Narrative:

While operating flight from ZZZ; our nosewheel steering was inoperative per MEL and company procedures. The following occurred: due to the narrow txwys; I advised company in ZZZ we would need to be towed out to the runway for departure per the MEL procedures. Operations personnel informed me that company did not have a tug to take us out. Operations advised me we could borrow another airline's tug and tow bar for this procedure. The other airline personnel asked me about disconnecting the nosewheel steering scissors and I told him it was not necessary as long as he didn't bring the tow bar past the red lines painted on the nose of the aircraft indicating the tow bar limitations with nosewheel steering off. Our company ramp supervisor accompanied the other airline's operations tug driver during this procedure. We then called for taxi clearance out to the runway and were cleared to be towed out to the hold short line of runway 27. Through the headset on the tug; I advised the other airline's operations person who was driving the tug that we were cleared out to the hold short line of runway 27. An airport operations vehicle also accompanied us out to the runway. During the taxi we started both engines and ran through the taxi checks. During our taxi the ground controller gave us permission to be towed onto the runway into position. I relayed this to the tug driver. Once the aircraft was on the runway and lined up; the other airline's operations person and our company ramp supervisor unhooked the tow bar and gave us a thumbs up. An airport operations vehicle escorted them off the runway and back to the ramp area. Once all our checklists were complete; we were cleared for takeoff (first officer was PF). We departed runway 27 normally and proceeded to climb out. With positive rate of climb; I selected the landing gear to the up position per checklist procedures. The 2 main landing gear came up and locked. The nose landing gear stayed down and locked. We then received gear disagreement and nose door open red warning messages and audible alerts along with a wow input amber cas message. We leveled off at 3000 ft and stayed in contact with the tower. After running the QRH for those items we lowered the landing gear; and all 3 landing gear were then down and locked. At this time I elected to return. ATC advised they would have crash fire rescue equipment trucks standing by; although we did not declare an emergency. We entered a right downwind for runway 27 and proceeded to make a visual approach. We were cleared for landing by tower. The touchdown was normal until we reached about 60 KTS. At that time we began to feel a severe vibration from the nose landing gear and the aircraft pulled to the right. I took control of the aircraft and safely came to a stop on the runway. Crash fire rescue equipment trucks inspected the aircraft and saw no immediate damage (all tires intact; no smoke or fire). I advised all passenger to remain seated. ATC asked us if we would be able to taxi to the gate to which I replied negative. We then advised ATC we would need to be towed back to the gate. We remained on the runway for approximately 50 mins until the tug could arrive to take us back to the terminal. Arriving at the gate we deplaned and no one reported any kind of injury from the incident. I was advised by the contract maintenance personnel and a company ramp employee that accompanied him that upon arrival on the runway to tow the aircraft back to the gate after landing that the nosewheel steering scissors was disconnected and probably had been for our takeoff roll as well. At no time did I authority/authorized the ground personnel to disconnect the nosewheel steering scissors and at no time was I informed that they had done so. There was slight damage to one of the nose landing gear bay doors (a tear about 4-5 inches long on the nose landing gear aft bay door and one of the nosewheel steering scissors t-handles was missing). I contacted the company dispatch supervisor and told him what had happened. I also spoke with company maintenance control and described the incident and the damage to the aircraft. Contract maintenance personnel were present and took photographs of the damage to the aircraft and sent them to company maintenance control. I called the control tower as well and gave them my name and certificate number. I inadvertently did not make a logbook entryfor the damage to the aircraft and phoned company maintenance control the next morning to advise the company of my error (the aircraft had not flown). I believe the situation could be prevented by removing this MEL from our procedures. I have never been trained to operate an aircraft without nosewheel steering and will never attempt to do so again. Also; having company personnel properly trained in pushback procedures possibly would have avoided this situation as well. If the nosewheel steering scissors had not been disconnected; I feel we would have had an incident-free flight that day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ WAS DISPATCHED WITH NOSEWHEEL STEERING INOP. THE GND CREW TOWED THE ACFT TO THE RWY AND IMPROPERLY DISCONNECTED THE NOSE GEAR SCISSORS AND THE NOSE GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. FLT RETURNED TO THE DEP ARPT.

Narrative: WHILE OPERATING FLT FROM ZZZ; OUR NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS INOP PER MEL AND COMPANY PROCS. THE FOLLOWING OCCURRED: DUE TO THE NARROW TXWYS; I ADVISED COMPANY IN ZZZ WE WOULD NEED TO BE TOWED OUT TO THE RWY FOR DEP PER THE MEL PROCS. OPS PERSONNEL INFORMED ME THAT COMPANY DID NOT HAVE A TUG TO TAKE US OUT. OPS ADVISED ME WE COULD BORROW ANOTHER AIRLINE'S TUG AND TOW BAR FOR THIS PROC. THE OTHER AIRLINE PERSONNEL ASKED ME ABOUT DISCONNECTING THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING SCISSORS AND I TOLD HIM IT WAS NOT NECESSARY AS LONG AS HE DIDN'T BRING THE TOW BAR PAST THE RED LINES PAINTED ON THE NOSE OF THE ACFT INDICATING THE TOW BAR LIMITATIONS WITH NOSEWHEEL STEERING OFF. OUR COMPANY RAMP SUPVR ACCOMPANIED THE OTHER AIRLINE'S OPS TUG DRIVER DURING THIS PROC. WE THEN CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC OUT TO THE RWY AND WERE CLRED TO BE TOWED OUT TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF RWY 27. THROUGH THE HEADSET ON THE TUG; I ADVISED THE OTHER AIRLINE'S OPS PERSON WHO WAS DRIVING THE TUG THAT WE WERE CLRED OUT TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF RWY 27. AN ARPT OPS VEHICLE ALSO ACCOMPANIED US OUT TO THE RWY. DURING THE TAXI WE STARTED BOTH ENGS AND RAN THROUGH THE TAXI CHKS. DURING OUR TAXI THE GND CTLR GAVE US PERMISSION TO BE TOWED ONTO THE RWY INTO POS. I RELAYED THIS TO THE TUG DRIVER. ONCE THE ACFT WAS ON THE RWY AND LINED UP; THE OTHER AIRLINE'S OPS PERSON AND OUR COMPANY RAMP SUPVR UNHOOKED THE TOW BAR AND GAVE US A THUMBS UP. AN ARPT OPS VEHICLE ESCORTED THEM OFF THE RWY AND BACK TO THE RAMP AREA. ONCE ALL OUR CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE; WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF (FO WAS PF). WE DEPARTED RWY 27 NORMALLY AND PROCEEDED TO CLB OUT. WITH POSITIVE RATE OF CLB; I SELECTED THE LNDG GEAR TO THE UP POS PER CHKLIST PROCS. THE 2 MAIN LNDG GEAR CAME UP AND LOCKED. THE NOSE LNDG GEAR STAYED DOWN AND LOCKED. WE THEN RECEIVED GEAR DISAGREEMENT AND NOSE DOOR OPEN RED WARNING MESSAGES AND AUDIBLE ALERTS ALONG WITH A WOW INPUT AMBER CAS MESSAGE. WE LEVELED OFF AT 3000 FT AND STAYED IN CONTACT WITH THE TWR. AFTER RUNNING THE QRH FOR THOSE ITEMS WE LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR; AND ALL 3 LNDG GEAR WERE THEN DOWN AND LOCKED. AT THIS TIME I ELECTED TO RETURN. ATC ADVISED THEY WOULD HAVE CFR TRUCKS STANDING BY; ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. WE ENTERED A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27 AND PROCEEDED TO MAKE A VISUAL APCH. WE WERE CLRED FOR LNDG BY TWR. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE REACHED ABOUT 60 KTS. AT THAT TIME WE BEGAN TO FEEL A SEVERE VIBRATION FROM THE NOSE LNDG GEAR AND THE ACFT PULLED TO THE R. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND SAFELY CAME TO A STOP ON THE RWY. CFR TRUCKS INSPECTED THE ACFT AND SAW NO IMMEDIATE DAMAGE (ALL TIRES INTACT; NO SMOKE OR FIRE). I ADVISED ALL PAX TO REMAIN SEATED. ATC ASKED US IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAXI TO THE GATE TO WHICH I REPLIED NEGATIVE. WE THEN ADVISED ATC WE WOULD NEED TO BE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE. WE REMAINED ON THE RWY FOR APPROX 50 MINS UNTIL THE TUG COULD ARRIVE TO TAKE US BACK TO THE TERMINAL. ARRIVING AT THE GATE WE DEPLANED AND NO ONE RPTED ANY KIND OF INJURY FROM THE INCIDENT. I WAS ADVISED BY THE CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL AND A COMPANY RAMP EMPLOYEE THAT ACCOMPANIED HIM THAT UPON ARR ON THE RWY TO TOW THE ACFT BACK TO THE GATE AFTER LNDG THAT THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING SCISSORS WAS DISCONNECTED AND PROBABLY HAD BEEN FOR OUR TKOF ROLL AS WELL. AT NO TIME DID I AUTH THE GND PERSONNEL TO DISCONNECT THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING SCISSORS AND AT NO TIME WAS I INFORMED THAT THEY HAD DONE SO. THERE WAS SLIGHT DAMAGE TO ONE OF THE NOSE LNDG GEAR BAY DOORS (A TEAR ABOUT 4-5 INCHES LONG ON THE NOSE LNDG GEAR AFT BAY DOOR AND ONE OF THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING SCISSORS T-HANDLES WAS MISSING). I CONTACTED THE COMPANY DISPATCH SUPVR AND TOLD HIM WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I ALSO SPOKE WITH COMPANY MAINT CTL AND DESCRIBED THE INCIDENT AND THE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT AND TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT AND SENT THEM TO COMPANY MAINT CTL. I CALLED THE CTL TWR AS WELL AND GAVE THEM MY NAME AND CERTIFICATE NUMBER. I INADVERTENTLY DID NOT MAKE A LOGBOOK ENTRYFOR THE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT AND PHONED COMPANY MAINT CTL THE NEXT MORNING TO ADVISE THE COMPANY OF MY ERROR (THE ACFT HAD NOT FLOWN). I BELIEVE THE SIT COULD BE PREVENTED BY REMOVING THIS MEL FROM OUR PROCS. I HAVE NEVER BEEN TRAINED TO OPERATE AN ACFT WITHOUT NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND WILL NEVER ATTEMPT TO DO SO AGAIN. ALSO; HAVING COMPANY PERSONNEL PROPERLY TRAINED IN PUSHBACK PROCS POSSIBLY WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS SIT AS WELL. IF THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING SCISSORS HAD NOT BEEN DISCONNECTED; I FEEL WE WOULD HAVE HAD AN INCIDENT-FREE FLT THAT DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.