Narrative:

At one point the sector had 12 eagle arrs. This is a small sector and the 12 doesn't include den departures; aspen arrs; and eagle departures (ege). The sector was fully staffed (3 cpc's) due to the volume of aircraft. Tmu initiatives for flow control (stmp program;) was not in place or utilized. Normal conditions with those programs if used would limit an arrival rate of 8 or so (WX conditions permitting) per hour to ege. IFR approachs were required at ege. With no program being used it contributed to the unsafe conditions that resulted in a loss of separation with 2 ege arrs being sequenced. Having a program that is at our disposal to assist in the controled and safe flow of traffic during known busy traffic days or times should never be sacrificed in order not to inconvenience the users. At no point are those with the power to turn on or off those traffic restricting programs communicating with the controllers or supervisors. Safety is commonly compromised and the volume of aircraft causes delays and operrors and if the trend continues; aircraft collisions. To sum things up; controllers are being required to work under conditions that are not necessary. This day and situation proves it. History shows us that traffic conditions spike during certain times and errors spike with them. While all ATC specialists hope to be able to handle every situation given to them; there are limits; and it is only a matter of time before the traffic congestion leads to more than just a loss of separation. Flow restrs are there to prevent exactly what happened today. The error that occurred that prompted this form could have easily been prevented. There was adequate staffing of the sector. None of the 3 controllers caught the loss of separation until it was too late. The primary contributing factor was the lack of willingness to engage the stmp program during a historically busy time; which in turn allowed too many aircraft in the sector. The FAA's web site regarding the stmp program states; 'IFR special air traffic procedures will be implemented; when needed; to enhance safety and minimize air traffic delays.' before there is a loss of life; let's consider our customers and use what we have already in place! Supplemental information from acn 684331: the aircraft (aircraft Y) was at 16000 ft heading for a 16300 ft minimum instrument altitude. I saw a turn was made to avoid the 16300 ft mia but I did not realize the sharp turn would be less than 5 mi from aircraft X.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDV CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 16000 FT WHEN SEQUENCING TFC FOR EGE; CITING LACK OF TFC MGMNT INITIATIVES AS A CAUSAL FACTOR.

Narrative: AT ONE POINT THE SECTOR HAD 12 EAGLE ARRS. THIS IS A SMALL SECTOR AND THE 12 DOESN'T INCLUDE DEN DEPS; ASPEN ARRS; AND EAGLE DEPS (EGE). THE SECTOR WAS FULLY STAFFED (3 CPC'S) DUE TO THE VOLUME OF ACFT. TMU INITIATIVES FOR FLOW CTL (STMP PROGRAM;) WAS NOT IN PLACE OR UTILIZED. NORMAL CONDITIONS WITH THOSE PROGRAMS IF USED WOULD LIMIT AN ARR RATE OF 8 OR SO (WX CONDITIONS PERMITTING) PER HR TO EGE. IFR APCHS WERE REQUIRED AT EGE. WITH NO PROGRAM BEING USED IT CONTRIBUTED TO THE UNSAFE CONDITIONS THAT RESULTED IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION WITH 2 EGE ARRS BEING SEQUENCED. HAVING A PROGRAM THAT IS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ASSIST IN THE CTLED AND SAFE FLOW OF TFC DURING KNOWN BUSY TFC DAYS OR TIMES SHOULD NEVER BE SACRIFICED IN ORDER NOT TO INCONVENIENCE THE USERS. AT NO POINT ARE THOSE WITH THE PWR TO TURN ON OR OFF THOSE TFC RESTRICTING PROGRAMS COMMUNICATING WITH THE CTLRS OR SUPVRS. SAFETY IS COMMONLY COMPROMISED AND THE VOLUME OF ACFT CAUSES DELAYS AND OPERRORS AND IF THE TREND CONTINUES; ACFT COLLISIONS. TO SUM THINGS UP; CTLRS ARE BEING REQUIRED TO WORK UNDER CONDITIONS THAT ARE NOT NECESSARY. THIS DAY AND SITUATION PROVES IT. HISTORY SHOWS US THAT TFC CONDITIONS SPIKE DURING CERTAIN TIMES AND ERRORS SPIKE WITH THEM. WHILE ALL ATC SPECIALISTS HOPE TO BE ABLE TO HANDLE EVERY SITUATION GIVEN TO THEM; THERE ARE LIMITS; AND IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE TFC CONGESTION LEADS TO MORE THAN JUST A LOSS OF SEPARATION. FLOW RESTRS ARE THERE TO PREVENT EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED TODAY. THE ERROR THAT OCCURRED THAT PROMPTED THIS FORM COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN PREVENTED. THERE WAS ADEQUATE STAFFING OF THE SECTOR. NONE OF THE 3 CTLRS CAUGHT THE LOSS OF SEPARATION UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE LACK OF WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE THE STMP PROGRAM DURING A HISTORICALLY BUSY TIME; WHICH IN TURN ALLOWED TOO MANY ACFT IN THE SECTOR. THE FAA'S WEB SITE REGARDING THE STMP PROGRAM STATES; 'IFR SPECIAL AIR TFC PROCS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED; WHEN NEEDED; TO ENHANCE SAFETY AND MINIMIZE AIR TFC DELAYS.' BEFORE THERE IS A LOSS OF LIFE; LET'S CONSIDER OUR CUSTOMERS AND USE WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY IN PLACE! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 684331: THE ACFT (ACFT Y) WAS AT 16000 FT HDG FOR A 16300 FT MINIMUM INST ALT. I SAW A TURN WAS MADE TO AVOID THE 16300 FT MIA BUT I DID NOT REALIZE THE SHARP TURN WOULD BE LESS THAN 5 MI FROM ACFT X.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.