Narrative:

Upon arrival at the ZZZ airport; we found that aircraft X had been brought down from the aircraft service center after having maintenance work performed. During the preflight we found that the required indicator lights for a switch on the co-pilot's side were burnt out. The MEL section of the afm states that one but not both indicator lights may be MEL'ed inoperative. After faxing our company's maintenance control in ZZZ1; I was informed that I was to MEL the item under a different MEL number that would MEL the switch; which was working just fine; so that the aircraft could continue on being used for the day's operation. After numerous phone calls between myself and maintenance control phone tech mr X; company chief pilot mr Y; and assistant director of operations mr Z. I was told indirectly that disciplinary action was forthcoming and that I was going to comply with how they wanted the paperwork to read and that I was going to MEL the switch and continue the day's flts. At that time; I stated that I would comply only under protest to avoid disciplinary action from the company. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the airplane sat on the ground for six hours while the issue was debated. Enough pressure built up with management that the threat of disciplinary action was used to force the MEL deferred item reference to be changed. To fix the switch position lighting would have required about 30 minutes of tech time. The airplanes are on tight schedules.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR STATES THAT COMPANY PRESSURED FLT CREW TO ACCEPT IMPROPER MEL DEFERRAL IN ORDER TO AVOID A MAINT DELAY.

Narrative: UPON ARR AT THE ZZZ ARPT; WE FOUND THAT ACFT X HAD BEEN BROUGHT DOWN FROM THE ACFT SERVICE CTR AFTER HAVING MAINT WORK PERFORMED. DURING THE PREFLT WE FOUND THAT THE REQUIRED INDICATOR LIGHTS FOR A SWITCH ON THE CO-PLT'S SIDE WERE BURNT OUT. THE MEL SECTION OF THE AFM STATES THAT ONE BUT NOT BOTH INDICATOR LIGHTS MAY BE MEL'ED INOP. AFTER FAXING OUR COMPANY'S MAINT CTL IN ZZZ1; I WAS INFORMED THAT I WAS TO MEL THE ITEM UNDER A DIFFERENT MEL NUMBER THAT WOULD MEL THE SWITCH; WHICH WAS WORKING JUST FINE; SO THAT THE ACFT COULD CONTINUE ON BEING USED FOR THE DAY'S OP. AFTER NUMEROUS PHONE CALLS BETWEEN MYSELF AND MAINT CTL PHONE TECH MR X; COMPANY CHIEF PLT MR Y; AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF OPS MR Z. I WAS TOLD INDIRECTLY THAT DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS FORTHCOMING AND THAT I WAS GOING TO COMPLY WITH HOW THEY WANTED THE PAPERWORK TO READ AND THAT I WAS GOING TO MEL THE SWITCH AND CONTINUE THE DAY'S FLTS. AT THAT TIME; I STATED THAT I WOULD COMPLY ONLY UNDER PROTEST TO AVOID DISCIPLINARY ACTION FROM THE COMPANY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE AIRPLANE SAT ON THE GND FOR SIX HOURS WHILE THE ISSUE WAS DEBATED. ENOUGH PRESSURE BUILT UP WITH MANAGEMENT THAT THE THREAT OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS USED TO FORCE THE MEL DEFERRED ITEM REFERENCE TO BE CHANGED. TO FIX THE SWITCH POSITION LIGHTING WOULD HAVE REQUIRED ABOUT 30 MINUTES OF TECH TIME. THE AIRPLANES ARE ON TIGHT SCHEDULES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.