37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 659219 |
Time | |
Date | 200505 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : ord.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | BAe 125 Series 800 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : maintenance ground : parked ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 87 flight time total : 6500 flight time type : 900 |
ASRS Report | 659219 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : inspection performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Chart Or Publication Company Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
On may/sat/2005; I was dispatched as the PIC to perform a post-maintenance chkflt on a hawker 800XP. The operational check flight was to originate at ZZZ; and was under the operational control of air taxi X. The aircraft had been written up by the prior crew and required flight control checks for two items: aileron cable tension adjustment and elevator cable tension adjustment. During our preflight; my first officer found the main cabin entry door seal to be abraded; cut; and compromised in terms of cabin pressurization. I wrote up this discrepancy; and it was logged in our aircraft logbook. Air taxi then sent a mechanic to meet us at the aircraft and visually inspect the door seal. He did so and determined it to be not safe for pressurized flight. After speaking on the phone with my hawker assistant chief pilot; and the company maintenance about this issue; the company then faxed me a DOT-FAA special airworthiness certificate (ferry flight permit -- at or below 12000 ft for an unpressurized aircraft). The asst chief pilot then instructed me to fly the post-maintenance check flight in conjunction with the ferry flight permit leg to ZZZ1 for more maintenance. I was not comfortable accepting this brief; I did not feel it was legal (or safe) to conduct this flight. I expressed this reservation to my asst chief pilot; and our maintenance department; pointing out that #6 of the limitations on the special flight permit states: 'this permit is not valid unless the aircraft is inspected to the extent necessary to determine that it is safe for the intended flight.' the asst chief pilot then raised his voice forcefully and aggressively while practically threatening us to take this flight on the speakerphone with my first officer and me. He also had the company's maintenance supervisor tell us to take the flight as it was legal to do so. My first officer and myself reluctantly flew the operational check flight for control checks while flying under the ferry flight permit to ZZZ1. We feel we should never have been forced to do so. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated two issues were involved in the maintenance ferry flight. That a test flight be accomplished during the maintenance ferry for flight control checks and the required inspection by a certified tech was not necessary. The asst chief pilot and the company maintenance supervisor both agreed the inspection step 6 of the ferry permit was to be ignored and was not necessary. The permit itself states the ferry permit is not valid without the inspection. They sent the permit and had the original document. The original inspection was not accomplished; but the test flight was accomplished. Reporter stated; 'I now believe it all comes down to their way or the highway.'
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A HAWKER 800XP CREW WAS PRESSURED TO OPERATE THE AIRPLANE ON A MAINT FERRY FLT THAT WAS NOT INSPECTED AND SIGNED OFF AS SAFE TO FLY. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS STATED ON THE MAINT FERRY PERMIT.
Narrative: ON MAY/SAT/2005; I WAS DISPATCHED AS THE PIC TO PERFORM A POST-MAINT CHKFLT ON A HAWKER 800XP. THE OPERATIONAL CHK FLT WAS TO ORIGINATE AT ZZZ; AND WAS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CTL OF AIR TAXI X. THE ACFT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP BY THE PRIOR CREW AND REQUIRED FLT CTL CHKS FOR TWO ITEMS: AILERON CABLE TENSION ADJUSTMENT AND ELEVATOR CABLE TENSION ADJUSTMENT. DURING OUR PREFLT; MY FO FOUND THE MAIN CABIN ENTRY DOOR SEAL TO BE ABRADED; CUT; AND COMPROMISED IN TERMS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION. I WROTE UP THIS DISCREPANCY; AND IT WAS LOGGED IN OUR ACFT LOGBOOK. AIR TAXI THEN SENT A MECHANIC TO MEET US AT THE ACFT AND VISUALLY INSPECT THE DOOR SEAL. HE DID SO AND DETERMINED IT TO BE NOT SAFE FOR PRESSURIZED FLT. AFTER SPEAKING ON THE PHONE WITH MY HAWKER ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT; AND THE COMPANY MAINT ABOUT THIS ISSUE; THE COMPANY THEN FAXED ME A DOT-FAA SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE (FERRY FLT PERMIT -- AT OR BELOW 12000 FT FOR AN UNPRESSURIZED ACFT). THE ASST CHIEF PLT THEN INSTRUCTED ME TO FLY THE POST-MAINT CHK FLT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FERRY FLT PERMIT LEG TO ZZZ1 FOR MORE MAINT. I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE ACCEPTING THIS BRIEF; I DID NOT FEEL IT WAS LEGAL (OR SAFE) TO CONDUCT THIS FLT. I EXPRESSED THIS RESERVATION TO MY ASST CHIEF PLT; AND OUR MAINT DEPARTMENT; POINTING OUT THAT #6 OF THE LIMITATIONS ON THE SPECIAL FLT PERMIT STATES: 'THIS PERMIT IS NOT VALID UNLESS THE ACFT IS INSPECTED TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THAT IT IS SAFE FOR THE INTENDED FLT.' THE ASST CHIEF PLT THEN RAISED HIS VOICE FORCEFULLY AND AGGRESSIVELY WHILE PRACTICALLY THREATENING US TO TAKE THIS FLT ON THE SPEAKERPHONE WITH MY FO AND ME. HE ALSO HAD THE COMPANY'S MAINT SUPVR TELL US TO TAKE THE FLT AS IT WAS LEGAL TO DO SO. MY FO AND MYSELF RELUCTANTLY FLEW THE OPERATIONAL CHK FLT FOR CTL CHKS WHILE FLYING UNDER THE FERRY FLT PERMIT TO ZZZ1. WE FEEL WE SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DO SO. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED TWO ISSUES WERE INVOLVED IN THE MAINT FERRY FLT. THAT A TEST FLT BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE MAINT FERRY FOR FLT CTL CHKS AND THE REQUIRED INSPECTION BY A CERTIFIED TECH WAS NOT NECESSARY. THE ASST CHIEF PLT AND THE COMPANY MAINT SUPVR BOTH AGREED THE INSPECTION STEP 6 OF THE FERRY PERMIT WAS TO BE IGNORED AND WAS NOT NECESSARY. THE PERMIT ITSELF STATES THE FERRY PERMIT IS NOT VALID WITHOUT THE INSPECTION. THEY SENT THE PERMIT AND HAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT. THE ORIGINAL INSPECTION WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED; BUT THE TEST FLT WAS ACCOMPLISHED. RPTR STATED; 'I NOW BELIEVE IT ALL COMES DOWN TO THEIR WAY OR THE HIGHWAY.'
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.