Narrative:

A320 was dispatched from ord with an inoperative bleed air valve on engine #2. In-flight icing and adverse convective WX were not forecasted along our route. The resulting altitude limitation of the bleed valve deferral restr us to a maximum altitude of FL310; FL300 was our filed altitude. Approaching the 'front range' over the rocky mountains; south of colorado springs airport; we observed an unforecast solid line of rapidly developing severe thunderstorms oriented north/south along the mountains 80 NM ahead of us. The line reflectivity was 'solid red' but we observed on WX radar a hole through which we could pass. We requested a left course deviation to avoid the WX which the ATC controller approved. The wording the controller used was; '...deviations left and right for WX are approved.' we turned right 30 degrees to a heading 210 degrees for the hole in the WX. On the 210 degree heading and 30 mi from the line of WX the controller assigned us a new ATC frequency and we contacted the new controller. At 20 mi from the WX we observed the hole ahead was rapidly closing and we scanned right with the WX radar and visually and detected another hole on a 280 degree heading from our present position. There was significant ATC communication congestion so we checked both TCAS and visually scanned to north; saw no conflicting traffic; and commenced the right turn to heading 280 degrees to avoid the severe WX directly ahead. We believed the new ATC controller was briefed by the previous controller about our 'left or right turn' clearance since he did not revise the previous clearance; however; as we turned right through 250 degrees and were about to announce the turn to the controller; he angrily and very unprofessionally began reprimanding us on the frequency repeatedly for not obtaining prior clearance for the right turn. We attempted to explain the clearance we received from the previous controller; our structural altitude restr of FL310; our close proximity to the severe WX ahead; and the ATC frequency congestion. The controller was not persuaded and continued to display an uncommonly irate and unprofessional phraseology on the frequency to our WX avoidance turn. Our options were limited to 1) starting the right to 280 degrees and then contacting the controller as soon as possible on the busy frequency; 2) declare an emergency and use captain's authority/authorized after the fact; or 3) fly through the severe WX and risk injury to the passenger; crew and almost certain damage to the aircraft. In my judgement options #2 and #3 were unacceptable in this case. The remainder of the flight was uneventful and landed without further incident in las.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW DEVIATES DUE TO TSTMS.

Narrative: A320 WAS DISPATCHED FROM ORD WITH AN INOP BLEED AIR VALVE ON ENG #2. INFLT ICING AND ADVERSE CONVECTIVE WX WERE NOT FORECASTED ALONG OUR RTE. THE RESULTING ALT LIMITATION OF THE BLEED VALVE DEFERRAL RESTR US TO A MAX ALT OF FL310; FL300 WAS OUR FILED ALT. APCHING THE 'FRONT RANGE' OVER THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS; S OF COLORADO SPRINGS ARPT; WE OBSERVED AN UNFORECAST SOLID LINE OF RAPIDLY DEVELOPING SEVERE TSTMS ORIENTED N/S ALONG THE MOUNTAINS 80 NM AHEAD OF US. THE LINE REFLECTIVITY WAS 'SOLID RED' BUT WE OBSERVED ON WX RADAR A HOLE THROUGH WHICH WE COULD PASS. WE REQUESTED A L COURSE DEV TO AVOID THE WX WHICH THE ATC CTLR APPROVED. THE WORDING THE CTLR USED WAS; '...DEVS L AND R FOR WX ARE APPROVED.' WE TURNED R 30 DEGS TO A HDG 210 DEGS FOR THE HOLE IN THE WX. ON THE 210 DEG HDG AND 30 MI FROM THE LINE OF WX THE CTLR ASSIGNED US A NEW ATC FREQ AND WE CONTACTED THE NEW CTLR. AT 20 MI FROM THE WX WE OBSERVED THE HOLE AHEAD WAS RAPIDLY CLOSING AND WE SCANNED R WITH THE WX RADAR AND VISUALLY AND DETECTED ANOTHER HOLE ON A 280 DEG HDG FROM OUR PRESENT POS. THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT ATC COM CONGESTION SO WE CHKED BOTH TCAS AND VISUALLY SCANNED TO N; SAW NO CONFLICTING TFC; AND COMMENCED THE R TURN TO HDG 280 DEGS TO AVOID THE SEVERE WX DIRECTLY AHEAD. WE BELIEVED THE NEW ATC CTLR WAS BRIEFED BY THE PREVIOUS CTLR ABOUT OUR 'L OR R TURN' CLRNC SINCE HE DID NOT REVISE THE PREVIOUS CLRNC; HOWEVER; AS WE TURNED R THROUGH 250 DEGS AND WERE ABOUT TO ANNOUNCE THE TURN TO THE CTLR; HE ANGRILY AND VERY UNPROFESSIONALLY BEGAN REPRIMANDING US ON THE FREQ REPEATEDLY FOR NOT OBTAINING PRIOR CLRNC FOR THE R TURN. WE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THE CLRNC WE RECEIVED FROM THE PREVIOUS CTLR; OUR STRUCTURAL ALT RESTR OF FL310; OUR CLOSE PROX TO THE SEVERE WX AHEAD; AND THE ATC FREQ CONGESTION. THE CTLR WAS NOT PERSUADED AND CONTINUED TO DISPLAY AN UNCOMMONLY IRATE AND UNPROFESSIONAL PHRASEOLOGY ON THE FREQ TO OUR WX AVOIDANCE TURN. OUR OPTIONS WERE LIMITED TO 1) STARTING THE R TO 280 DEGS AND THEN CONTACTING THE CTLR ASAP ON THE BUSY FREQ; 2) DECLARE AN EMER AND USE CAPT'S AUTH AFTER THE FACT; OR 3) FLY THROUGH THE SEVERE WX AND RISK INJURY TO THE PAX; CREW AND ALMOST CERTAIN DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. IN MY JUDGEMENT OPTIONS #2 AND #3 WERE UNACCEPTABLE IN THIS CASE. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT IN LAS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.