Narrative:

I was approached by a fellow pilot approximately 3 days before this flight occurred and was asked to serve as a safety pilot/passenger so that the pilot could practice instrument procedures on a flight with stops at various airports along the route to practice instrument procedures. I was under the impression that the pilot was instrument rated and current and was wanting me to come along to ensure that he could get the 6 instrument approachs and other requirements for instrument currency while I watched for traffic during VFR portions while the pilot was simulating instrument conditions with a hood. On the day of the flight the pilot wanted to file an IFR flight plan so that he could practice communicating with ATC during instrument procedures. The pilot also informed me that he had flown the exact same route under IFR with his instructor during his training. During the beginning of the flight I once again assumed that the pilot was instrument rated and current and I took on the role of a passenger looking out for traffic. During the filing of the pilot's IFR flight plan in the air and handling of the airplane into IMC during the climb out and cruise; I began to suspect that the pilot did not have adequate experience or proficiency in some instrument procedures. The pilot began to deviate from the assigned altitude of 5000 ft MSL to 5300 ft MSL without asking for a clearance. I mentioned the deviation to the pilot and he eventually got a clearance to cruise at 5300 ft MSL. During the flight; I was taking the role of a passenger and enjoying the view outside the airplane and assumed that the pilot as PIC was listening to the radios and copying clrncs. I began to become disconnected from the radio communications and navigation route. I glanced at the DME to the IAF for the VOR/DME runway 11 approach; and mentioned to the pilot that we would be reaching it soon. Once again; I began looking outside the aircraft until the pilot asked me what the initial heading on the approach was. I told him that we would need to turn to a heading of approximately 270 degrees and assumed that he had already been cleared for the approach and confirmed the clearance. The pilot began the DME arc for the approach and was unable to maintain the arc and seemed ignorant of how to perform DME arc procedures. I immediately became very suspicious and had to begin offering help on following the approach course. Shortly after that; center came over the radio and asked for the pilot's heading. The pilot replied that he was 'on the DME arc for the VOR/DME runway 11 approach.' center replied to the pilot that he was not cleared for the approach. The pilot replied to center with an apology and said that he was a 'VFR pilot flying in instrument conditions and had a safety pilot on board.' center replied informing the pilot of his various infractions of the FARS and that the controller had called the adjacent airspace to warn them of the pilot's aircraft. The pilot then requested to go to ZZZ for the visual approach and was given a holding clearance at ZZZ VOR by center. The pilot then asked me to take control of the radios at this point and I repeated the holding clearance and directed the pilot toward ZZZ VOR. At 5000 ft MSL we were in the clouds and were beginning to experience some light airframe icing. I requested an altitude of 3000 ft MSL to escape the icing and was initially denied due to traffic. Shortly thereafter; we were cleared to descend to 3000 ft MSL and report when we had ZZZ in sight. Upon reaching 3000 ft MSL; we were clear of the clouds in VMC and I reported ZZZ in sight and canceled the IFR flight plan. The pilot resumed communications and aircraft control at this point and landed under VFR. When on the ground; the pilot and I discussed the preceding events. The pilot informed me that he thought that having an instrument rated safety pilot would allow him to practice instrument procedures on an IFR flight plan. I informed him that he would need a cfii to be able to fly in instrument conditions with only a private pilot certificate and that I thought he was instrument rated and current when we left to go on the flight. We then decided to abandon our trip and returned to the aircraft's home airport in VFR conditions. One of the factors that contributed to the problems during this flight was the fact that I assumed that the pilot was instrument rated and current and did not verify the pilot's ratings and currency. I also assumed that the pilot understood the far's regarding safety pilots and flying under IFR. Another factor that contributed to the problems during this flight was the fact that the pilot was 50 yrs old; owned the aircraft that was flown and that I was 19. I had known the pilot for my entire life; trusted him and thought that he knew what he was doing since he was 30 yrs my senior and owned the airplane. This made it harder for me to correct the pilot; especially since I was assuming that I would be fulfilling a passenger/safety pilot role during the flight. I learned that in the future I should always verify pilot's qualifications and never assume that another pilot has the ratings that he/she would need to legally act as PIC on a flight. I also learned that it is important to verify your role in a flight and to never be afraid to offer suggestions if you see a problem; even if the pilot is 30 yrs your senior or if there are questions about seniority. It is also important to be alert to the aircraft operations and communications when you are a passenger with a pilot's certificate on a small aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOW TIME; INST RATED PAX; SAFETY PLT OBSERVED SEVERAL PROCEDURAL ERRORS BY PA28 PLT ON AN IFR FLT. PAX WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE PLT WAS NOT INST RATED.

Narrative: I WAS APCHED BY A FELLOW PLT APPROX 3 DAYS BEFORE THIS FLT OCCURRED AND WAS ASKED TO SERVE AS A SAFETY PLT/PAX SO THAT THE PLT COULD PRACTICE INST PROCS ON A FLT WITH STOPS AT VARIOUS ARPTS ALONG THE RTE TO PRACTICE INST PROCS. I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PLT WAS INST RATED AND CURRENT AND WAS WANTING ME TO COME ALONG TO ENSURE THAT HE COULD GET THE 6 INST APCHS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR INST CURRENCY WHILE I WATCHED FOR TFC DURING VFR PORTIONS WHILE THE PLT WAS SIMULATING INST CONDITIONS WITH A HOOD. ON THE DAY OF THE FLT THE PLT WANTED TO FILE AN IFR FLT PLAN SO THAT HE COULD PRACTICE COMMUNICATING WITH ATC DURING INST PROCS. THE PLT ALSO INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD FLOWN THE EXACT SAME RTE UNDER IFR WITH HIS INSTRUCTOR DURING HIS TRAINING. DURING THE BEGINNING OF THE FLT I ONCE AGAIN ASSUMED THAT THE PLT WAS INST RATED AND CURRENT AND I TOOK ON THE ROLE OF A PAX LOOKING OUT FOR TFC. DURING THE FILING OF THE PLT'S IFR FLT PLAN IN THE AIR AND HANDLING OF THE AIRPLANE INTO IMC DURING THE CLBOUT AND CRUISE; I BEGAN TO SUSPECT THAT THE PLT DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE EXPERIENCE OR PROFICIENCY IN SOME INST PROCS. THE PLT BEGAN TO DEVIATE FROM THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 5000 FT MSL TO 5300 FT MSL WITHOUT ASKING FOR A CLRNC. I MENTIONED THE DEV TO THE PLT AND HE EVENTUALLY GOT A CLRNC TO CRUISE AT 5300 FT MSL. DURING THE FLT; I WAS TAKING THE ROLE OF A PAX AND ENJOYING THE VIEW OUTSIDE THE AIRPLANE AND ASSUMED THAT THE PLT AS PIC WAS LISTENING TO THE RADIOS AND COPYING CLRNCS. I BEGAN TO BECOME DISCONNECTED FROM THE RADIO COMS AND NAV RTE. I GLANCED AT THE DME TO THE IAF FOR THE VOR/DME RWY 11 APCH; AND MENTIONED TO THE PLT THAT WE WOULD BE REACHING IT SOON. ONCE AGAIN; I BEGAN LOOKING OUTSIDE THE ACFT UNTIL THE PLT ASKED ME WHAT THE INITIAL HDG ON THE APCH WAS. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD NEED TO TURN TO A HDG OF APPROX 270 DEGS AND ASSUMED THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH AND CONFIRMED THE CLRNC. THE PLT BEGAN THE DME ARC FOR THE APCH AND WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THE ARC AND SEEMED IGNORANT OF HOW TO PERFORM DME ARC PROCS. I IMMEDIATELY BECAME VERY SUSPICIOUS AND HAD TO BEGIN OFFERING HELP ON FOLLOWING THE APCH COURSE. SHORTLY AFTER THAT; CTR CAME OVER THE RADIO AND ASKED FOR THE PLT'S HDG. THE PLT REPLIED THAT HE WAS 'ON THE DME ARC FOR THE VOR/DME RWY 11 APCH.' CTR REPLIED TO THE PLT THAT HE WAS NOT CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE PLT REPLIED TO CTR WITH AN APOLOGY AND SAID THAT HE WAS A 'VFR PLT FLYING IN INST CONDITIONS AND HAD A SAFETY PLT ON BOARD.' CTR REPLIED INFORMING THE PLT OF HIS VARIOUS INFRACTIONS OF THE FARS AND THAT THE CTLR HAD CALLED THE ADJACENT AIRSPACE TO WARN THEM OF THE PLT'S ACFT. THE PLT THEN REQUESTED TO GO TO ZZZ FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND WAS GIVEN A HOLDING CLRNC AT ZZZ VOR BY CTR. THE PLT THEN ASKED ME TO TAKE CTL OF THE RADIOS AT THIS POINT AND I REPEATED THE HOLDING CLRNC AND DIRECTED THE PLT TOWARD ZZZ VOR. AT 5000 FT MSL WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS AND WERE BEGINNING TO EXPERIENCE SOME LIGHT AIRFRAME ICING. I REQUESTED AN ALT OF 3000 FT MSL TO ESCAPE THE ICING AND WAS INITIALLY DENIED DUE TO TFC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO 3000 FT MSL AND RPT WHEN WE HAD ZZZ IN SIGHT. UPON REACHING 3000 FT MSL; WE WERE CLR OF THE CLOUDS IN VMC AND I RPTED ZZZ IN SIGHT AND CANCELED THE IFR FLT PLAN. THE PLT RESUMED COMS AND ACFT CTL AT THIS POINT AND LANDED UNDER VFR. WHEN ON THE GND; THE PLT AND I DISCUSSED THE PRECEDING EVENTS. THE PLT INFORMED ME THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HAVING AN INST RATED SAFETY PLT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO PRACTICE INST PROCS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. I INFORMED HIM THAT HE WOULD NEED A CFII TO BE ABLE TO FLY IN INST CONDITIONS WITH ONLY A PVT PLT CERTIFICATE AND THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS INST RATED AND CURRENT WHEN WE LEFT TO GO ON THE FLT. WE THEN DECIDED TO ABANDON OUR TRIP AND RETURNED TO THE ACFT'S HOME ARPT IN VFR CONDITIONS. ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROBS DURING THIS FLT WAS THE FACT THAT I ASSUMED THAT THE PLT WAS INST RATED AND CURRENT AND DID NOT VERIFY THE PLT'S RATINGS AND CURRENCY. I ALSO ASSUMED THAT THE PLT UNDERSTOOD THE FAR'S REGARDING SAFETY PLTS AND FLYING UNDER IFR. ANOTHER FACTOR THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROBS DURING THIS FLT WAS THE FACT THAT THE PLT WAS 50 YRS OLD; OWNED THE ACFT THAT WAS FLOWN AND THAT I WAS 19. I HAD KNOWN THE PLT FOR MY ENTIRE LIFE; TRUSTED HIM AND THOUGHT THAT HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING SINCE HE WAS 30 YRS MY SENIOR AND OWNED THE AIRPLANE. THIS MADE IT HARDER FOR ME TO CORRECT THE PLT; ESPECIALLY SINCE I WAS ASSUMING THAT I WOULD BE FULFILLING A PAX/SAFETY PLT ROLE DURING THE FLT. I LEARNED THAT IN THE FUTURE I SHOULD ALWAYS VERIFY PLT'S QUALIFICATIONS AND NEVER ASSUME THAT ANOTHER PLT HAS THE RATINGS THAT HE/SHE WOULD NEED TO LEGALLY ACT AS PIC ON A FLT. I ALSO LEARNED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO VERIFY YOUR ROLE IN A FLT AND TO NEVER BE AFRAID TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS IF YOU SEE A PROB; EVEN IF THE PLT IS 30 YRS YOUR SENIOR OR IF THERE ARE QUESTIONS ABOUT SENIORITY. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO BE ALERT TO THE ACFT OPS AND COMS WHEN YOU ARE A PAX WITH A PLT'S CERTIFICATE ON A SMALL ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.