Narrative:

Upon flight crew preflight checks; thrust rating indicator was found to have a malfunction. I was not present; as discrepancy occurred on my day off; but to the best of my knowledge; the indicator was replaced for corrective action. This work card is accomplished after the global FMS modification in order to do an operations check of all the units disturbed during the wiring installation of the global FMS. Since the generator control units were removed and reinstalled; an operations check was required and at ZZZ is usually accomplished by an avionics technician assisting the a&P mechanics who are engine run qualified. This was the case because as an avionics amt I am not engine run qualified. I performed the tests on the #1 and #2 engine generators per steps 44 and 45 of engineering change order XXX card 30 and amm 24-20-01 and found both system to check normal. Since the only place to sign off for the work I performed was on steps 44 and 45 of the work card; I did so. Perhaps I should have had the a&P mechanic running the engines to sign on the lines with me. As pointed out to me by FAA representative; when I signed off these 2 steps; I was also signing for all the engine checks; which could have included the thrust rating indicator. Please allow me to point out that the nomenclature in steps 44 and 45 do not call out for engine 'checks' or 'tests' but merely engine run for the obvious reason that the engine must be running in order for the generator system to function. Also allow me to point out that the work card was written with the intent that the work would be performed at line stations other than ZZZ where the a&P mechanic performs the generator checks without the assistance of the avionics technician and; therefore; is operating the engine himself at the time. Perhaps; to clarify the responsibility for the signoffs; the first sentence of these 2 steps could be removed and an additional step added for the a&P to sign off for engine operation. I would also like to point out that an engine run is not required by the maintenance manual for a thrust rating indicator installation; only per amm 34-19-02 step 3B; a self test and a return to service test is the only requirement. I take my work serious and was just as alarmed as everyone else to discover that this operations check was somehow overlooked as well as the standby compass missing; so I did some follow-up work after meeting with the review team and would like to contribute my findings. First of all; I wish to point out that aircraft X as well as aircraft Y we are presently working on and 2 other previous modification line aircraft were a unique operation in the fact that they were not worked in conjunction with a 'C' check or any other operation; where pattern cards or routine cards assigned to the 'C' check are performed after the aircraft is de-hangared. These routine check cards cover operations checks on practically all system and would have prevented these discrepancies from occurring on aircraft X. Also the global FMS and enhanced ground proximity modification are generally accompanied by engineering change order XXXX; which is the captain's; first officer's; and center instrument panel standardization modification. In fact; reference to this is made in engineering change order YYYY; which states in the note: coordination with engineering change order AAAA. Since this engineering change order was not accomplished at this visit; the engineering change order AAAA was not issued in the bill of work. Also not issued in the bill of work (to my knowledge; anyway) was card 'maintenance program quality checklist' which is supposed to be issued on every MD80 modification line check even though the dock manager has the discretion to wholly or partially 'north/a' it. Perhaps; if it had been issued; the thrust rating indicator would have been checked. The standby compass would have been checked; and the cockpit door operation would have been checked. All that assuming that these steps would not have been north/a'ed by management. To summarize the cause of the incidents that took place on aircraft X; I would have to say that the paperwork system that we had in place during that operation was lacking; allowing things to fall through the cracks and needs to be corrected on this current operation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the only place to sign off for work accomplished being the generator control panel checks was on steps 44 and 45 on the job card. The FAA interpreted these 2 steps included the operations check of the other system including the thrust rating indicator and magnetic compass. The company has started the process to revise the job cards to break out the individual system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 WAS RELEASED FOR SVC AFTER MODIFICATIONS AND A PREFLT CHK BY THE FLT CREW REVEALED SEVERAL MAINT DISCREPANCIES.

Narrative: UPON FLT CREW PREFLT CHKS; THRUST RATING INDICATOR WAS FOUND TO HAVE A MALFUNCTION. I WAS NOT PRESENT; AS DISCREPANCY OCCURRED ON MY DAY OFF; BUT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE; THE INDICATOR WAS REPLACED FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION. THIS WORK CARD IS ACCOMPLISHED AFTER THE GLOBAL FMS MODIFICATION IN ORDER TO DO AN OPS CHK OF ALL THE UNITS DISTURBED DURING THE WIRING INSTALLATION OF THE GLOBAL FMS. SINCE THE GENERATOR CTL UNITS WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED; AN OPS CHK WAS REQUIRED AND AT ZZZ IS USUALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY AN AVIONICS TECHNICIAN ASSISTING THE A&P MECHS WHO ARE ENG RUN QUALIFIED. THIS WAS THE CASE BECAUSE AS AN AVIONICS AMT I AM NOT ENG RUN QUALIFIED. I PERFORMED THE TESTS ON THE #1 AND #2 ENG GENERATORS PER STEPS 44 AND 45 OF ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER XXX CARD 30 AND AMM 24-20-01 AND FOUND BOTH SYS TO CHK NORMAL. SINCE THE ONLY PLACE TO SIGN OFF FOR THE WORK I PERFORMED WAS ON STEPS 44 AND 45 OF THE WORK CARD; I DID SO. PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE HAD THE A&P MECH RUNNING THE ENGS TO SIGN ON THE LINES WITH ME. AS POINTED OUT TO ME BY FAA REPRESENTATIVE; WHEN I SIGNED OFF THESE 2 STEPS; I WAS ALSO SIGNING FOR ALL THE ENG CHKS; WHICH COULD HAVE INCLUDED THE THRUST RATING INDICATOR. PLEASE ALLOW ME TO POINT OUT THAT THE NOMENCLATURE IN STEPS 44 AND 45 DO NOT CALL OUT FOR ENG 'CHKS' OR 'TESTS' BUT MERELY ENG RUN FOR THE OBVIOUS REASON THAT THE ENG MUST BE RUNNING IN ORDER FOR THE GENERATOR SYS TO FUNCTION. ALSO ALLOW ME TO POINT OUT THAT THE WORK CARD WAS WRITTEN WITH THE INTENT THAT THE WORK WOULD BE PERFORMED AT LINE STATIONS OTHER THAN ZZZ WHERE THE A&P MECH PERFORMS THE GENERATOR CHKS WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE AVIONICS TECHNICIAN AND; THEREFORE; IS OPERATING THE ENG HIMSELF AT THE TIME. PERHAPS; TO CLARIFY THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SIGNOFFS; THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THESE 2 STEPS COULD BE REMOVED AND AN ADDITIONAL STEP ADDED FOR THE A&P TO SIGN OFF FOR ENG OP. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT AN ENG RUN IS NOT REQUIRED BY THE MAINT MANUAL FOR A THRUST RATING INDICATOR INSTALLATION; ONLY PER AMM 34-19-02 STEP 3B; A SELF TEST AND A RETURN TO SVC TEST IS THE ONLY REQUIREMENT. I TAKE MY WORK SERIOUS AND WAS JUST AS ALARMED AS EVERYONE ELSE TO DISCOVER THAT THIS OPS CHK WAS SOMEHOW OVERLOOKED AS WELL AS THE STANDBY COMPASS MISSING; SO I DID SOME FOLLOW-UP WORK AFTER MEETING WITH THE REVIEW TEAM AND WOULD LIKE TO CONTRIBUTE MY FINDINGS. FIRST OF ALL; I WISH TO POINT OUT THAT ACFT X AS WELL AS ACFT Y WE ARE PRESENTLY WORKING ON AND 2 OTHER PREVIOUS MODIFICATION LINE ACFT WERE A UNIQUE OP IN THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT WORKED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A 'C' CHK OR ANY OTHER OP; WHERE PATTERN CARDS OR ROUTINE CARDS ASSIGNED TO THE 'C' CHK ARE PERFORMED AFTER THE ACFT IS DE-HANGARED. THESE ROUTINE CHK CARDS COVER OPS CHKS ON PRACTICALLY ALL SYS AND WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THESE DISCREPANCIES FROM OCCURRING ON ACFT X. ALSO THE GLOBAL FMS AND ENHANCED GND PROX MODIFICATION ARE GENERALLY ACCOMPANIED BY ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER XXXX; WHICH IS THE CAPT'S; FO'S; AND CTR INST PANEL STANDARDIZATION MODIFICATION. IN FACT; REF TO THIS IS MADE IN ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER YYYY; WHICH STATES IN THE NOTE: COORD WITH ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER AAAA. SINCE THIS ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED AT THIS VISIT; THE ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER AAAA WAS NOT ISSUED IN THE BILL OF WORK. ALSO NOT ISSUED IN THE BILL OF WORK (TO MY KNOWLEDGE; ANYWAY) WAS CARD 'MAINT PROGRAM QUALITY CHKLIST' WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ISSUED ON EVERY MD80 MODIFICATION LINE CHK EVEN THOUGH THE DOCK MGR HAS THE DISCRETION TO WHOLLY OR PARTIALLY 'N/A' IT. PERHAPS; IF IT HAD BEEN ISSUED; THE THRUST RATING INDICATOR WOULD HAVE BEEN CHKED. THE STANDBY COMPASS WOULD HAVE BEEN CHKED; AND THE COCKPIT DOOR OP WOULD HAVE BEEN CHKED. ALL THAT ASSUMING THAT THESE STEPS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN N/A'ED BY MGMNT. TO SUMMARIZE THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE ON ACFT X; I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE PAPERWORK SYS THAT WE HAD IN PLACE DURING THAT OP WAS LACKING; ALLOWING THINGS TO FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS AND NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED ON THIS CURRENT OP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ONLY PLACE TO SIGN OFF FOR WORK ACCOMPLISHED BEING THE GENERATOR CTL PANEL CHKS WAS ON STEPS 44 AND 45 ON THE JOB CARD. THE FAA INTERPED THESE 2 STEPS INCLUDED THE OPS CHK OF THE OTHER SYS INCLUDING THE THRUST RATING INDICATOR AND MAGNETIC COMPASS. THE COMPANY HAS STARTED THE PROCESS TO REVISE THE JOB CARDS TO BREAK OUT THE INDIVIDUAL SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.