Narrative:

An operational error occurred at rno. Runway 16R/left were the active runways. The ground controller released control of runway 7 to local control for an arrival. The ground controller then taxied a BE58 to runway 16R; with no restrs other than a route which gave the aircraft permission to cross runway 7. The lights were set to the appropriate indicators; and the runway in use placard was in place on the controller's pad according to directives. The BE58 crossed runway 7 as a C210 was landing. Their paths intersected at the intersection of runway 7 and taxiway a. The C210 took evasive action swerving to the left side of the runway; smoking a brake in the process. The BE58 saw the aircraft landing and stopped/turned his aircraft to the right. The aircraft passed within less than 20 ft of each other. At the time of the occurrence; I was working ground control and controller in charge combined. Local control #1 and clearance delivery position were opened. The most direct cause of the incident was that I forgot I no longer had control of runway 7. Indirect causal factors were distrs in the tower cabin attendant; one of which was that as controller in charge; I was attempting to work the standby radio to determine if the ATIS broadcast was going out. (We had received several complaints that the ATIS was not being received through clearance delivery.) staffing at this facility is critical. We are operating at approximately 75% staffing level. If controller in charge had been staffed separately; there would have been an extra set of eyes/ears in the tower cabin attendant; I would not have been distraction by other duties; and this error/near fatal incident would not have occurred. An additional factor to this incident directly relates to staffing and current FAA mandates. I was not feeling well that day due to lack of sleep and severe headache. (This headache eventually grew to a migraine for which I had to be medicated after leaving work.) under the threat of the loss of my job; I routinely report to work when I feel incapacitated for duty. Upon reporting to work; I did request annual leave as soon as possible. However; due to staffing; the supervisor was unable to release me. At the time of this incident; an unusual event occurred which I consider my personal causal factor for the incident. I had placed the runway in use placard on my pad (which is one of the options in accordance with local directives) rather than holding it in my left hand; which is the hand I use to 'talk' (push the button on my headset) and is my normal operating practice/habit. I have been unable to determine why at this particular moment; I did not have the placard in my hand; other than to blame it on distrs both in the cabin attendant and due to my 'health.' to prevent further similar events; this and all ATC facilities need to be adequately staffed so that controllers are not overworked nor taxed with extra duties that cause distrs. Controllers also should not be under the threat of the loss of their job when they are ill; especially considering that because we must maintain our medical clearance and are restr from taking most any medications to treat illness because of the nature of our job. ATC is a unique and serious job that can lead to serious consequences under less than ideal situations. Administrative personnel at higher levels who are in charge of our staffing and other directives should not try to 'cookie cut' the FAA and its controllers to a business model nor hold us accountable to all other opm regulations (regarding sick leave) when we are held to a higher standard elsewhere. ATC controllers need to operate at a 100% success rate 100% of the time. ATC controllers also cannot take medication when they are ill as we are restr due to our medical clearance. This job is unique. These people are unique. We need appropriate support to do the job we all love to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LCL CTLR AT RNO DESCRIBES OPERROR BTWN TAXIING AND LNDG ACFT.

Narrative: AN OPERROR OCCURRED AT RNO. RWY 16R/L WERE THE ACTIVE RWYS. THE GND CTLR RELEASED CTL OF RWY 7 TO LCL CTL FOR AN ARR. THE GND CTLR THEN TAXIED A BE58 TO RWY 16R; WITH NO RESTRS OTHER THAN A RTE WHICH GAVE THE ACFT PERMISSION TO CROSS RWY 7. THE LIGHTS WERE SET TO THE APPROPRIATE INDICATORS; AND THE RWY IN USE PLACARD WAS IN PLACE ON THE CTLR'S PAD ACCORDING TO DIRECTIVES. THE BE58 CROSSED RWY 7 AS A C210 WAS LNDG. THEIR PATHS INTERSECTED AT THE INTXN OF RWY 7 AND TXWY A. THE C210 TOOK EVASIVE ACTION SWERVING TO THE L SIDE OF THE RWY; SMOKING A BRAKE IN THE PROCESS. THE BE58 SAW THE ACFT LNDG AND STOPPED/TURNED HIS ACFT TO THE R. THE ACFT PASSED WITHIN LESS THAN 20 FT OF EACH OTHER. AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE; I WAS WORKING GND CTL AND CIC COMBINED. LCL CTL #1 AND CLRNC DELIVERY POS WERE OPENED. THE MOST DIRECT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT WAS THAT I FORGOT I NO LONGER HAD CTL OF RWY 7. INDIRECT CAUSAL FACTORS WERE DISTRS IN THE TWR CAB; ONE OF WHICH WAS THAT AS CIC; I WAS ATTEMPTING TO WORK THE STANDBY RADIO TO DETERMINE IF THE ATIS BROADCAST WAS GOING OUT. (WE HAD RECEIVED SEVERAL COMPLAINTS THAT THE ATIS WAS NOT BEING RECEIVED THROUGH CLRNC DELIVERY.) STAFFING AT THIS FACILITY IS CRITICAL. WE ARE OPERATING AT APPROX 75% STAFFING LEVEL. IF CIC HAD BEEN STAFFED SEPARATELY; THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EXTRA SET OF EYES/EARS IN THE TWR CAB; I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISTR BY OTHER DUTIES; AND THIS ERROR/NEAR FATAL INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR TO THIS INCIDENT DIRECTLY RELATES TO STAFFING AND CURRENT FAA MANDATES. I WAS NOT FEELING WELL THAT DAY DUE TO LACK OF SLEEP AND SEVERE HEADACHE. (THIS HEADACHE EVENTUALLY GREW TO A MIGRAINE FOR WHICH I HAD TO BE MEDICATED AFTER LEAVING WORK.) UNDER THE THREAT OF THE LOSS OF MY JOB; I ROUTINELY RPT TO WORK WHEN I FEEL INCAPACITATED FOR DUTY. UPON RPTING TO WORK; I DID REQUEST ANNUAL LEAVE ASAP. HOWEVER; DUE TO STAFFING; THE SUPVR WAS UNABLE TO RELEASE ME. AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT; AN UNUSUAL EVENT OCCURRED WHICH I CONSIDER MY PERSONAL CAUSAL FACTOR FOR THE INCIDENT. I HAD PLACED THE RWY IN USE PLACARD ON MY PAD (WHICH IS ONE OF THE OPTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LCL DIRECTIVES) RATHER THAN HOLDING IT IN MY L HAND; WHICH IS THE HAND I USE TO 'TALK' (PUSH THE BUTTON ON MY HEADSET) AND IS MY NORMAL OPERATING PRACTICE/HABIT. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHY AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT; I DID NOT HAVE THE PLACARD IN MY HAND; OTHER THAN TO BLAME IT ON DISTRS BOTH IN THE CAB AND DUE TO MY 'HEALTH.' TO PREVENT FURTHER SIMILAR EVENTS; THIS AND ALL ATC FACILITIES NEED TO BE ADEQUATELY STAFFED SO THAT CTLRS ARE NOT OVERWORKED NOR TAXED WITH EXTRA DUTIES THAT CAUSE DISTRS. CTLRS ALSO SHOULD NOT BE UNDER THE THREAT OF THE LOSS OF THEIR JOB WHEN THEY ARE ILL; ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT BECAUSE WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR MEDICAL CLRNC AND ARE RESTR FROM TAKING MOST ANY MEDICATIONS TO TREAT ILLNESS BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF OUR JOB. ATC IS A UNIQUE AND SERIOUS JOB THAT CAN LEAD TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES UNDER LESS THAN IDEAL SITUATIONS. ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AT HIGHER LEVELS WHO ARE IN CHARGE OF OUR STAFFING AND OTHER DIRECTIVES SHOULD NOT TRY TO 'COOKIE CUT' THE FAA AND ITS CTLRS TO A BUSINESS MODEL NOR HOLD US ACCOUNTABLE TO ALL OTHER OPM REGS (REGARDING SICK LEAVE) WHEN WE ARE HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD ELSEWHERE. ATC CTLRS NEED TO OPERATE AT A 100% SUCCESS RATE 100% OF THE TIME. ATC CTLRS ALSO CANNOT TAKE MEDICATION WHEN THEY ARE ILL AS WE ARE RESTR DUE TO OUR MEDICAL CLRNC. THIS JOB IS UNIQUE. THESE PEOPLE ARE UNIQUE. WE NEED APPROPRIATE SUPPORT TO DO THE JOB WE ALL LOVE TO DO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.