Narrative:

The WX at cvg airport was low IFR and fog, reporting RVR's. I was cleared for ILS approach to runway 18R and cleared to land by tower. Upon landing and rollout, control tower gave me instructions to exit on taxiway J, which I replied back as I was slowing the aircraft. The runway was brightly lit. As I got the aircraft to a safe manageable speed where I could divide my focus between looking for txwys and markers, I've noticed that I have passed taxiway J. Thus, while still moving on the runway centerline, I notified the tower that I've passed the taxiway. Tower came back with a loud acknowledgement 'stop!,' 'stop right there.' so I got the aircraft stopped in a safe manner and without locking the tires up. At this point, it was foggy all around and realized that I came to a stop on the intersection of runway 27. Realizing that the tower told me to stop completely on the runway was for a reason, so I instinctively added power to move forward and get out of the intersection. Against tower's wishes for me to stop. It saved the day. Pulling forward and coming to a complete stop at this time, looking back, I saw a regional jet rolling down the runway 27 behind me. He aborted takeoff. If I did not pull forward, there would have been a major accident. Why this occurred? I thought about it. The WX is bad, the tower cannot see ground traffic. When I landed on runway 18R, that was my runway until I got off of it completely. I did not hear the other traffic on frequency who was taking off on runway 27 or his clearance for takeoff by ATC. Otherwise, I would have been situationally aware. I believe the problem to all of this is assuming. The tower was assuming that I would get off on taxiway J. When I read back clrncs, it is just that, a readback saying I hear what you told me. It is not a guarantee that I will make whatever is said happen. For instance, if I was told to take off on a runway, I read it back, and afterwards, while I attempt to do as said, I abort the takeoff. It was not a guarantee the takeoff will happen. ATC cannot question why I didn't take off, same as why I did not turn off on taxiway J. In this kind of environment, the ATC should have confirmed that I exited the runway, get a confirmation from me that I have in fact exited the runway before the other regional jet was given an ok to take off. I believe they were assuming that I was going to turn off at taxiway J by looking at their ground radar. Not confirming but assuming. I believe the contributing factors were that of above. Lack of vigilance, and complacency of the everyday good WX routine. When the WX is bad, you confirm and rechk and double-check. Basically, the other aircraft was given clearance for takeoff when I was not done with the runway 18R, which is to bring the aircraft to a safe speed, identify the runway, get it in sight, before turning off. Us humans are at fault. I take away from this incident that I will analyze clrncs more carefully. In this business, you cannot come back and say, why didn't you follow what I said? Then, it's too late. Clearance, when issued, we need to wait and see if the action did happen in accordance with the clearance. And us pilots, we try to do everything possible to make things happen according to ATC instructions, but not always. Some things are just impossible and when we can't, we let ATC know as soon as possible. In this case, as I did. There was a communication breakdown and the use of assumptions. When intersecting runways are in use, we need to do things one at a time. Which means, finish one task completely on one runway before doing things on the other runway. That way, it's absolute and safe. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter spoke with a slight foreign accent. Stated he was flying single pilot in an SW4 into cvg and landed on runway 18R in fog with RVR 2600 ft visibility. Just after touchdown, the tower controller instructed him to turn off on taxiway J. He acknowledged by just repeating, 'taxiway J.' he then told the tower that he had passed the taxiway and was immediately instructed to stop. He moved away from the runway intersection and a few seconds later saw a regional jet pass behind going at a pretty good pace. He did not see any lights onthe rj. He then heard a different voice on the radio. After parking, he said he called the tower and was told there was no problem and that the controller had used his best judgement. Reporter also stated that he has been contacted by FSDO who are investigating the incident. Supplemental information from acn 634122: we had to do a rejected takeoff from runway 27 at cvg due to an aircraft going through the intersection of runway 18R. The WX was part of the problem: 1/2 mi visibility with fog at night. At approximately 100 KIAS, we saw the traffic and did the abort. The cause appears to be 2-FOLD. The other aircraft did not follow the tower's instructions and the tower apparently did not know exactly where the other aircraft was. Also, the other aircraft appeared to have only a rotating beacon. No landing, taxi, or strobe lights which made it difficult to see under the WX and light conditions. Callback conversation with reporter on acn 634122 revealed the following information: reporter said after the incident he returned to the gate to have the brakes checked by maintenance. While parked at the gate he called the tower to discuss the incident. The person in the tower did not give any definitive information except to say the metroliner should not have been there. Supplemental information from acn 634566: we initiated the takeoff after being cleared for takeoff on runway 27. During the takeoff roll, at about 100 KIAS, I noticed aircraft lights on runway 18R approaching runway 27 intersection. Just as I was about to notify the captain, the tower controller yelled, 'stop! Stop! Stop!' on the radio. I called 'abort abort abort' and the captain initiated the abort just above 100 KIAS. We passed through the intersection a few seconds after the metroliner and would estimate our closest approach to be approximately 20 ft. It would appear to me that the metroliner crew either thought they were supposed to cross runway 27 or did not realize they were crossing runway 27. It also appeared that the metroliner had no strobe lights or the strobe lights were off. I think I may have noticed the airplane earlier if they were on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEAR COLLISION WHEN A CRJ100 TAKING OFF ON RWY 27 AT CVG IS ABORTED AND NARROWLY MISSES A SW4 ROLLING OUT ON RWY 18R. WX AT THE TIME WAS LOW VISIBILITY WITH FOG AND LOW CEILING.

Narrative: THE WX AT CVG ARPT WAS LOW IFR AND FOG, RPTING RVR'S. I WAS CLRED FOR ILS APCH TO RWY 18R AND CLRED TO LAND BY TWR. UPON LNDG AND ROLLOUT, CTL TWR GAVE ME INSTRUCTIONS TO EXIT ON TXWY J, WHICH I REPLIED BACK AS I WAS SLOWING THE ACFT. THE RWY WAS BRIGHTLY LIT. AS I GOT THE ACFT TO A SAFE MANAGEABLE SPD WHERE I COULD DIVIDE MY FOCUS BTWN LOOKING FOR TXWYS AND MARKERS, I'VE NOTICED THAT I HAVE PASSED TXWY J. THUS, WHILE STILL MOVING ON THE RWY CTRLINE, I NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT I'VE PASSED THE TXWY. TWR CAME BACK WITH A LOUD ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 'STOP!,' 'STOP RIGHT THERE.' SO I GOT THE ACFT STOPPED IN A SAFE MANNER AND WITHOUT LOCKING THE TIRES UP. AT THIS POINT, IT WAS FOGGY ALL AROUND AND REALIZED THAT I CAME TO A STOP ON THE INTXN OF RWY 27. REALIZING THAT THE TWR TOLD ME TO STOP COMPLETELY ON THE RWY WAS FOR A REASON, SO I INSTINCTIVELY ADDED PWR TO MOVE FORWARD AND GET OUT OF THE INTXN. AGAINST TWR'S WISHES FOR ME TO STOP. IT SAVED THE DAY. PULLING FORWARD AND COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP AT THIS TIME, LOOKING BACK, I SAW A REGIONAL JET ROLLING DOWN THE RWY 27 BEHIND ME. HE ABORTED TKOF. IF I DID NOT PULL FORWARD, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR ACCIDENT. WHY THIS OCCURRED? I THOUGHT ABOUT IT. THE WX IS BAD, THE TWR CANNOT SEE GND TFC. WHEN I LANDED ON RWY 18R, THAT WAS MY RWY UNTIL I GOT OFF OF IT COMPLETELY. I DID NOT HEAR THE OTHER TFC ON FREQ WHO WAS TAKING OFF ON RWY 27 OR HIS CLRNC FOR TKOF BY ATC. OTHERWISE, I WOULD HAVE BEEN SITUATIONALLY AWARE. I BELIEVE THE PROB TO ALL OF THIS IS ASSUMING. THE TWR WAS ASSUMING THAT I WOULD GET OFF ON TXWY J. WHEN I READ BACK CLRNCS, IT IS JUST THAT, A READBACK SAYING I HEAR WHAT YOU TOLD ME. IT IS NOT A GUARANTEE THAT I WILL MAKE WHATEVER IS SAID HAPPEN. FOR INSTANCE, IF I WAS TOLD TO TAKE OFF ON A RWY, I READ IT BACK, AND AFTERWARDS, WHILE I ATTEMPT TO DO AS SAID, I ABORT THE TKOF. IT WAS NOT A GUARANTEE THE TKOF WILL HAPPEN. ATC CANNOT QUESTION WHY I DIDN'T TAKE OFF, SAME AS WHY I DID NOT TURN OFF ON TXWY J. IN THIS KIND OF ENVIRONMENT, THE ATC SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED THAT I EXITED THE RWY, GET A CONFIRMATION FROM ME THAT I HAVE IN FACT EXITED THE RWY BEFORE THE OTHER REGIONAL JET WAS GIVEN AN OK TO TAKE OFF. I BELIEVE THEY WERE ASSUMING THAT I WAS GOING TO TURN OFF AT TXWY J BY LOOKING AT THEIR GND RADAR. NOT CONFIRMING BUT ASSUMING. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THAT OF ABOVE. LACK OF VIGILANCE, AND COMPLACENCY OF THE EVERYDAY GOOD WX ROUTINE. WHEN THE WX IS BAD, YOU CONFIRM AND RECHK AND DOUBLE-CHK. BASICALLY, THE OTHER ACFT WAS GIVEN CLRNC FOR TKOF WHEN I WAS NOT DONE WITH THE RWY 18R, WHICH IS TO BRING THE ACFT TO A SAFE SPD, IDENT THE RWY, GET IT IN SIGHT, BEFORE TURNING OFF. US HUMANS ARE AT FAULT. I TAKE AWAY FROM THIS INCIDENT THAT I WILL ANALYZE CLRNCS MORE CAREFULLY. IN THIS BUSINESS, YOU CANNOT COME BACK AND SAY, WHY DIDN'T YOU FOLLOW WHAT I SAID? THEN, IT'S TOO LATE. CLRNC, WHEN ISSUED, WE NEED TO WAIT AND SEE IF THE ACTION DID HAPPEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CLRNC. AND US PLTS, WE TRY TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAKE THINGS HAPPEN ACCORDING TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS, BUT NOT ALWAYS. SOME THINGS ARE JUST IMPOSSIBLE AND WHEN WE CAN'T, WE LET ATC KNOW ASAP. IN THIS CASE, AS I DID. THERE WAS A COM BREAKDOWN AND THE USE OF ASSUMPTIONS. WHEN INTERSECTING RWYS ARE IN USE, WE NEED TO DO THINGS ONE AT A TIME. WHICH MEANS, FINISH ONE TASK COMPLETELY ON ONE RWY BEFORE DOING THINGS ON THE OTHER RWY. THAT WAY, IT'S ABSOLUTE AND SAFE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SPOKE WITH A SLIGHT FOREIGN ACCENT. STATED HE WAS FLYING SINGLE PLT IN AN SW4 INTO CVG AND LANDED ON RWY 18R IN FOG WITH RVR 2600 FT VISIBILITY. JUST AFTER TOUCHDOWN, THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED HIM TO TURN OFF ON TXWY J. HE ACKNOWLEDGED BY JUST REPEATING, 'TXWY J.' HE THEN TOLD THE TWR THAT HE HAD PASSED THE TXWY AND WAS IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED TO STOP. HE MOVED AWAY FROM THE RWY INTXN AND A FEW SECONDS LATER SAW A REGIONAL JET PASS BEHIND GOING AT A PRETTY GOOD PACE. HE DID NOT SEE ANY LIGHTS ONTHE RJ. HE THEN HEARD A DIFFERENT VOICE ON THE RADIO. AFTER PARKING, HE SAID HE CALLED THE TWR AND WAS TOLD THERE WAS NO PROB AND THAT THE CTLR HAD USED HIS BEST JUDGEMENT. RPTR ALSO STATED THAT HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY FSDO WHO ARE INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 634122: WE HAD TO DO A REJECTED TKOF FROM RWY 27 AT CVG DUE TO AN ACFT GOING THROUGH THE INTXN OF RWY 18R. THE WX WAS PART OF THE PROB: 1/2 MI VISIBILITY WITH FOG AT NIGHT. AT APPROX 100 KIAS, WE SAW THE TFC AND DID THE ABORT. THE CAUSE APPEARS TO BE 2-FOLD. THE OTHER ACFT DID NOT FOLLOW THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS AND THE TWR APPARENTLY DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THE OTHER ACFT WAS. ALSO, THE OTHER ACFT APPEARED TO HAVE ONLY A ROTATING BEACON. NO LNDG, TAXI, OR STROBE LIGHTS WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE UNDER THE WX AND LIGHT CONDITIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ON ACN 634122 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID AFTER THE INCIDENT HE RETURNED TO THE GATE TO HAVE THE BRAKES CHKED BY MAINT. WHILE PARKED AT THE GATE HE CALLED THE TWR TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. THE PERSON IN THE TWR DID NOT GIVE ANY DEFINITIVE INFO EXCEPT TO SAY THE METROLINER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 634566: WE INITIATED THE TKOF AFTER BEING CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 27. DURING THE TKOF ROLL, AT ABOUT 100 KIAS, I NOTICED ACFT LIGHTS ON RWY 18R APCHING RWY 27 INTXN. JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO NOTIFY THE CAPT, THE TWR CTLR YELLED, 'STOP! STOP! STOP!' ON THE RADIO. I CALLED 'ABORT ABORT ABORT' AND THE CAPT INITIATED THE ABORT JUST ABOVE 100 KIAS. WE PASSED THROUGH THE INTXN A FEW SECONDS AFTER THE METROLINER AND WOULD ESTIMATE OUR CLOSEST APCH TO BE APPROX 20 FT. IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME THAT THE METROLINER CREW EITHER THOUGHT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO CROSS RWY 27 OR DID NOT REALIZE THEY WERE XING RWY 27. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT THE METROLINER HAD NO STROBE LIGHTS OR THE STROBE LIGHTS WERE OFF. I THINK I MAY HAVE NOTICED THE AIRPLANE EARLIER IF THEY WERE ON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.