Narrative:

Not sure if there was a deviation or if controller confused call signs. Inbound to phx from north on STAR. Were told to descend to 6000 ft by approach. Passing 7500 ft, approach said verbiage as remembered 'company X stop your descent at 8000 ft.' I called back 'company X, what do you want us to do, we are already passing 7500 ft.' controller came back with, 'company X, that was for another aircraft.' the captain and I had a short discussion in the cockpit confirming we had both heard the same directions. I asked the controller what altitude he/she wanted us to go to. Controller told us 7000 ft and gave us a new frequency. I asked if there was a problem, asking for the telephone number for phx approach, and asked if we should call. Controller said there was no problem, said to call tower on the ground if we wanted to, and gave us a frequency change. The next controller continued vectoring for arrival. Contributing factors and recommendations: I am unable to come up with contributing factors and corrective actions regarding the cockpit crew based on what we thought we heard. Phx approach, however, due to attitude or philosophy in controling airspace, is another story. Whether there is a distrust of pilots or a desire to exert absolute control over airspace, phx is often overloading their own apple carts, causing apples to fall out. Later on the same approach, the second controller vectored us (VMC) all the way onto final runway 8 with another aircraft on adjacent approach to runway 7R (formation join-up). The controller overshot final causing a TCAS RA. This would not have happened had we been given a visual approach farther out. By being directed to exert full control of all dimensions of their airspace, phx controllers become mentally task saturated, cause frustration in the pilots, and create delays in the airspace system. There is no teamwork between the controllers and pilots. Controllers have little time and ability to observe and make corrections to bad sits developing, because they are too busy flying our planes. Recommendations: a change in attitude at phx TRACON to allow pilots as much autonomy in flying the approachs, as soon as possible. This will allow controllers the ability to do more observing and less controling, enhancing safety and flow. Send phx controllers to observe lax or bwi operations to see how efficient and safe flow can be affected by working as a team with the pilots. Recommend individual controllers as well as phx TRACON leadership involved in creating a safer more efficient airspace. Leadership issues? I have no idea what the leadership situation is at phx. Maybe bwi, lax, controllers or some other agency could assist phx in relooking at the way they do business and help create a safer and more efficient air traffic control situation. I honestly don't know all the in's and out's of what goes on at phx. I only know what I see from my myopic pilot perspective and it doesn't look good.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 LNDG PHX EXPERIENCED POSSIBLE ALTDEV AND TCAS RA DURING TURN TO FINAL.

Narrative: NOT SURE IF THERE WAS A DEV OR IF CTLR CONFUSED CALL SIGNS. INBOUND TO PHX FROM N ON STAR. WERE TOLD TO DSND TO 6000 FT BY APCH. PASSING 7500 FT, APCH SAID VERBIAGE AS REMEMBERED 'COMPANY X STOP YOUR DSCNT AT 8000 FT.' I CALLED BACK 'COMPANY X, WHAT DO YOU WANT US TO DO, WE ARE ALREADY PASSING 7500 FT.' CTLR CAME BACK WITH, 'COMPANY X, THAT WAS FOR ANOTHER ACFT.' THE CAPT AND I HAD A SHORT DISCUSSION IN THE COCKPIT CONFIRMING WE HAD BOTH HEARD THE SAME DIRECTIONS. I ASKED THE CTLR WHAT ALT HE/SHE WANTED US TO GO TO. CTLR TOLD US 7000 FT AND GAVE US A NEW FREQ. I ASKED IF THERE WAS A PROB, ASKING FOR THE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR PHX APCH, AND ASKED IF WE SHOULD CALL. CTLR SAID THERE WAS NO PROB, SAID TO CALL TWR ON THE GND IF WE WANTED TO, AND GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE. THE NEXT CTLR CONTINUED VECTORING FOR ARR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: I AM UNABLE TO COME UP WITH CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REGARDING THE COCKPIT CREW BASED ON WHAT WE THOUGHT WE HEARD. PHX APCH, HOWEVER, DUE TO ATTITUDE OR PHILOSOPHY IN CTLING AIRSPACE, IS ANOTHER STORY. WHETHER THERE IS A DISTRUST OF PLTS OR A DESIRE TO EXERT ABSOLUTE CTL OVER AIRSPACE, PHX IS OFTEN OVERLOADING THEIR OWN APPLE CARTS, CAUSING APPLES TO FALL OUT. LATER ON THE SAME APCH, THE SECOND CTLR VECTORED US (VMC) ALL THE WAY ONTO FINAL RWY 8 WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON ADJACENT APCH TO RWY 7R (FORMATION JOIN-UP). THE CTLR OVERSHOT FINAL CAUSING A TCAS RA. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED HAD WE BEEN GIVEN A VISUAL APCH FARTHER OUT. BY BEING DIRECTED TO EXERT FULL CTL OF ALL DIMENSIONS OF THEIR AIRSPACE, PHX CTLRS BECOME MENTALLY TASK SATURATED, CAUSE FRUSTRATION IN THE PLTS, AND CREATE DELAYS IN THE AIRSPACE SYS. THERE IS NO TEAMWORK BTWN THE CTLRS AND PLTS. CTLRS HAVE LITTLE TIME AND ABILITY TO OBSERVE AND MAKE CORRECTIONS TO BAD SITS DEVELOPING, BECAUSE THEY ARE TOO BUSY FLYING OUR PLANES. RECOMMENDATIONS: A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE AT PHX TRACON TO ALLOW PLTS AS MUCH AUTONOMY IN FLYING THE APCHS, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS WILL ALLOW CTLRS THE ABILITY TO DO MORE OBSERVING AND LESS CTLING, ENHANCING SAFETY AND FLOW. SEND PHX CTLRS TO OBSERVE LAX OR BWI OPS TO SEE HOW EFFICIENT AND SAFE FLOW CAN BE AFFECTED BY WORKING AS A TEAM WITH THE PLTS. RECOMMEND INDIVIDUAL CTLRS AS WELL AS PHX TRACON LEADERSHIP INVOLVED IN CREATING A SAFER MORE EFFICIENT AIRSPACE. LEADERSHIP ISSUES? I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE LEADERSHIP SIT IS AT PHX. MAYBE BWI, LAX, CTLRS OR SOME OTHER AGENCY COULD ASSIST PHX IN RELOOKING AT THE WAY THEY DO BUSINESS AND HELP CREATE A SAFER AND MORE EFFICIENT AIR TFC CTL SIT. I HONESTLY DON'T KNOW ALL THE IN'S AND OUT'S OF WHAT GOES ON AT PHX. I ONLY KNOW WHAT I SEE FROM MY MYOPIC PLT PERSPECTIVE AND IT DOESN'T LOOK GOOD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.