Narrative:

I was conducting a new-hire training flight for a type rated pilot. I was the PNF in the left seat and he was the PF in the right seat. He was wearing a view limiting device (hood). I had trained him the day prior on flying a VOR approach, single engine and the VOR at mfd was not providing us with a useable signal, which caused him to have problems and made the maneuver incomplete. I had to retrain the VOR approach and did not want to use that VOR again, so I chose a close by airport, marion, oh (mnn). After conducting an ILS approach to runway 32 at mansfield, oh, single engine, we missed single engine off that approach and entered published holding over the mansfield VOR at 4000 ft MSL. I left the engine 'failed' as we still needed to conduct the VOR approach to mnn, single engine. While in the holding pattern over the mansfield VOR, I called on the marion unicom to find out who was in the traffic pattern. I overheard on the radio that glider activity might be going on at the marion airport. I was able to contact the tow plane that was towing the gliders aloft at mnn. I told him that I was going to conduct a practice VOR approach to runway 25. The radio was 'bloced' several times by xmissions from other nearby airports, but I believed that what I had communicated to the tow plane pilot was received. About 10 mins later, I called mansfield approach and ased for vectors to final for the VOR-a approach at marion. Mansfield subsequently gave us vectors and descended us down to 3000 ft MSL and then cleared us for the approach. When we got within 10 mi of the buceye VOR (bud) we descended down to the MDA which is 1500 ft MSL (510 ft AGL). At least 3 times during our vector I gave the communication radio #2 to the other pilot and I made a call on unicom at mnn to let the traffic now where we were and what we were doing. I communicated directly with the tow plane pilot who said he was on runway 25 with a glider that he was getting ready to tow up into the air. I acnowledged his information. I didn't see the tow plane nor the glider until we were about 5 mi from the runway. I made a call and the tow plane pilot stated that he just released a glider and that they were both south of the airport and would stay out of our way. I stated that I would overfly the runway and would stay away from where they were flying. At about a 3 mi final, I noticed that one of the aircraft was heading bac to the airport. I thought it was the tow plane heading bac to PIC up another glider. I figured that he was gong to maneuver around and behind me to land on runway 25 to PIC up another glider. At about a 2 mi final, it appeared to me that what I thought was the tow plane was heading straight for me. I made a call on the unicom frequency and ased the tow plane pilot if he was going to 'miss me' (pass behind me). He stated that he was still south of the field and didn't now what the glider pilot was doing. He then stated that 'be advised that the glider pilot does not have a radio.' that's when I realized that this was the glider pilot heading bac to the airport and that he probably didn't see me. We were now about a 1 mi final. I told the other pilot that I had the controls, I immediately brought up power on the engine that was being simulated as failed and pushed up both power levers to execute a missed approach. I also disconnected the autoplt and turned away from the glider and began a climb to our missed approach altitude. Our missed approach instructions were to climb to 3000 ft MSL and fly heading 270 degrees. During the evasive maneuver I estimate that we came within 300-500 ft laterally of the glider which was now about our altitude. I don't believe the glider ever saw us until we went past him because the glider did not tae any evasive action at all. I fully realize that the glider had the right of way and as soon as I realized that it was a glider and that we were on a collision course, I began evasive maneuvers. In retrospect, and true to our company's policy, it's best not to mix high performance aircraft and slower aircraft, especially at an uncontrolled airport. My decision to attempt the approach was influenced by my perceived need to finish this new pilot's training today.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING A SINGLE ENG VOR TRAINING APCH AT AN UNCTLED ARPT AFTER COMMUNICATING WITH A TOW ACFT ON CTAF TO COORDINATE TFC A C560 COMES WITHIN 500 FT OF A NORDO GLIDER REQUIRING THE APCH TO BE ABANDONED AND EVASIVE ACTION TAEN.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING A NEW-HIRE TRAINING FLT FOR A TYPE RATED PLT. I WAS THE PNF IN THE L SEAT AND HE WAS THE PF IN THE R SEAT. HE WAS WEARING A VIEW LIMITING DEVICE (HOOD). I HAD TRAINED HIM THE DAY PRIOR ON FLYING A VOR APCH, SINGLE ENG AND THE VOR AT MFD WAS NOT PROVIDING US WITH A USEABLE SIGNAL, WHICH CAUSED HIM TO HAVE PROBS AND MADE THE MANEUVER INCOMPLETE. I HAD TO RETRAIN THE VOR APCH AND DID NOT WANT TO USE THAT VOR AGAIN, SO I CHOSE A CLOSE BY ARPT, MARION, OH (MNN). AFTER CONDUCTING AN ILS APCH TO RWY 32 AT MANSFIELD, OH, SINGLE ENG, WE MISSED SINGLE ENG OFF THAT APCH AND ENTERED PUBLISHED HOLDING OVER THE MANSFIELD VOR AT 4000 FT MSL. I LEFT THE ENG 'FAILED' AS WE STILL NEEDED TO CONDUCT THE VOR APCH TO MNN, SINGLE ENG. WHILE IN THE HOLDING PATTERN OVER THE MANSFIELD VOR, I CALLED ON THE MARION UNICOM TO FIND OUT WHO WAS IN THE TFC PATTERN. I OVERHEARD ON THE RADIO THAT GLIDER ACTIVITY MIGHT BE GOING ON AT THE MARION ARPT. I WAS ABLE TO CONTACT THE TOW PLANE THAT WAS TOWING THE GLIDERS ALOFT AT MNN. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS GOING TO CONDUCT A PRACTICE VOR APCH TO RWY 25. THE RADIO WAS 'BLOCED' SEVERAL TIMES BY XMISSIONS FROM OTHER NEARBY ARPTS, BUT I BELIEVED THAT WHAT I HAD COMMUNICATED TO THE TOW PLANE PLT WAS RECEIVED. ABOUT 10 MINS LATER, I CALLED MANSFIELD APCH AND ASED FOR VECTORS TO FINAL FOR THE VOR-A APCH AT MARION. MANSFIELD SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE US VECTORS AND DSNDED US DOWN TO 3000 FT MSL AND THEN CLRED US FOR THE APCH. WHEN WE GOT WITHIN 10 MI OF THE BUCEYE VOR (BUD) WE DSNDED DOWN TO THE MDA WHICH IS 1500 FT MSL (510 FT AGL). AT LEAST 3 TIMES DURING OUR VECTOR I GAVE THE COM RADIO #2 TO THE OTHER PLT AND I MADE A CALL ON UNICOM AT MNN TO LET THE TFC NOW WHERE WE WERE AND WHAT WE WERE DOING. I COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH THE TOW PLANE PLT WHO SAID HE WAS ON RWY 25 WITH A GLIDER THAT HE WAS GETTING READY TO TOW UP INTO THE AIR. I ACNOWLEDGED HIS INFO. I DIDN'T SEE THE TOW PLANE NOR THE GLIDER UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 5 MI FROM THE RWY. I MADE A CALL AND THE TOW PLANE PLT STATED THAT HE JUST RELEASED A GLIDER AND THAT THEY WERE BOTH S OF THE ARPT AND WOULD STAY OUT OF OUR WAY. I STATED THAT I WOULD OVERFLY THE RWY AND WOULD STAY AWAY FROM WHERE THEY WERE FLYING. AT ABOUT A 3 MI FINAL, I NOTICED THAT ONE OF THE ACFT WAS HDG BAC TO THE ARPT. I THOUGHT IT WAS THE TOW PLANE HDG BAC TO PIC UP ANOTHER GLIDER. I FIGURED THAT HE WAS GONG TO MANEUVER AROUND AND BEHIND ME TO LAND ON RWY 25 TO PIC UP ANOTHER GLIDER. AT ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE TOW PLANE WAS HDG STRAIGHT FOR ME. I MADE A CALL ON THE UNICOM FREQ AND ASED THE TOW PLANE PLT IF HE WAS GOING TO 'MISS ME' (PASS BEHIND ME). HE STATED THAT HE WAS STILL S OF THE FIELD AND DIDN'T NOW WHAT THE GLIDER PLT WAS DOING. HE THEN STATED THAT 'BE ADVISED THAT THE GLIDER PLT DOES NOT HAVE A RADIO.' THAT'S WHEN I REALIZED THAT THIS WAS THE GLIDER PLT HDG BAC TO THE ARPT AND THAT HE PROBABLY DIDN'T SEE ME. WE WERE NOW ABOUT A 1 MI FINAL. I TOLD THE OTHER PLT THAT I HAD THE CTLS, I IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT UP PWR ON THE ENG THAT WAS BEING SIMULATED AS FAILED AND PUSHED UP BOTH PWR LEVERS TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. I ALSO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND TURNED AWAY FROM THE GLIDER AND BEGAN A CLB TO OUR MISSED APCH ALT. OUR MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CLB TO 3000 FT MSL AND FLY HDG 270 DEGS. DURING THE EVASIVE MANEUVER I ESTIMATE THAT WE CAME WITHIN 300-500 FT LATERALLY OF THE GLIDER WHICH WAS NOW ABOUT OUR ALT. I DON'T BELIEVE THE GLIDER EVER SAW US UNTIL WE WENT PAST HIM BECAUSE THE GLIDER DID NOT TAE ANY EVASIVE ACTION AT ALL. I FULLY REALIZE THAT THE GLIDER HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND AS SOON AS I REALIZED THAT IT WAS A GLIDER AND THAT WE WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE, I BEGAN EVASIVE MANEUVERS. IN RETROSPECT, AND TRUE TO OUR COMPANY'S POLICY, IT'S BEST NOT TO MIX HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT AND SLOWER ACFT, ESPECIALLY AT AN UNCTLED ARPT. MY DECISION TO ATTEMPT THE APCH WAS INFLUENCED BY MY PERCEIVED NEED TO FINISH THIS NEW PLT'S TRAINING TODAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.