Narrative:

I was conducting IOE for a company pilot qualified in the aircraft. I arrived at the airport about 1 hour prior to departure to discuss the WX conditions with him. WX was marginal along our route; and I suggested that we could take an IFR equipped aircraft; but he was confident that we could complete the flight VFR. We departed from smn and proceeded along our course past llj; cruising at about 9500 ft MSL. When we came to the river that leads to the summit we were planning to fly across; the mountain tops were obscured and visibility in the valley appeared marginal. The pilot said that he could clearly see the road that led across the summit; so we proceeded up the canyon on the right side. Our position limited my visibility of the road; and all I could really see were the mountains in front of us and to either side. As we approached the summit; one of our passenger tapped me on the shoulder and pointed out that the pilot had lost 500 ft of altitude. I mentioned it to the pilot and he responded that he needed to be lower to get through the pass. I told him that we couldn't descend any lower than that. At the top of the summit the road that we were following bends southward to the left; but when we arrived at the summit the pilot turned right. I immediately asked him if he had the road in sight; and he responded that he had the river. I asked again if he had the road; and he said that it was covered with snow so he couldn't see it; but he had the river. I asked him again where the road was; and he replied that 'this is bad...I'm turning around.' with our position in question in what I believed was a box canyon; I instructed the pilot to climb. We circled in the canyon; maintaining visual separation with the canyon walls to 12500 ft. I then instructed the pilot to fly a south heading and proceed direct to the sun using the aircraft's VFR GPS. We called ZLC on the appropriate frequency and asked them to provide a descent to VFR conditions; but we broke out of the clouds before they were able to identify us on radar. We descended VFR after that and continued to our destination without further occurrence. From the time that we reached 12500 ft and turned sbound until the time that we broke out of the clouds; we were in IMC for approximately 15 mins. During that time the airplane; which did not have any surface deice equipment; accumulated light rime ice. This ice broke free from the airplane during our descent. While the pilot of the aircraft made several decisions that led to this situation; it was ultimately my responsibility to protest when those decisions put us into a dangerous position. While I voiced my concerns to the pilot; it is clear to me that I failed to take charge of the situation at any one of the many opportunities that I had to stop this chain of events. I believe that part of my failure to recognize how critical the situation had become was my lack of experience with marginal VFR operations in the area. While I have abundant experience with VFR operations in good WX; I generally fly IFR equipped aircraft for my company. I think that in this instance I regarded the IOE just as a formality wherein I simply rode along with a pilot who was qualified in the aircraft and had more time in it than I did. I suppose that complacency led me to tolerate decisions that I would not have made myself. I certainly recognize that we were fortunate to survive a situation that has killed far better pilots than ourselves.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C210 FLT CREW ENTER IMC CONDITIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN WHILE FLYING VFR.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING IOE FOR A COMPANY PLT QUALIFIED IN THE ACFT. I ARRIVED AT THE ARPT ABOUT 1 HR PRIOR TO DEP TO DISCUSS THE WX CONDITIONS WITH HIM. WX WAS MARGINAL ALONG OUR RTE; AND I SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD TAKE AN IFR EQUIPPED ACFT; BUT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT WE COULD COMPLETE THE FLT VFR. WE DEPARTED FROM SMN AND PROCEEDED ALONG OUR COURSE PAST LLJ; CRUISING AT ABOUT 9500 FT MSL. WHEN WE CAME TO THE RIVER THAT LEADS TO THE SUMMIT WE WERE PLANNING TO FLY ACROSS; THE MOUNTAIN TOPS WERE OBSCURED AND VISIBILITY IN THE VALLEY APPEARED MARGINAL. THE PLT SAID THAT HE COULD CLRLY SEE THE ROAD THAT LED ACROSS THE SUMMIT; SO WE PROCEEDED UP THE CANYON ON THE R SIDE. OUR POS LIMITED MY VISIBILITY OF THE ROAD; AND ALL I COULD REALLY SEE WERE THE MOUNTAINS IN FRONT OF US AND TO EITHER SIDE. AS WE APCHED THE SUMMIT; ONE OF OUR PAX TAPPED ME ON THE SHOULDER AND POINTED OUT THAT THE PLT HAD LOST 500 FT OF ALT. I MENTIONED IT TO THE PLT AND HE RESPONDED THAT HE NEEDED TO BE LOWER TO GET THROUGH THE PASS. I TOLD HIM THAT WE COULDN'T DSND ANY LOWER THAN THAT. AT THE TOP OF THE SUMMIT THE ROAD THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING BENDS SOUTHWARD TO THE L; BUT WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE SUMMIT THE PLT TURNED R. I IMMEDIATELY ASKED HIM IF HE HAD THE ROAD IN SIGHT; AND HE RESPONDED THAT HE HAD THE RIVER. I ASKED AGAIN IF HE HAD THE ROAD; AND HE SAID THAT IT WAS COVERED WITH SNOW SO HE COULDN'T SEE IT; BUT HE HAD THE RIVER. I ASKED HIM AGAIN WHERE THE ROAD WAS; AND HE REPLIED THAT 'THIS IS BAD...I'M TURNING AROUND.' WITH OUR POS IN QUESTION IN WHAT I BELIEVED WAS A BOX CANYON; I INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO CLB. WE CIRCLED IN THE CANYON; MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION WITH THE CANYON WALLS TO 12500 FT. I THEN INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO FLY A S HDG AND PROCEED DIRECT TO THE SUN USING THE ACFT'S VFR GPS. WE CALLED ZLC ON THE APPROPRIATE FREQ AND ASKED THEM TO PROVIDE A DSCNT TO VFR CONDITIONS; BUT WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS BEFORE THEY WERE ABLE TO IDENT US ON RADAR. WE DSNDED VFR AFTER THAT AND CONTINUED TO OUR DEST WITHOUT FURTHER OCCURRENCE. FROM THE TIME THAT WE REACHED 12500 FT AND TURNED SBOUND UNTIL THE TIME THAT WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS; WE WERE IN IMC FOR APPROX 15 MINS. DURING THAT TIME THE AIRPLANE; WHICH DID NOT HAVE ANY SURFACE DEICE EQUIP; ACCUMULATED LIGHT RIME ICE. THIS ICE BROKE FREE FROM THE AIRPLANE DURING OUR DSCNT. WHILE THE PLT OF THE ACFT MADE SEVERAL DECISIONS THAT LED TO THIS SIT; IT WAS ULTIMATELY MY RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEST WHEN THOSE DECISIONS PUT US INTO A DANGEROUS POS. WHILE I VOICED MY CONCERNS TO THE PLT; IT IS CLR TO ME THAT I FAILED TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE SIT AT ANY ONE OF THE MANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT I HAD TO STOP THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS. I BELIEVE THAT PART OF MY FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE HOW CRITICAL THE SIT HAD BECOME WAS MY LACK OF EXPERIENCE WITH MARGINAL VFR OPS IN THE AREA. WHILE I HAVE ABUNDANT EXPERIENCE WITH VFR OPS IN GOOD WX; I GENERALLY FLY IFR EQUIPPED ACFT FOR MY COMPANY. I THINK THAT IN THIS INSTANCE I REGARDED THE IOE JUST AS A FORMALITY WHEREIN I SIMPLY RODE ALONG WITH A PLT WHO WAS QUALIFIED IN THE ACFT AND HAD MORE TIME IN IT THAN I DID. I SUPPOSE THAT COMPLACENCY LED ME TO TOLERATE DECISIONS THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE MADE MYSELF. I CERTAINLY RECOGNIZE THAT WE WERE FORTUNATE TO SURVIVE A SIT THAT HAS KILLED FAR BETTER PLTS THAN OURSELVES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.