Narrative:

I was involved in an incident whereby I entered the air traffic area and apparently caused 2 aircraft to deviate on their departures from den runway 8. The following is a narrative of the events from my perspective. I was acting as PIC on an IFR flight from msp to apa. En route, one of my passenger asked of the possibility of being dropped off at ftg airport so that he could fly his personal aircraft back to apa. The WX was VFR in the denver area and I saw no reason not to do so. Although I had never made a landing at ftg, I was familiar with its general location from my almost daily flts between apa and ama. On initial contact with denver approach, my copilot, requested a change in destination from apa to ftg. The approach controller on 128.25 then vectored us to a point approximately 10 mi east of ftg at 8000 ft MSL on a south heading. At that point I reported ftg in sight and I understood denver approach to clear me for a visual approach to ftg with clearance to switch to unicom frequency. Based upon an inquiry of denver approach about departing ftg for apa, I then switched communication #1 to 128.45 for the departure out of ftg back to apa. I discontinued monitoring communication #1 and only monitored communication #2, which was set on unicom 123.0. I then began a right turn to the west to enter a left downwind for runway 8 at ftg. Runway 8 at ftg was selected to facilitate a shorter taxi route at ftg. Although the airport layout in the commercial plates denotes right traffic, I decided to enter a left traffic pattern so as to avoid touch-and-go traffic that had been reported for ftg runway 17/35. In the process of making a descending right turn along with momentarily looking inside the cockpit to reselect the ftg airport on the aircraft's global navigation system, I lost sight of ftg. When I looked up I saw an ew runway that I believed to be ftg runway 8/26 about 10-12 mi away. My copilot's attention at that point was diverted by communications on unicom 123.0 in trying to determine traffic and airport advisories at ftg. She didn't initially realize where I was headed. By the time I was about 4 mi from the end of runway 26 at den, the copilot questioned my proximity to den. At approximately the same time, I saw an aircraft at my 10 O'clock position above me in a climb heading in approximately the opposite direction but away from my direction of flight to the southeast. I was flying at about 6500 ft. It was at this point that I realized my true position and proximity to the den airport. Upon recognition that I was closing in on the end of runway 26 with departures from den runway 8, I made a left descending turn to the south to clear the airspace. I did this only after I was safely clear of the aircraft. By the time I made the turn, I was probably 1 1/2 mi from the end of runway 26 at den. As I was making the left turn to the south my copilot immediately contacted denver approach control on 128.45 that was set in communication #1 to report our position and intentions. I then continued to a normal landing at ftg airport on runway 8. We were asked by denver approach control to call denver TRACON about the incident, upon landing, which I did. The other aircraft's nearest point to me was about 500-700 ft above and 2000-3000 ft horizontally. I did not feel that either the aircraft or my aircraft was in danger of a midair collision, nor did I have to take any evasive action when I saw the aircraft. It did not appear to me that the aircraft was taking evasive action either but obviously was aware of my presence. TRACON has indicated that a second aircraft was involved as well. If this is so, neither my copilot nor myself saw this aircraft. In reviewing my actions, it is clear that I lost positional awareness of my aircraft. There were several reasons this occurred. My preoccupation with the navigation system while in a descending turn took my eyes off the ftg airport and into the cockpit. Secondly, although I have flown into and out of the denver area almost daily over the past 4 yrs, the low altitude, flat perspective, hazy conditions, and entry from a different direction created an unfamiliar view of ftg. Thirdly, my copilot's attention was disrupted with concern for ftg traffic and communications on unicom 123.0 and prevented her from recognizing my error. Fourthly, I was concerned about possible touch-and-go traffic on runway 17/35 at ftg and wanted to give plenty of room for this traffic. Finally, I did not appreciate and recognize the proximity of the 2 airports. In hindsight there are obviously many things I would have done differently. First, I would have continued to monitor denver approach control on 128.25 after being cleared for the visual approach at ftg. Unlike apa where tower control is involved on a visual approach, there is no control at ftg. I left myself exposed by not monitoring approach control. I have no doubt that approach control tried to call us long before I got so close to den. Secondly, I should have never taken my eyes off the ftg airport, and should have instructed my copilot to make the changes on our navigation system or, better yet, just left it alone. Thirdly, had I appreciated just how close the 2 airports are to each other, I would have continued south at 6500 ft for several mi until well clear of ftg runway 17/35 traffic and entered a right base for ftg runway 8. This would have ensured maximum separation from den. Supplemental information from acn 443722: when we were handed off from ZDV to denver approach on 119.3, I told him we would like to stop at ftg first on the way to apa. The controller said that there would be no problem with that. We continued on the STAR and were handed off to another controller who gave us vectors east of ftg. While being vectored, I tuned in the AWOS again to double check the winds, but there was nothing being reported. So I told the PIC I would call ftg unicom, on #2 communication, to get an airport advisory. He took over #1 communication while I did this. At the same time that I called for airport information, denver approach called us, so I didn't hear what either approach or unicom said. The PIC said that he had the airport in sight, so I understood us to be on a visual to runway 8 at ftg because we were still squawking the same code (not 1200) at the same time we were descending from 8000 ft to approximately 6700 ft, the PIC switch #1 communication to denver approach in preparation for the next leg to apa and I switched over on unicom #2 communication. I radioed ftg traffic and stated that we were east of the airport, planning on a left downwind for runway 8. We were flying northwest and from my perspective the PIC was entering a left downwind. We didn't monitor denver approach. The PIC said that he had lost the airport momentarily, so direct ftg was selected again on the GNS. After making position reports with ftg CTAF, looking at the GNS, and reviewing the checklist, I realized when I looked up, that we were too close to the den ew runway and said something to the PIC. He immediately descended in a left turn for a left base for runway 8 at ftg. We did see 1 aircraft approaching us prior to our turn, and he was in a climb turning southeast. I immediately called denver approach on 128.45. Told him we were on a visual for runway 8. He had me squawk a new code and said that he had us on radar and saw that we were descending into ftg. He then asked us to call them when we got on the ground. I should have done several things differently. I should have stayed 100% on the radios with denver approach. Then the PIC and I would have been on the same page and would have eliminated confusion later on if we were cleared for a visual or not at ftg. Since the ftg and den airports are so close together, I would have monitored denver approach after switching to the CTAF at ftg. I'm sure that denver approach was calling us to find out our intentions. This would have alerted us earlier, that we were too close to den.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LAST MIN DEST CHANGE, A CORPORATE ACFT, NOT COMMUNICATING WITH ATC, ENTERED CLASS B AIRSPACE ENRTE TO UNDERLYING UNCTLED ARPT. TFC CONFLICT RESULTED WITH ACR DEPARTING CLASS B ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT WHEREBY I ENTERED THE ATA AND APPARENTLY CAUSED 2 ACFT TO DEVIATE ON THEIR DEPS FROM DEN RWY 8. THE FOLLOWING IS A NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. I WAS ACTING AS PIC ON AN IFR FLT FROM MSP TO APA. ENRTE, ONE OF MY PAX ASKED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING DROPPED OFF AT FTG ARPT SO THAT HE COULD FLY HIS PERSONAL ACFT BACK TO APA. THE WX WAS VFR IN THE DENVER AREA AND I SAW NO REASON NOT TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH I HAD NEVER MADE A LNDG AT FTG, I WAS FAMILIAR WITH ITS GENERAL LOCATION FROM MY ALMOST DAILY FLTS BTWN APA AND AMA. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DENVER APCH, MY COPLT, REQUESTED A CHANGE IN DEST FROM APA TO FTG. THE APCH CTLR ON 128.25 THEN VECTORED US TO A POINT APPROX 10 MI E OF FTG AT 8000 FT MSL ON A S HEADING. AT THAT POINT I RPTED FTG IN SIGHT AND I UNDERSTOOD DENVER APCH TO CLR ME FOR A VISUAL APCH TO FTG WITH CLRNC TO SWITCH TO UNICOM FREQ. BASED UPON AN INQUIRY OF DENVER APCH ABOUT DEPARTING FTG FOR APA, I THEN SWITCHED COM #1 TO 128.45 FOR THE DEP OUT OF FTG BACK TO APA. I DISCONTINUED MONITORING COM #1 AND ONLY MONITORED COM #2, WHICH WAS SET ON UNICOM 123.0. I THEN BEGAN A R TURN TO THE W TO ENTER A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8 AT FTG. RWY 8 AT FTG WAS SELECTED TO FACILITATE A SHORTER TAXI RTE AT FTG. ALTHOUGH THE ARPT LAYOUT IN THE COMMERCIAL PLATES DENOTES R TFC, I DECIDED TO ENTER A L TFC PATTERN SO AS TO AVOID TOUCH-AND-GO TFC THAT HAD BEEN RPTED FOR FTG RWY 17/35. IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING A DSNDING R TURN ALONG WITH MOMENTARILY LOOKING INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO RESELECT THE FTG ARPT ON THE ACFT'S GLOBAL NAV SYS, I LOST SIGHT OF FTG. WHEN I LOOKED UP I SAW AN EW RWY THAT I BELIEVED TO BE FTG RWY 8/26 ABOUT 10-12 MI AWAY. MY COPLT'S ATTN AT THAT POINT WAS DIVERTED BY COMS ON UNICOM 123.0 IN TRYING TO DETERMINE TFC AND ARPT ADVISORIES AT FTG. SHE DIDN'T INITIALLY REALIZE WHERE I WAS HEADED. BY THE TIME I WAS ABOUT 4 MI FROM THE END OF RWY 26 AT DEN, THE COPLT QUESTIONED MY PROX TO DEN. AT APPROX THE SAME TIME, I SAW AN ACFT AT MY 10 O'CLOCK POS ABOVE ME IN A CLB HEADING IN APPROX THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION BUT AWAY FROM MY DIRECTION OF FLT TO THE SE. I WAS FLYING AT ABOUT 6500 FT. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT I REALIZED MY TRUE POS AND PROX TO THE DEN ARPT. UPON RECOGNITION THAT I WAS CLOSING IN ON THE END OF RWY 26 WITH DEPS FROM DEN RWY 8, I MADE A L DSNDING TURN TO THE S TO CLR THE AIRSPACE. I DID THIS ONLY AFTER I WAS SAFELY CLR OF THE ACFT. BY THE TIME I MADE THE TURN, I WAS PROBABLY 1 1/2 MI FROM THE END OF RWY 26 AT DEN. AS I WAS MAKING THE L TURN TO THE S MY COPLT IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED DENVER APCH CTL ON 128.45 THAT WAS SET IN COM #1 TO RPT OUR POS AND INTENTIONS. I THEN CONTINUED TO A NORMAL LNDG AT FTG ARPT ON RWY 8. WE WERE ASKED BY DENVER APCH CTL TO CALL DENVER TRACON ABOUT THE INCIDENT, UPON LNDG, WHICH I DID. THE OTHER ACFT'S NEAREST POINT TO ME WAS ABOUT 500-700 FT ABOVE AND 2000-3000 FT HORIZLY. I DID NOT FEEL THAT EITHER THE ACFT OR MY ACFT WAS IN DANGER OF A MIDAIR COLLISION, NOR DID I HAVE TO TAKE ANY EVASIVE ACTION WHEN I SAW THE ACFT. IT DID NOT APPEAR TO ME THAT THE ACFT WAS TAKING EVASIVE ACTION EITHER BUT OBVIOUSLY WAS AWARE OF MY PRESENCE. TRACON HAS INDICATED THAT A SECOND ACFT WAS INVOLVED AS WELL. IF THIS IS SO, NEITHER MY COPLT NOR MYSELF SAW THIS ACFT. IN REVIEWING MY ACTIONS, IT IS CLR THAT I LOST POSITIONAL AWARENESS OF MY ACFT. THERE WERE SEVERAL REASONS THIS OCCURRED. MY PREOCCUPATION WITH THE NAV SYS WHILE IN A DSNDING TURN TOOK MY EYES OFF THE FTG ARPT AND INTO THE COCKPIT. SECONDLY, ALTHOUGH I HAVE FLOWN INTO AND OUT OF THE DENVER AREA ALMOST DAILY OVER THE PAST 4 YRS, THE LOW ALT, FLAT PERSPECTIVE, HAZY CONDITIONS, AND ENTRY FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION CREATED AN UNFAMILIAR VIEW OF FTG. THIRDLY, MY COPLT'S ATTN WAS DISRUPTED WITH CONCERN FOR FTG TFC AND COMS ON UNICOM 123.0 AND PREVENTED HER FROM RECOGNIZING MY ERROR. FOURTHLY, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE TOUCH-AND-GO TFC ON RWY 17/35 AT FTG AND WANTED TO GIVE PLENTY OF ROOM FOR THIS TFC. FINALLY, I DID NOT APPRECIATE AND RECOGNIZE THE PROX OF THE 2 ARPTS. IN HINDSIGHT THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY MANY THINGS I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY. FIRST, I WOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO MONITOR DENVER APCH CTL ON 128.25 AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AT FTG. UNLIKE APA WHERE TWR CTL IS INVOLVED ON A VISUAL APCH, THERE IS NO CTL AT FTG. I LEFT MYSELF EXPOSED BY NOT MONITORING APCH CTL. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT APCH CTL TRIED TO CALL US LONG BEFORE I GOT SO CLOSE TO DEN. SECONDLY, I SHOULD HAVE NEVER TAKEN MY EYES OFF THE FTG ARPT, AND SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED MY COPLT TO MAKE THE CHANGES ON OUR NAV SYS OR, BETTER YET, JUST LEFT IT ALONE. THIRDLY, HAD I APPRECIATED JUST HOW CLOSE THE 2 ARPTS ARE TO EACH OTHER, I WOULD HAVE CONTINUED S AT 6500 FT FOR SEVERAL MI UNTIL WELL CLR OF FTG RWY 17/35 TFC AND ENTERED A R BASE FOR FTG RWY 8. THIS WOULD HAVE ENSURED MAX SEPARATION FROM DEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 443722: WHEN WE WERE HANDED OFF FROM ZDV TO DENVER APCH ON 119.3, I TOLD HIM WE WOULD LIKE TO STOP AT FTG FIRST ON THE WAY TO APA. THE CTLR SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROB WITH THAT. WE CONTINUED ON THE STAR AND WERE HANDED OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR WHO GAVE US VECTORS E OF FTG. WHILE BEING VECTORED, I TUNED IN THE AWOS AGAIN TO DOUBLE CHK THE WINDS, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING BEING RPTED. SO I TOLD THE PIC I WOULD CALL FTG UNICOM, ON #2 COM, TO GET AN ARPT ADVISORY. HE TOOK OVER #1 COM WHILE I DID THIS. AT THE SAME TIME THAT I CALLED FOR ARPT INFO, DENVER APCH CALLED US, SO I DIDN'T HEAR WHAT EITHER APCH OR UNICOM SAID. THE PIC SAID THAT HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT, SO I UNDERSTOOD US TO BE ON A VISUAL TO RWY 8 AT FTG BECAUSE WE WERE STILL SQUAWKING THE SAME CODE (NOT 1200) AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE DSNDING FROM 8000 FT TO APPROX 6700 FT, THE PIC SWITCH #1 COM TO DENVER APCH IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT LEG TO APA AND I SWITCHED OVER ON UNICOM #2 COM. I RADIOED FTG TFC AND STATED THAT WE WERE E OF THE ARPT, PLANNING ON A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8. WE WERE FLYING NW AND FROM MY PERSPECTIVE THE PIC WAS ENTERING A L DOWNWIND. WE DIDN'T MONITOR DENVER APCH. THE PIC SAID THAT HE HAD LOST THE ARPT MOMENTARILY, SO DIRECT FTG WAS SELECTED AGAIN ON THE GNS. AFTER MAKING POS RPTS WITH FTG CTAF, LOOKING AT THE GNS, AND REVIEWING THE CHKLIST, I REALIZED WHEN I LOOKED UP, THAT WE WERE TOO CLOSE TO THE DEN EW RWY AND SAID SOMETHING TO THE PIC. HE IMMEDIATELY DSNDED IN A L TURN FOR A L BASE FOR RWY 8 AT FTG. WE DID SEE 1 ACFT APCHING US PRIOR TO OUR TURN, AND HE WAS IN A CLB TURNING SE. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED DENVER APCH ON 128.45. TOLD HIM WE WERE ON A VISUAL FOR RWY 8. HE HAD ME SQUAWK A NEW CODE AND SAID THAT HE HAD US ON RADAR AND SAW THAT WE WERE DSNDING INTO FTG. HE THEN ASKED US TO CALL THEM WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. I SHOULD HAVE DONE SEVERAL THINGS DIFFERENTLY. I SHOULD HAVE STAYED 100% ON THE RADIOS WITH DENVER APCH. THEN THE PIC AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE SAME PAGE AND WOULD HAVE ELIMINATED CONFUSION LATER ON IF WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL OR NOT AT FTG. SINCE THE FTG AND DEN ARPTS ARE SO CLOSE TOGETHER, I WOULD HAVE MONITORED DENVER APCH AFTER SWITCHING TO THE CTAF AT FTG. I'M SURE THAT DENVER APCH WAS CALLING US TO FIND OUT OUR INTENTIONS. THIS WOULD HAVE ALERTED US EARLIER, THAT WE WERE TOO CLOSE TO DEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.