Narrative:

We were waiting in an indefinite hold for departure due to thunderstorms when we got a 'rad altitude 1 fail' on EICAS along with 'GPWS inoperative' and 'windshear inoperative.' after looking at the MEL and QRH; I contacted dispatch and maintenance control. Maintenance control told me that since I had left the gate I was en route; and to write it up and it would be dealt with in ZZZ2. He hadn't pulled the MEL before telling me this. After some prodding; he did read the MEL and agreed that maintenance needed to defer it. He still would not say that we needed to return to the gate. The main problem was the windshear inoperative. It states to avoid windshear; and we had thunderstorms and windshear at departure and at destination. Dispatch agreed that we couldn't continue with this deferred; maintenance control didn't agree. Maintenance control commanded ZZZ1 maintenance to defer and not replace the #1 radio altimeter. After doing so; maintenance control wanted us to depart again for ZZZ2. I refused and again cited the reason why. Dispatch cancelled the flight in the mean time; ending the argument. Maintenance control then tried to give the airplane to a second crew (who stated the same problem); and a third crew. While the third crew was arguing with maintenance control; maintenance replaced the radio altimeter fixing the problem. The chain had to be repeatedly broken. Maintenance control did all they could to keep the chain of events in place. The weakness beyond maintenance control was the MEL. For radar altimeter #1 fail; it notes the associated failures of GPWS; not windshear. The two are tied together so one might not think it is necessary to state the windshear. This case proves the need. The primary problem is maintenance control. First they had a canned response without looking at the books and considering the situation. Then they would not accept the need to look at windshear inoperative as a separate deferral. They wanted to send the airplane out incorrectly and inadequately deferred. Then they tried to pass the problem on. This is more than a legality issue; it is a safety issue. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter advised that the company's maintenance operations considers an aircraft to be 'in flight' once it has left the gate. He advises maintenance response to any reported abnormality once the aircraft has left the gate is to 'follow the pilot's operations handbook and to contact us when you are at your destination.' the reporter stated the pragmatic result of this philosophy is the refusal of maintenance to provide assistance and to attempt to force flight crews to continue to their destinations with mechanical irregularities they might personally consider to be unacceptable. This happens even; as in this case; when the aircraft is physically still on the ground at the departure station when a disqualifying anomaly is discovered by the flight crew. Reporter finally stated he felt the flight crews were under significant pressure to conform to the intent of this philosophy. He feels that the intent is to make the completion of the flight to destination the primary consideration once the aircraft has left the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF ERJ ENCOUNTER RELUCTANCE BY MAINT CTLR TO ADDRESS MULTIPLE FLT SAFETY WARNING SYSTEM FAILURES. CAPT REFUSES ACFT WHEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF MEL REQUIREMENTS.

Narrative: WE WERE WAITING IN AN INDEFINITE HOLD FOR DEP DUE TO TSTMS WHEN WE GOT A 'RAD ALT 1 FAIL' ON EICAS ALONG WITH 'GPWS INOP' AND 'WINDSHEAR INOP.' AFTER LOOKING AT THE MEL AND QRH; I CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL. MAINT CTL TOLD ME THAT SINCE I HAD LEFT THE GATE I WAS ENRTE; AND TO WRITE IT UP AND IT WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN ZZZ2. HE HADN'T PULLED THE MEL BEFORE TELLING ME THIS. AFTER SOME PRODDING; HE DID READ THE MEL AND AGREED THAT MAINT NEEDED TO DEFER IT. HE STILL WOULD NOT SAY THAT WE NEEDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE. THE MAIN PROB WAS THE WINDSHEAR INOP. IT STATES TO AVOID WINDSHEAR; AND WE HAD TSTMS AND WINDSHEAR AT DEP AND AT DESTINATION. DISPATCH AGREED THAT WE COULDN'T CONTINUE WITH THIS DEFERRED; MAINT CTL DIDN'T AGREE. MAINT CTL COMMANDED ZZZ1 MAINT TO DEFER AND NOT REPLACE THE #1 RADIO ALTIMETER. AFTER DOING SO; MAINT CTL WANTED US TO DEPART AGAIN FOR ZZZ2. I REFUSED AND AGAIN CITED THE REASON WHY. DISPATCH CANCELLED THE FLT IN THE MEAN TIME; ENDING THE ARGUMENT. MAINT CTL THEN TRIED TO GIVE THE AIRPLANE TO A SECOND CREW (WHO STATED THE SAME PROB); AND A THIRD CREW. WHILE THE THIRD CREW WAS ARGUING WITH MAINT CTL; MAINT REPLACED THE RADIO ALTIMETER FIXING THE PROB. THE CHAIN HAD TO BE REPEATEDLY BROKEN. MAINT CTL DID ALL THEY COULD TO KEEP THE CHAIN OF EVENTS IN PLACE. THE WEAKNESS BEYOND MAINT CTL WAS THE MEL. FOR RADAR ALTIMETER #1 FAIL; IT NOTES THE ASSOCIATED FAILURES OF GPWS; NOT WINDSHEAR. THE TWO ARE TIED TOGETHER SO ONE MIGHT NOT THINK IT IS NECESSARY TO STATE THE WINDSHEAR. THIS CASE PROVES THE NEED. THE PRIMARY PROB IS MAINT CTL. FIRST THEY HAD A CANNED RESPONSE WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE BOOKS AND CONSIDERING THE SIT. THEN THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NEED TO LOOK AT WINDSHEAR INOP AS A SEPARATE DEFERRAL. THEY WANTED TO SEND THE AIRPLANE OUT INCORRECTLY AND INADEQUATELY DEFERRED. THEN THEY TRIED TO PASS THE PROB ON. THIS IS MORE THAN A LEGALITY ISSUE; IT IS A SAFETY ISSUE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADVISED THAT THE COMPANY'S MAINT OPS CONSIDERS AN ACFT TO BE 'IN FLT' ONCE IT HAS LEFT THE GATE. HE ADVISES MAINT RESPONSE TO ANY RPTED ABNORMALITY ONCE THE ACFT HAS LEFT THE GATE IS TO 'FOLLOW THE PLT'S OPS HANDBOOK AND TO CONTACT US WHEN YOU ARE AT YOUR DEST.' THE RPTR STATED THE PRAGMATIC RESULT OF THIS PHILOSOPHY IS THE REFUSAL OF MAINT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND TO ATTEMPT TO FORCE FLT CREWS TO CONTINUE TO THEIR DESTINATIONS WITH MECHANICAL IRREGULARITIES THEY MIGHT PERSONALLY CONSIDER TO BE UNACCEPTABLE. THIS HAPPENS EVEN; AS IN THIS CASE; WHEN THE ACFT IS PHYSICALLY STILL ON THE GND AT THE DEP STATION WHEN A DISQUALIFYING ANOMALY IS DISCOVERED BY THE FLT CREW. RPTR FINALLY STATED HE FELT THE FLT CREWS WERE UNDER SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE TO CONFORM TO THE INTENT OF THIS PHILOSOPHY. HE FEELS THAT THE INTENT IS TO MAKE THE COMPLETION OF THE FLT TO DEST THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION ONCE THE ACFT HAS LEFT THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.