Narrative:

I was working the arrival coordinator (cia) position during the busy inbound arrival push. The arrival west (arw) controller was very busy; but he was doing an excellent job utilizing speed control to keep his sector under control. He had approximately 10-12 aircraft on his frequency being vectored to runway 18R. The arrival east (are) controller had approximately 6 aircraft on his frequency being vectored to runway 18C and 27; but at least 10-12 more in his tab list. The arw tab list was empty. The supervisor asked me what my plan was; and indicated that I should 'move' some of the arw traffic over to runway 18C or to runway 27. I informed the supervisor that the arw controller had everything under control; and that everyone was back to 230 KTS and that spacing was excellent. The supervisor was concerned about one particular aircraft from the northwest; and he felt that this would put the final west (arf) controller down the tubes. I explained that the downwind would go out a few extra mi; but that it would never extend outside the final box. The supervisor ordered me to move a crj at 10000 ft; 25 mi southeast of mem; and have the are controller vector this aircraft to runway 27. The supervisor also wanted me to take a SF34 from the southwest corner and put this traffic on a left downwind for runway 27. I passed along the order to the are controller and then pointed the traffic out to the departure east (drv) controller. Drv said pointout 'approved;' but informed me that are and the runway 27 final controller (arn) would have to miss an AC69 that was 7 mi southeast of mem at 5000 ft. I walked back to the traffic management unit scope where cia normally works; and took a look at this developing situation. The supervisor had wandered off at this point. The departure was eastbound at 5000 ft and trapped beneath traffic at 6000 ft. The crj was now at 5000 ft and on a converging course with the AC69. I ran across the room to the arn scope and told him that he had 2 aircraft at 5000 ft. Arn 'expedited' the crj out of 5000 ft; just as drv was finally able to expedite the AC69 out of 5000 ft for the climb. By now the supervisor had decided that this was all a bad call; and further decided to just let the SF34 stay on his original arrival route. As a cia; I am not allowed to issue any speed or spacing restrs to the center. I am not allowed to take 'high side' jet traffic to runway 27. But the supervisor may issue speed and spacing restrs to the center; and he may also decide to take 'high side' traffic to runway 27. Additionally; the cia or the supervisor are allowed to take turboprop traffic off of the high side from the southwest corner post; and run this traffic through dra; drv and are airspace to be handed off to arn. Mem FAA management has a procedure in place that severely limits when and why we may or may not move jet traffic off of the 'high side' to runway 27. This is supposedly done for 'safety' and to keep these jets out of departure airspace during busy arrival pushes. Ironically enough; the supervisor broke the procedural rule and nearly caused us to run 2 aircraft together. This same supervisor believes that it is ok for the 'high side' turboprop aircraft to fly through 3 other sectors via pointout. There is no rhyme or reason to their actions. This is all a knee jerk reaction to 'show' that we are doing something to prevent operrors; but we are creating more problems than we are solving. If mem FAA management would simply allow us to slow the aircraft; keep them in line; and keep them on the appropriate side of the airspace; everything would work out just fine. There is never any constructive discussion about these issues. No pre-planning before the push. No de-briefing after the push. Just a bunch of back slapping when it's all over and done with; thankful that nothing bad happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEM CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN SUPERVISORY SEQUENCING DIRECTION RESULTED IN A NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE ARR COORDINATOR (CIA) POS DURING THE BUSY INBOUND ARR PUSH. THE ARR W (ARW) CTLR WAS VERY BUSY; BUT HE WAS DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB UTILIZING SPD CTL TO KEEP HIS SECTOR UNDER CTL. HE HAD APPROX 10-12 ACFT ON HIS FREQ BEING VECTORED TO RWY 18R. THE ARR E (ARE) CTLR HAD APPROX 6 ACFT ON HIS FREQ BEING VECTORED TO RWY 18C AND 27; BUT AT LEAST 10-12 MORE IN HIS TAB LIST. THE ARW TAB LIST WAS EMPTY. THE SUPVR ASKED ME WHAT MY PLAN WAS; AND INDICATED THAT I SHOULD 'MOVE' SOME OF THE ARW TFC OVER TO RWY 18C OR TO RWY 27. I INFORMED THE SUPVR THAT THE ARW CTLR HAD EVERYTHING UNDER CTL; AND THAT EVERYONE WAS BACK TO 230 KTS AND THAT SPACING WAS EXCELLENT. THE SUPVR WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ONE PARTICULAR ACFT FROM THE NW; AND HE FELT THAT THIS WOULD PUT THE FINAL W (ARF) CTLR DOWN THE TUBES. I EXPLAINED THAT THE DOWNWIND WOULD GO OUT A FEW EXTRA MI; BUT THAT IT WOULD NEVER EXTEND OUTSIDE THE FINAL BOX. THE SUPVR ORDERED ME TO MOVE A CRJ AT 10000 FT; 25 MI SE OF MEM; AND HAVE THE ARE CTLR VECTOR THIS ACFT TO RWY 27. THE SUPVR ALSO WANTED ME TO TAKE A SF34 FROM THE SW CORNER AND PUT THIS TFC ON A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27. I PASSED ALONG THE ORDER TO THE ARE CTLR AND THEN POINTED THE TFC OUT TO THE DEP E (DRV) CTLR. DRV SAID POINTOUT 'APPROVED;' BUT INFORMED ME THAT ARE AND THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR (ARN) WOULD HAVE TO MISS AN AC69 THAT WAS 7 MI SE OF MEM AT 5000 FT. I WALKED BACK TO THE TFC MGMNT UNIT SCOPE WHERE CIA NORMALLY WORKS; AND TOOK A LOOK AT THIS DEVELOPING SITUATION. THE SUPVR HAD WANDERED OFF AT THIS POINT. THE DEP WAS EBOUND AT 5000 FT AND TRAPPED BENEATH TFC AT 6000 FT. THE CRJ WAS NOW AT 5000 FT AND ON A CONVERGING COURSE WITH THE AC69. I RAN ACROSS THE ROOM TO THE ARN SCOPE AND TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD 2 ACFT AT 5000 FT. ARN 'EXPEDITED' THE CRJ OUT OF 5000 FT; JUST AS DRV WAS FINALLY ABLE TO EXPEDITE THE AC69 OUT OF 5000 FT FOR THE CLB. BY NOW THE SUPVR HAD DECIDED THAT THIS WAS ALL A BAD CALL; AND FURTHER DECIDED TO JUST LET THE SF34 STAY ON HIS ORIGINAL ARR RTE. AS A CIA; I AM NOT ALLOWED TO ISSUE ANY SPD OR SPACING RESTRS TO THE CTR. I AM NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE 'HIGH SIDE' JET TFC TO RWY 27. BUT THE SUPVR MAY ISSUE SPD AND SPACING RESTRS TO THE CTR; AND HE MAY ALSO DECIDE TO TAKE 'HIGH SIDE' TFC TO RWY 27. ADDITIONALLY; THE CIA OR THE SUPVR ARE ALLOWED TO TAKE TURBOPROP TFC OFF OF THE HIGH SIDE FROM THE SW CORNER POST; AND RUN THIS TFC THROUGH DRA; DRV AND ARE AIRSPACE TO BE HANDED OFF TO ARN. MEM FAA MGMNT HAS A PROC IN PLACE THAT SEVERELY LIMITS WHEN AND WHY WE MAY OR MAY NOT MOVE JET TFC OFF OF THE 'HIGH SIDE' TO RWY 27. THIS IS SUPPOSEDLY DONE FOR 'SAFETY' AND TO KEEP THESE JETS OUT OF DEP AIRSPACE DURING BUSY ARR PUSHES. IRONICALLY ENOUGH; THE SUPVR BROKE THE PROCEDURAL RULE AND NEARLY CAUSED US TO RUN 2 ACFT TOGETHER. THIS SAME SUPVR BELIEVES THAT IT IS OK FOR THE 'HIGH SIDE' TURBOPROP ACFT TO FLY THROUGH 3 OTHER SECTORS VIA POINTOUT. THERE IS NO RHYME OR REASON TO THEIR ACTIONS. THIS IS ALL A KNEE JERK REACTION TO 'SHOW' THAT WE ARE DOING SOMETHING TO PREVENT OPERRORS; BUT WE ARE CREATING MORE PROBS THAN WE ARE SOLVING. IF MEM FAA MGMNT WOULD SIMPLY ALLOW US TO SLOW THE ACFT; KEEP THEM IN LINE; AND KEEP THEM ON THE APPROPRIATE SIDE OF THE AIRSPACE; EVERYTHING WOULD WORK OUT JUST FINE. THERE IS NEVER ANY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION ABOUT THESE ISSUES. NO PRE-PLANNING BEFORE THE PUSH. NO DE-BRIEFING AFTER THE PUSH. JUST A BUNCH OF BACK SLAPPING WHEN IT'S ALL OVER AND DONE WITH; THANKFUL THAT NOTHING BAD HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.