Narrative:

I was working a busy sector by myself (mcb hi FL240-FL340). I took a handoff on air carrier X inbound to gpt descending from FL330 to FL250. The aircraft was approximately 20 mi north of ZHU boundary and 40 mi north of R4401 which was active at and below FL290. I noticed the aircraft was headed for R4401; but I didn't have time to call ZME and instruct them to turn the aircraft. I figured I would turn the aircraft when it crossed into my airspace. The aircraft never called me; attempts to establish contact were unsuccessful; and the aircraft flew through the restr area. This deviation was a direct result of the staffing shortage in new specialty of ZHU. For 2 yrs; staffing in our specialty has been critical and nothing has been done. We constantly work busy sectors with 1 person. This leads to coordination being done late or not at all; putting controllers and aircraft in compromising sits. At the time of the deviation; every controller on duty was in the specialty. My sector and the sector adjacent to mine should have had help; but none was available. ZME put air carrier X on the wrong frequency; that controller was too busy to answer him; he went back to ZME and then finally to me. By that time he had flown through R4401. Management claims we are being more productive by working with fewer controllers. I claim we are compromising safety. What would the passenger and families of passenger on air carrier X think if someone told them they could have been shot down in a restr area because the controllers were too busy to ensure the safety of the aircraft? A d-side on my sector would have enabled us to call ZME; put the aircraft on a heading; and the deviation would never happen. These sits are going to happen more frequently as we continue to work more aircraft with less controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZHU CTLR DESCRIBES OPDEV THROUGH RESTR AIRSPACE AFTER LATE ACFT FREQ XFER AND RPTED MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING A BUSY SECTOR BY MYSELF (MCB HI FL240-FL340). I TOOK A HDOF ON ACR X INBOUND TO GPT DSNDING FROM FL330 TO FL250. THE ACFT WAS APPROX 20 MI N OF ZHU BOUNDARY AND 40 MI N OF R4401 WHICH WAS ACTIVE AT AND BELOW FL290. I NOTICED THE ACFT WAS HEADED FOR R4401; BUT I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO CALL ZME AND INSTRUCT THEM TO TURN THE ACFT. I FIGURED I WOULD TURN THE ACFT WHEN IT CROSSED INTO MY AIRSPACE. THE ACFT NEVER CALLED ME; ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL; AND THE ACFT FLEW THROUGH THE RESTR AREA. THIS DEV WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE STAFFING SHORTAGE IN NEW SPECIALTY OF ZHU. FOR 2 YRS; STAFFING IN OUR SPECIALTY HAS BEEN CRITICAL AND NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE. WE CONSTANTLY WORK BUSY SECTORS WITH 1 PERSON. THIS LEADS TO COORD BEING DONE LATE OR NOT AT ALL; PUTTING CTLRS AND ACFT IN COMPROMISING SITS. AT THE TIME OF THE DEV; EVERY CTLR ON DUTY WAS IN THE SPECIALTY. MY SECTOR AND THE SECTOR ADJACENT TO MINE SHOULD HAVE HAD HELP; BUT NONE WAS AVAILABLE. ZME PUT ACR X ON THE WRONG FREQ; THAT CTLR WAS TOO BUSY TO ANSWER HIM; HE WENT BACK TO ZME AND THEN FINALLY TO ME. BY THAT TIME HE HAD FLOWN THROUGH R4401. MGMNT CLAIMS WE ARE BEING MORE PRODUCTIVE BY WORKING WITH FEWER CTLRS. I CLAIM WE ARE COMPROMISING SAFETY. WHAT WOULD THE PAX AND FAMILIES OF PAX ON ACR X THINK IF SOMEONE TOLD THEM THEY COULD HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN IN A RESTR AREA BECAUSE THE CTLRS WERE TOO BUSY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT? A D-SIDE ON MY SECTOR WOULD HAVE ENABLED US TO CALL ZME; PUT THE ACFT ON A HDG; AND THE DEV WOULD NEVER HAPPEN. THESE SITS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN MORE FREQUENTLY AS WE CONTINUE TO WORK MORE ACFT WITH LESS CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.