Narrative:

Local controller attempted to have 2 air carrier departures in front of an air carrier arrival on runway 6 at bdl. The first departure; an E145; departed without incident. The second departure; MD80; was cleared for takeoff while the B737; who was cleared to land; was on or just inside a 3 mi final indicating 170 KTS ground speed. The MD80 was slow on departure roll. While the B737 was approaching the threshold of runway 6. The departing MD80 was about midfield and not airborne. The arriving B737 pilot tried to keep from touching down while the departure was still on the runway. When the arrival was approximately 1500 ft down the runway the pilot initiated a go around because the departure was not airborne. The local controller did not see the go around; and reclred the arrival to land. The B737 was issued instructions to remain in the pattern and landed without incident on runway 6. Human factors: local controller used poor judgement with the second departure. Did not notice the arrival's ground speed; nor was the go around immediately recognized. Although the arrival was told there would be 2 departures before its arrival; no speed reduction instructions were issued. It was the shift supervisor working the local position; so he should have reported the incident. The clearance delivery/FD controller notified his supervisor on the following day and an investigation was started. It was determined a loss of separation did occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BDL GND CTLR WITNESSED LCL CTLR LOSE SEPARATION BTWN ARR AND DEP ACFT REQUIRING A FLT CREW INITIATED GAR.

Narrative: LCL CTLR ATTEMPTED TO HAVE 2 ACR DEPS IN FRONT OF AN ACR ARR ON RWY 6 AT BDL. THE FIRST DEP; AN E145; DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE SECOND DEP; MD80; WAS CLRED FOR TKOF WHILE THE B737; WHO WAS CLRED TO LAND; WAS ON OR JUST INSIDE A 3 MI FINAL INDICATING 170 KTS GND SPD. THE MD80 WAS SLOW ON DEP ROLL. WHILE THE B737 WAS APCHING THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 6. THE DEPARTING MD80 WAS ABOUT MIDFIELD AND NOT AIRBORNE. THE ARRIVING B737 PLT TRIED TO KEEP FROM TOUCHING DOWN WHILE THE DEP WAS STILL ON THE RWY. WHEN THE ARR WAS APPROX 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY THE PLT INITIATED A GAR BECAUSE THE DEP WAS NOT AIRBORNE. THE LCL CTLR DID NOT SEE THE GAR; AND RECLRED THE ARR TO LAND. THE B737 WAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAIN IN THE PATTERN AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON RWY 6. HUMAN FACTORS: LCL CTLR USED POOR JUDGEMENT WITH THE SECOND DEP. DID NOT NOTICE THE ARR'S GND SPD; NOR WAS THE GAR IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED. ALTHOUGH THE ARR WAS TOLD THERE WOULD BE 2 DEPS BEFORE ITS ARR; NO SPD REDUCTION INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED. IT WAS THE SHIFT SUPVR WORKING THE LCL POS; SO HE SHOULD HAVE RPTED THE INCIDENT. THE CD/FD CTLR NOTIFIED HIS SUPVR ON THE FOLLOWING DAY AND AN INVESTIGATION WAS STARTED. IT WAS DETERMINED A LOSS OF SEPARATION DID OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.