Narrative:

Flight was attempting to depart on runway 6 at bhm. With the captain flying; the thrust levers were being advanced to a takeoff thrust setting when the aircraft began veering sharply to the right. Immediately and simultaneously; reactionary rudder and tiller nosewheel steering inputs were made to maintain directional control. It was simultaneously observed that the #2 engine's instrumentation (specifically N1) was not showing the #2 engine to be spooling up correspondingly with the thrust lever advancement. The result was a significant asymmetric thrust condition that warranted the execution of a rejected takeoff. Proper notifications were made to ATC (tower) and the flight attendant crew. After clearing the runway; the QRH was accomplished. The flight attendants were briefed as were the passenger; and both were continuously updated. A subsequent evaluate of all flight controls; steering and braking system; and independent and simultaneous short engine run-ups verifying proper engine parameters and thrust lever travel proved nominal. Unable to duplicate or explain the momentary abnormality; the decision was made to continue with the flight; which was satisfactorily accomplished and proved uneventful. While en route; an ACARS message was sent to dispatch to inform them of the incident and to request maintenance to meet the aircraft on arrival for a logbook entry regarding the rejected takeoff. As a result of the logbook entry; and a perceived ambiguity in the interpretation of the requirements pertaining to entries of this nature; and the procedural steps to resolve the entry; maintenance took over the aircraft to conduct a maintenance engine run-up prior to returning the aircraft back to service. This was accomplished without issue. To address the aforementioned ambiguity; there is some vagueness about how this type of incident should be reported/documented beyond the fom. It is not included in the 'information only' provision for confign or circuit breakers; and it was not an explainable; repetitive; or persistent malfunction requiring immediate maintenance. The fom and QRH seem to leave the decision making up to the captain with very little guidance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 CAPT DEPARTS FOLLOWING A REJECTED TKOF FOR A SLOW SPOOLING ENG WITHOUT MAINT EXAMINING THE ENG'S SLOW RESPONSE CAUSE.

Narrative: FLT WAS ATTEMPTING TO DEPART ON RWY 6 AT BHM. WITH THE CAPT FLYING; THE THRUST LEVERS WERE BEING ADVANCED TO A TKOF THRUST SETTING WHEN THE ACFT BEGAN VEERING SHARPLY TO THE R. IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY; REACTIONARY RUDDER AND TILLER NOSEWHEEL STEERING INPUTS WERE MADE TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. IT WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY OBSERVED THAT THE #2 ENG'S INSTRUMENTATION (SPECIFICALLY N1) WAS NOT SHOWING THE #2 ENG TO BE SPOOLING UP CORRESPONDINGLY WITH THE THRUST LEVER ADVANCEMENT. THE RESULT WAS A SIGNIFICANT ASYMMETRIC THRUST CONDITION THAT WARRANTED THE EXECUTION OF A REJECTED TKOF. PROPER NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE TO ATC (TWR) AND THE FLT ATTENDANT CREW. AFTER CLRING THE RWY; THE QRH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BRIEFED AS WERE THE PAX; AND BOTH WERE CONTINUOUSLY UPDATED. A SUBSEQUENT EVAL OF ALL FLT CTLS; STEERING AND BRAKING SYS; AND INDEPENDENT AND SIMULTANEOUS SHORT ENG RUN-UPS VERIFYING PROPER ENG PARAMETERS AND THRUST LEVER TRAVEL PROVED NOMINAL. UNABLE TO DUPLICATE OR EXPLAIN THE MOMENTARY ABNORMALITY; THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE WITH THE FLT; WHICH WAS SATISFACTORILY ACCOMPLISHED AND PROVED UNEVENTFUL. WHILE ENRTE; AN ACARS MESSAGE WAS SENT TO DISPATCH TO INFORM THEM OF THE INCIDENT AND TO REQUEST MAINT TO MEET THE ACFT ON ARR FOR A LOGBOOK ENTRY REGARDING THE RTO. AS A RESULT OF THE LOGBOOK ENTRY; AND A PERCEIVED AMBIGUITY IN THE INTERP OF THE REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO ENTRIES OF THIS NATURE; AND THE PROCEDURAL STEPS TO RESOLVE THE ENTRY; MAINT TOOK OVER THE ACFT TO CONDUCT A MAINT ENG RUN-UP PRIOR TO RETURNING THE ACFT BACK TO SVC. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ISSUE. TO ADDRESS THE AFOREMENTIONED AMBIGUITY; THERE IS SOME VAGUENESS ABOUT HOW THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT SHOULD BE RPTED/DOCUMENTED BEYOND THE FOM. IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE 'INFO ONLY' PROVISION FOR CONFIGN OR CIRCUIT BREAKERS; AND IT WAS NOT AN EXPLAINABLE; REPETITIVE; OR PERSISTENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRING IMMEDIATE MAINT. THE FOM AND QRH SEEM TO LEAVE THE DECISION MAKING UP TO THE CAPT WITH VERY LITTLE GUIDANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.