Narrative:

We flew aircraft XXX into ict as the ron (remain overnight) aircraft. Prior to our arrival the next morning, ict folks moved the aircraft using the maintenance checklist. When I arrived, the aircraft was dead electrically and the cockpit locked with our outbound paperwork. I then turned on both battery switches and performed a fire test. The baggage smoke and engine #2 did not test, but the APU and engine #1 did test. I turned on the APU master, but the EICAS showed no power to the APU and it could not be cranked. No gpu was available then, so I asked ict folks to get me one which they did. The aircraft did not take ground power, so we tried a second gpu. This time, with the battery switches 'on,' the APU panel was pwred and the APU successfully started. The APU generator did not come on line when I deselected ground. Maintenance showed up and found the bus tie switch off, which I missed during my entering the cockpit. All switches were confirmed proper by my first officer the night before. One ict personnel admitted that he turned the bus tie off when he moved the aircraft, stating that it was the normal position for that switch on power down. I take responsibility for missing the initial improper switch position for the bus tie, but I had honestly thought the problem was low battery voltage (perhaps from the prior pwring of the aircraft that morning) and didn't think to check that switch. I know now to include all switches on the electrical panel when faced with an electrical anomaly before calling maintenance and losing passenger and costing us money. I also suggest that the bus tie switches be included in the normal checklists, external power or APU power flows, so that this anomaly will be detected earlier.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF ERJ FAILS TO NOTE AN OPEN BUS TIE BREAKER DURING HIS PREFLT INSPECTION AND CALLS MAINT TO ADDRESS THE RESULTING ELECTRICAL ANOMALY.

Narrative: WE FLEW ACFT XXX INTO ICT AS THE RON (REMAIN OVERNIGHT) ACFT. PRIOR TO OUR ARR THE NEXT MORNING, ICT FOLKS MOVED THE ACFT USING THE MAINT CHKLIST. WHEN I ARRIVED, THE ACFT WAS DEAD ELECTRICALLY AND THE COCKPIT LOCKED WITH OUR OUTBOUND PAPERWORK. I THEN TURNED ON BOTH BATTERY SWITCHES AND PERFORMED A FIRE TEST. THE BAGGAGE SMOKE AND ENG #2 DID NOT TEST, BUT THE APU AND ENG #1 DID TEST. I TURNED ON THE APU MASTER, BUT THE EICAS SHOWED NO PWR TO THE APU AND IT COULD NOT BE CRANKED. NO GPU WAS AVAILABLE THEN, SO I ASKED ICT FOLKS TO GET ME ONE WHICH THEY DID. THE ACFT DID NOT TAKE GND PWR, SO WE TRIED A SECOND GPU. THIS TIME, WITH THE BATTERY SWITCHES 'ON,' THE APU PANEL WAS PWRED AND THE APU SUCCESSFULLY STARTED. THE APU GENERATOR DID NOT COME ON LINE WHEN I DESELECTED GND. MAINT SHOWED UP AND FOUND THE BUS TIE SWITCH OFF, WHICH I MISSED DURING MY ENTERING THE COCKPIT. ALL SWITCHES WERE CONFIRMED PROPER BY MY FO THE NIGHT BEFORE. ONE ICT PERSONNEL ADMITTED THAT HE TURNED THE BUS TIE OFF WHEN HE MOVED THE ACFT, STATING THAT IT WAS THE NORMAL POS FOR THAT SWITCH ON PWR DOWN. I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISSING THE INITIAL IMPROPER SWITCH POS FOR THE BUS TIE, BUT I HAD HONESTLY THOUGHT THE PROB WAS LOW BATTERY VOLTAGE (PERHAPS FROM THE PRIOR PWRING OF THE ACFT THAT MORNING) AND DIDN'T THINK TO CHK THAT SWITCH. I KNOW NOW TO INCLUDE ALL SWITCHES ON THE ELECTRICAL PANEL WHEN FACED WITH AN ELECTRICAL ANOMALY BEFORE CALLING MAINT AND LOSING PAX AND COSTING US MONEY. I ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE BUS TIE SWITCHES BE INCLUDED IN THE NORMAL CHKLISTS, EXTERNAL PWR OR APU PWR FLOWS, SO THAT THIS ANOMALY WILL BE DETECTED EARLIER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.