Narrative:

Short taxi time and reduced situational awareness resulting from elimination of B737 FLIP cards accompanied by a change in weight resulted in airspeed bugs being set incorrectly by first officer. Airspds were set to more conservative higher speed; but were; nonetheless; set incorrectly. Reduced takeoff numbers were conservative and did not compromise safety. Overall observation is that the removal of the FLIP cards from the cockpits of the B737 increases pilot workload; eliminates an easy way for the captain to xchk accurate weights and results in an overall degradation in situational awareness. Additional problems: technique is to transcribe weights to manifest increasing opportunity to make a mistake. Only way for captain to verify numbers is to pull out the card and reference it while taxiing. Also; previously with the FLIP cards; I could take the takeoff weight; subtract the proposed fuel burn and FLIP the card to the expected weight at landing. This served as an excellent check against the FMC. If there was a discrepancy approaching the destination; it could be resolved easily (ie; FLIP card incorrect; inoperative fuel gauge; etc). SOP calls for 'double clutching' the appropriate reference speed. The question is when?! Brief typically happens 45 mins out. Delays; holding; etc; can make a significant change to weights and thus the reference speed. Manually entering a reference speed only increases the chance of a mistake. I have now used the new system for 11 legs and the system does not work well. Replace the FLIP cards.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FLT CREW TOOK OFF WITH SPD BUGS SET IMPROPERLY.

Narrative: SHORT TAXI TIME AND REDUCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS RESULTING FROM ELIMINATION OF B737 FLIP CARDS ACCOMPANIED BY A CHANGE IN WT RESULTED IN AIRSPD BUGS BEING SET INCORRECTLY BY FO. AIRSPDS WERE SET TO MORE CONSERVATIVE HIGHER SPD; BUT WERE; NONETHELESS; SET INCORRECTLY. REDUCED TKOF NUMBERS WERE CONSERVATIVE AND DID NOT COMPROMISE SAFETY. OVERALL OBSERVATION IS THAT THE REMOVAL OF THE FLIP CARDS FROM THE COCKPITS OF THE B737 INCREASES PLT WORKLOAD; ELIMINATES AN EASY WAY FOR THE CAPT TO XCHK ACCURATE WTS AND RESULTS IN AN OVERALL DEGRADATION IN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. ADDITIONAL PROBS: TECHNIQUE IS TO TRANSCRIBE WTS TO MANIFEST INCREASING OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A MISTAKE. ONLY WAY FOR CAPT TO VERIFY NUMBERS IS TO PULL OUT THE CARD AND REF IT WHILE TAXIING. ALSO; PREVIOUSLY WITH THE FLIP CARDS; I COULD TAKE THE TKOF WT; SUBTRACT THE PROPOSED FUEL BURN AND FLIP THE CARD TO THE EXPECTED WT AT LNDG. THIS SERVED AS AN EXCELLENT CHK AGAINST THE FMC. IF THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY APCHING THE DEST; IT COULD BE RESOLVED EASILY (IE; FLIP CARD INCORRECT; INOP FUEL GAUGE; ETC). SOP CALLS FOR 'DOUBLE CLUTCHING' THE APPROPRIATE REF SPD. THE QUESTION IS WHEN?! BRIEF TYPICALLY HAPPENS 45 MINS OUT. DELAYS; HOLDING; ETC; CAN MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE TO WTS AND THUS THE REF SPD. MANUALLY ENTERING A REF SPD ONLY INCREASES THE CHANCE OF A MISTAKE. I HAVE NOW USED THE NEW SYS FOR 11 LEGS AND THE SYS DOES NOT WORK WELL. REPLACE THE FLIP CARDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.