my use of flaps 40 degrees. I responded that I thought I would need them to get down in time, and also continued to ask him where the rv was. He and the other instructor continued to look for traffic. The gear warning horn was dully present in the backgnd and readily audible when someone spoke, but we had previously been in the practice area doing slow flight and stalls and had turned the intercom squelch down so as not to be distraction by the gear warning horn. I fixated on maintaining best glide speed and on monitoring the progress of my glide, as it appeared on short final that my instructor had been right because my sink rate picked up considerably as I slowed for touchdown. The last thoughts I can recall before the propeller strike and grinding were to make sure that I didn't get too slow and, as stated above, that the yellow de havilland really looked white at this lower angle. Contributing factors: 1) my obvious general lack of situational awareness, 2) failure to divide my attention inside and outside the cockpit, 3) ignoring, 'tuning out' the gear warning horn, 4) my failure to execute 2 checklists, both of which require gear extension, 5) my failure to follow school SOP, which requires that the maneuver be initiated with the gear down, 6) distraction with other traffic in the pattern.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: STUDENT PLT AND 2 FLT INSTRUCTORS GET DISTR BY TFC AND LAND GEAR UP IN THEIR PA28 AT DVT.

Narrative: ON JUL/SUN/94 AT XA35 HRS, I PERFORMED A GEAR UP LNDG IN A PIPER ARROW SUBSEQUENT TO A PWR-OFF 180 DEG APCH. 4 DAYS PREVIOUS, I HAD DONE MY FIRST 2 SHORT APCHS AS A COMMERCIAL STUDENT, BEGINNING THE MANEUVER MIDFIELD ON THE DOWNWIND LEG OF THE TFC PATTERN, AS PER MY FLT SCHOOL'S SOP, BY 1) PICKING MY LNDG POINT, EXTENDING THE GEAR AND DOING THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST, AND THEN 2) PULLING PWR WHEN ABEAM THE LNDG POINT. THIS DAY, TFC IN THE PATTERN AND IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT WAS HEAVIER AND, THOUGH ORIGINALLY CLRED FOR THE SHORT APCH AND #1 TO LAND, I HAD TO EXTEND ON DOWNWIND BEYOND THE END OF THE RWY BY ROUGHLY 1/2 - 1 MI FOR 2 OTHER LNDG ACFT -- ONE, A DE HAVILLAND THAT HAD ENTERED DOWNWIND LOWER AND INSIDE OF US, THE SECOND, AN RV THAT HAD ENTERED BASE JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO TURN BASE, AND HAD MADE ITS INITIAL CALL TO TWR FROM THAT POS. THE DE HAVILLAND WAS CLRED TO LAND AHEAD OF US AND MADE A SHORT APCH TO GIVE US ROOM. I WAS TOLD 2 DAYS LATER THAT THE RV HAD ALSO LANDED AHEAD OF US, THOUGH I MISSED THIS RADIO CALL AND ONLY REMEMBER THINKING ON SHORT FINAL THAT THE 'YELLOW DE HAVILLAND SURE LOOKED WHITE AS IT WAS TAXIING OFF THE RWY.' THERE WERE 3 OF US IN THE ACFT, ME FLYING -- MY INSTRUCTOR AND A SECOND INSTRUCTOR IN THE BACK SEAT. WE WERE ALL TALKING WHILE LOOKING FOR TFC AND I JUST DON'T REMEMBER HEARING THAT THE RV WAS CLRED IN AHEAD OF US. THE SHORT APCH WAS BEGUN BY MY FLT INSTRUCTOR PULLING PWR TO IDLE AFTER WE WERE CLRED FOR A TOUCH-AND-GO. (I HAD ORIGINALLY ASSUMED THAT I HAD PULLED PWR.) SINCE WE WERE BEYOND A NORMAL POS FOR RECTANGULAR BASE AND FINAL LEGS, I MADE A L TURN AND AIMED STRAIGHT FOR THE NUMBERS. I WAS LNDG ON RWY 7L, WINDS WERE RPTED AS 120 DEGS AT 5 KTS. I ALSO PUT IN FULL FLAPS AS IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WE WERE HIGH. MY INSTRUCTOR IMMEDIATELY QUESTIONED MY USE OF FLAPS 40 DEGS. I RESPONDED THAT I THOUGHT I WOULD NEED THEM TO GET DOWN IN TIME, AND ALSO CONTINUED TO ASK HIM WHERE THE RV WAS. HE AND THE OTHER INSTRUCTOR CONTINUED TO LOOK FOR TFC. THE GEAR WARNING HORN WAS DULLY PRESENT IN THE BACKGND AND READILY AUDIBLE WHEN SOMEONE SPOKE, BUT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN THE PRACTICE AREA DOING SLOW FLT AND STALLS AND HAD TURNED THE INTERCOM SQUELCH DOWN SO AS NOT TO BE DISTR BY THE GEAR WARNING HORN. I FIXATED ON MAINTAINING BEST GLIDE SPD AND ON MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF MY GLIDE, AS IT APPEARED ON SHORT FINAL THAT MY INSTRUCTOR HAD BEEN RIGHT BECAUSE MY SINK RATE PICKED UP CONSIDERABLY AS I SLOWED FOR TOUCHDOWN. THE LAST THOUGHTS I CAN RECALL BEFORE THE PROP STRIKE AND GRINDING WERE TO MAKE SURE THAT I DIDN'T GET TOO SLOW AND, AS STATED ABOVE, THAT THE YELLOW DE HAVILLAND REALLY LOOKED WHITE AT THIS LOWER ANGLE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) MY OBVIOUS GENERAL LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, 2) FAILURE TO DIVIDE MY ATTN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT, 3) IGNORING, 'TUNING OUT' THE GEAR WARNING HORN, 4) MY FAILURE TO EXECUTE 2 CHKLISTS, BOTH OF WHICH REQUIRE GEAR EXTENSION, 5) MY FAILURE TO FOLLOW SCHOOL SOP, WHICH REQUIRES THAT THE MANEUVER BE INITIATED WITH THE GEAR DOWN, 6) DISTR WITH OTHER TFC IN THE PATTERN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.