Narrative:

We arrived at the aircraft for an XA40 departure and found a discrepancy on the ECAM hydraulic page indicating a line was pressurized from the blue electric pump box to abeam the RAT (ram air turbine). The line was amber from that point up, indicating low pressure. Previous experience told me we had a faulty pressure switch or cannon plug in the blue hydraulic line. We observed a previous day write-up of the same which was signed off with an MEL. This MEL had been removed before our flight. I notified maintenance and got 2 technicians working the problem. Then we notified maintenance controller of issue. I was told that we would be MEL'ed under the previous number. I told them the MEL was not appropriate as it didn't address the specific fault. The response was fine maintenance controller out. Nothing more. I re-established contact several mins later and got a new controller, apparently there was a shift change in progress. I re-explained the problem, same response, same MEL. I again refused relief under this MEL as I considered it inappropriate. Maintenance controller said he'd get back to me. Indirectly, I guess he did, as 10 mins later, 2 technicians returned with the singed off logbook and MEL sticker on front. I again refused and they simply replied they were doing as told by maintenance controller. Now 20 mins after scheduled push with a full aircraft, I again called maintenance controller to refuse the MEL. Now a 3RD controller insisted that since the MEL addressed the indicating system and the switch provided pressure indications, the MEL was correct. I replied the MEL addressed the indicator, not the source of the information and therefore was inappropriate. He stressed, again, it was the correct MEL and I should fly the aircraft. I asked him if he would be as adamant if an FAA was standing over my shoulder and he assured me he was absolutely positive, 100% certain, it was a good MEL. Against my better judgement, I relented, for 2 reasons. One, I hate delaying my passenger from their homes, families, or meetings. Two, I did not consider this one issue related to the critical safety of the flight. After expressing my reservations at least 6 times to at least 2 technicians as well as 3 maintenance controllers, I yielded to their interpretation and accepted the MEL. Once airborne, I had time to further examine the MEL book and realized that even to accept maintenance controller logic connecting the indicating system to the pressurize switch in question, which I don't, this MEL addresses the 3 hydraulic pumps indications specifically, not the pressure system in general. It was the wrong MEL, now for even another reason. Maintenance controller had twisted this MEL to fit this fault because there is, in my opinion, no relief in the MEL for this fault, as well as the fact that there were no switches available. I sent a text message while en route requesting the switch be replaced. They responded there was not enough time on quick turn. I then threatened to revisit the validity of this MEL when we arrived. Lo and behold, we were met with a team of technicians to fix the problem. Also, we were met by the assistant chief pilot as maintenance controller had reported to him that I had been uncooperative and obstinate. He listened to my account of events, reviewed the MEL book, and determined I was right to challenge. The reason for this as soon as possible are 2-FOLD: 1) address this maintenance issue in the MEL. It is a fairly common occurrence. Until it is addressed in MEL, do an in-house evaluation of this fault and establish what, if any, relief is available. Then, advise all technicians and maintenance controller what procedures should be followed until it gets addressed through the MEL. (Also, how about keeping a few switches at each out-station that services our busses...) and 2) address the mindset of a few of our controllers who feel their job is to push airplanes, rather than address the maintenance needs to satisfy the safety, as well as the legal requirements, of maintaining the schedule. It is extremely frustrating to have maintenance controller disregard my input, as a captain, that directly affects my license and livelihood, as well as my safety.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW ARRIVED AT THE ACFT TO FIND A REPEATED HYD SYS ABNORMALITY. THE FLT CREW FELT THAT THE MAINT MEL ASSIGNED WAS INACCURATE. AFTER SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS THE CREW FLEW THE ACFT, BUT LATER FELT IT WAS NOT A LEGAL MAINT MEL ASSIGNMENT.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT THE ACFT FOR AN XA40 DEP AND FOUND A DISCREPANCY ON THE ECAM HYD PAGE INDICATING A LINE WAS PRESSURIZED FROM THE BLUE ELECTRIC PUMP BOX TO ABEAM THE RAT (RAM AIR TURBINE). THE LINE WAS AMBER FROM THAT POINT UP, INDICATING LOW PRESSURE. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE TOLD ME WE HAD A FAULTY PRESSURE SWITCH OR CANNON PLUG IN THE BLUE HYD LINE. WE OBSERVED A PREVIOUS DAY WRITE-UP OF THE SAME WHICH WAS SIGNED OFF WITH AN MEL. THIS MEL HAD BEEN REMOVED BEFORE OUR FLT. I NOTIFIED MAINT AND GOT 2 TECHNICIANS WORKING THE PROB. THEN WE NOTIFIED MAINT CTLR OF ISSUE. I WAS TOLD THAT WE WOULD BE MEL'ED UNDER THE PREVIOUS NUMBER. I TOLD THEM THE MEL WAS NOT APPROPRIATE AS IT DIDN'T ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC FAULT. THE RESPONSE WAS FINE MAINT CTLR OUT. NOTHING MORE. I RE-ESTABLISHED CONTACT SEVERAL MINS LATER AND GOT A NEW CTLR, APPARENTLY THERE WAS A SHIFT CHANGE IN PROGRESS. I RE-EXPLAINED THE PROB, SAME RESPONSE, SAME MEL. I AGAIN REFUSED RELIEF UNDER THIS MEL AS I CONSIDERED IT INAPPROPRIATE. MAINT CTLR SAID HE'D GET BACK TO ME. INDIRECTLY, I GUESS HE DID, AS 10 MINS LATER, 2 TECHNICIANS RETURNED WITH THE SINGED OFF LOGBOOK AND MEL STICKER ON FRONT. I AGAIN REFUSED AND THEY SIMPLY REPLIED THEY WERE DOING AS TOLD BY MAINT CTLR. NOW 20 MINS AFTER SCHEDULED PUSH WITH A FULL ACFT, I AGAIN CALLED MAINT CTLR TO REFUSE THE MEL. NOW A 3RD CTLR INSISTED THAT SINCE THE MEL ADDRESSED THE INDICATING SYS AND THE SWITCH PROVIDED PRESSURE INDICATIONS, THE MEL WAS CORRECT. I REPLIED THE MEL ADDRESSED THE INDICATOR, NOT THE SOURCE OF THE INFO AND THEREFORE WAS INAPPROPRIATE. HE STRESSED, AGAIN, IT WAS THE CORRECT MEL AND I SHOULD FLY THE ACFT. I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD BE AS ADAMANT IF AN FAA WAS STANDING OVER MY SHOULDER AND HE ASSURED ME HE WAS ABSOLUTELY POSITIVE, 100% CERTAIN, IT WAS A GOOD MEL. AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGEMENT, I RELENTED, FOR 2 REASONS. ONE, I HATE DELAYING MY PAX FROM THEIR HOMES, FAMILIES, OR MEETINGS. TWO, I DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ONE ISSUE RELATED TO THE CRITICAL SAFETY OF THE FLT. AFTER EXPRESSING MY RESERVATIONS AT LEAST 6 TIMES TO AT LEAST 2 TECHNICIANS AS WELL AS 3 MAINT CTLRS, I YIELDED TO THEIR INTERP AND ACCEPTED THE MEL. ONCE AIRBORNE, I HAD TIME TO FURTHER EXAMINE THE MEL BOOK AND REALIZED THAT EVEN TO ACCEPT MAINT CTLR LOGIC CONNECTING THE INDICATING SYS TO THE PRESSURIZE SWITCH IN QUESTION, WHICH I DON'T, THIS MEL ADDRESSES THE 3 HYD PUMPS INDICATIONS SPECIFICALLY, NOT THE PRESSURE SYS IN GENERAL. IT WAS THE WRONG MEL, NOW FOR EVEN ANOTHER REASON. MAINT CTLR HAD TWISTED THIS MEL TO FIT THIS FAULT BECAUSE THERE IS, IN MY OPINION, NO RELIEF IN THE MEL FOR THIS FAULT, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO SWITCHES AVAILABLE. I SENT A TEXT MESSAGE WHILE ENRTE REQUESTING THE SWITCH BE REPLACED. THEY RESPONDED THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME ON QUICK TURN. I THEN THREATENED TO REVISIT THE VALIDITY OF THIS MEL WHEN WE ARRIVED. LO AND BEHOLD, WE WERE MET WITH A TEAM OF TECHNICIANS TO FIX THE PROB. ALSO, WE WERE MET BY THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT AS MAINT CTLR HAD RPTED TO HIM THAT I HAD BEEN UNCOOPERATIVE AND OBSTINATE. HE LISTENED TO MY ACCOUNT OF EVENTS, REVIEWED THE MEL BOOK, AND DETERMINED I WAS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE. THE REASON FOR THIS ASAP ARE 2-FOLD: 1) ADDRESS THIS MAINT ISSUE IN THE MEL. IT IS A FAIRLY COMMON OCCURRENCE. UNTIL IT IS ADDRESSED IN MEL, DO AN IN-HOUSE EVALUATION OF THIS FAULT AND ESTABLISH WHAT, IF ANY, RELIEF IS AVAILABLE. THEN, ADVISE ALL TECHNICIANS AND MAINT CTLR WHAT PROCS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UNTIL IT GETS ADDRESSED THROUGH THE MEL. (ALSO, HOW ABOUT KEEPING A FEW SWITCHES AT EACH OUT-STATION THAT SVCS OUR BUSSES...) AND 2) ADDRESS THE MINDSET OF A FEW OF OUR CTLRS WHO FEEL THEIR JOB IS TO PUSH AIRPLANES, RATHER THAN ADDRESS THE MAINT NEEDS TO SATISFY THE SAFETY, AS WELL AS THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, OF MAINTAINING THE SCHEDULE. IT IS EXTREMELY FRUSTRATING TO HAVE MAINT CTLR DISREGARD MY INPUT, AS A CAPT, THAT DIRECTLY AFFECTS MY LICENSE AND LIVELIHOOD, AS WELL AS MY SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.