Narrative:

Line maintenance found a hydraulic leak in the wheel well on the left side and the aircraft was taken OTS to repair. During the repair; a mechanic noticed a pulley loose and saw that an aileron cable was outside the cable guide and that the cable had begun to fray. It was determined that I had replaced that cable during a quality check in jan/06. During that particular time my regular work partners had left for a different shift; but the job stayed with me on the next shift. The company assigned several different mechanics that hadn't done the job before to work with me. The job entailed replacing and rigging all aileron and spoiler cables; so in addition to accomplishing the job I also had to train different mechanics in the process. At times; this became very frustrating and consequently I improperly routed the aileron cable in question. I feel that if the company would have chosen mechanics to learn the job before I lost my regular partners; this would not have occurred. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the normal crew of riggers had left for another shift. Management then assigned inexperienced and untrained techs to replace all the aileron and spoiler control cables and rig the controls. The reporter was to train the three unskilled techs while on the job; but also meet the heavy check release schedule. The reporter had to assume responsibility for the complete job with techs that never did this job. The job was completed and the aircraft was released for service; but came back to the station 8 months later with a hydraulic leak. While the hydraulic leak was being worked; an aileron cable was found 66% worn through. The aileron cable was not in the pulley groove and was routed outside the pulley bracket and over the cable guard pin causing the wear. Supplemental information fram acn 708532: the card was completed by myself checking for cable routing and safety pins in turnbuckles. I did not see any problems at that time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-400 HAD AILERON CABLES REPLACED IN A HVY MAINT CHK. LATER (8 MONTHS) DISCOVERED A R AILERON CABLE OUTSIDE OF THE PULLEY BRACKET AND WORN.

Narrative: LINE MAINT FOUND A HYD LEAK IN THE WHEEL WELL ON THE L SIDE AND THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS TO REPAIR. DURING THE REPAIR; A MECH NOTICED A PULLEY LOOSE AND SAW THAT AN AILERON CABLE WAS OUTSIDE THE CABLE GUIDE AND THAT THE CABLE HAD BEGUN TO FRAY. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT I HAD REPLACED THAT CABLE DURING A QUALITY CHK IN JAN/06. DURING THAT PARTICULAR TIME MY REGULAR WORK PARTNERS HAD LEFT FOR A DIFFERENT SHIFT; BUT THE JOB STAYED WITH ME ON THE NEXT SHIFT. THE COMPANY ASSIGNED SEVERAL DIFFERENT MECHS THAT HADN'T DONE THE JOB BEFORE TO WORK WITH ME. THE JOB ENTAILED REPLACING AND RIGGING ALL AILERON AND SPOILER CABLES; SO IN ADDITION TO ACCOMPLISHING THE JOB I ALSO HAD TO TRAIN DIFFERENT MECHS IN THE PROCESS. AT TIMES; THIS BECAME VERY FRUSTRATING AND CONSEQUENTLY I IMPROPERLY ROUTED THE AILERON CABLE IN QUESTION. I FEEL THAT IF THE COMPANY WOULD HAVE CHOSEN MECHS TO LEARN THE JOB BEFORE I LOST MY REGULAR PARTNERS; THIS WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE NORMAL CREW OF RIGGERS HAD LEFT FOR ANOTHER SHIFT. MANAGEMENT THEN ASSIGNED INEXPERIENCED AND UNTRAINED TECHS TO REPLACE ALL THE AILERON AND SPOILER CTL CABLES AND RIG THE CTLS. THE RPTR WAS TO TRAIN THE THREE UNSKILLED TECHS WHILE ON THE JOB; BUT ALSO MEET THE HEAVY CHECK RELEASE SCHEDULE. THE RPTR HAD TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMPLETE JOB WITH TECHS THAT NEVER DID THIS JOB. THE JOB WAS COMPLETED AND THE ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR SVC; BUT CAME BACK TO THE STATION 8 MONTHS LATER WITH A HYD LEAK. WHILE THE HYD LEAK WAS BEING WORKED; AN AILERON CABLE WAS FOUND 66% WORN THROUGH. THE AILERON CABLE WAS NOT IN THE PULLEY GROOVE AND WAS ROUTED OUTSIDE THE PULLEY BRACKET AND OVER THE CABLE GUARD PIN CAUSING THE WEAR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FRAM ACN 708532: THE CARD WAS COMPLETED BY MYSELF CHECKING FOR CABLE ROUTING AND SAFETY PINS IN TURNBUCKLES. I DID NOT SEE ANY PROBS AT THAT TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.