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Attributes | |
ACN | 722153 |
Time | |
Date | 200612 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Weather Elements | other |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 18000 flight time type : 6500 |
ASRS Report | 722153 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure non adherence other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : 4 |
Resolutory Action | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
The aircraft had an inoperative forward cargo door motor; so the forward cargo door had to be manually closed (requiring approximately 1300 cranks on a manual crank). Pushback and taxi out proceeded normally. When we were #2 aircraft for takeoff; we received a call from tower that operations had requested that we taxi back to the gate for a weight and balance problem. Taxi back to the gate was uneventful. After the aircraft was safely parked; I proceeded outside to investigate what the loading problem was. After the forward cargo hold was opened manually; it was found that not one piece of baggage nor cargo was to be found in the forward cargo hold. All baggage and cargo had been loaded in the aft cargo hold of a fully loaded B767-300. It seems to me that anyone who has had even cursory training in weight and balance should realize that total aft loading on the B767-300 was completely unsafe. It seems that the fact that the forward cargo door had to be manually opened and closed (very time and labor intensive) was a direct factor contributing to this bad decision to put all baggage/cargo in the aft hold. Another factor is that the forward cargo door had been without an operative motor for at least 2 days. The load was redistributed between both forward and aft cargo holds. The flight departed safely; but all connections (including international) were not met because of this bad decision to aft load the B767-300. I wonder what the consequences might have been had we been cleared for takeoff before the call from tower. Given the maintenance status of the forward cargo door and its importance in weight and balance; the aircraft should have had approval for a one time only flight to a maintenance base as soon as the problem was discovered. The lack of timely maintenance to the cargo door contributed to extremely dangerous load planning decisions by ground personnel. Neither situation is acceptable to a safe airline operation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767 CREW RECEIVES MESSAGE TO RETURN TO GATE JUST PRIOR TO TKOF FOR WT AND BAL ISSUES.
Narrative: THE ACFT HAD AN INOP FORWARD CARGO DOOR MOTOR; SO THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR HAD TO BE MANUALLY CLOSED (REQUIRING APPROX 1300 CRANKS ON A MANUAL CRANK). PUSHBACK AND TAXI OUT PROCEEDED NORMALLY. WHEN WE WERE #2 ACFT FOR TKOF; WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM TWR THAT OPS HAD REQUESTED THAT WE TAXI BACK TO THE GATE FOR A WT AND BAL PROB. TAXI BACK TO THE GATE WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER THE ACFT WAS SAFELY PARKED; I PROCEEDED OUTSIDE TO INVESTIGATE WHAT THE LOADING PROB WAS. AFTER THE FORWARD CARGO HOLD WAS OPENED MANUALLY; IT WAS FOUND THAT NOT ONE PIECE OF BAGGAGE NOR CARGO WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE FORWARD CARGO HOLD. ALL BAGGAGE AND CARGO HAD BEEN LOADED IN THE AFT CARGO HOLD OF A FULLY LOADED B767-300. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ANYONE WHO HAS HAD EVEN CURSORY TRAINING IN WT AND BAL SHOULD REALIZE THAT TOTAL AFT LOADING ON THE B767-300 WAS COMPLETELY UNSAFE. IT SEEMS THAT THE FACT THAT THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR HAD TO BE MANUALLY OPENED AND CLOSED (VERY TIME AND LABOR INTENSIVE) WAS A DIRECT FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS BAD DECISION TO PUT ALL BAGGAGE/CARGO IN THE AFT HOLD. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR HAD BEEN WITHOUT AN OPERATIVE MOTOR FOR AT LEAST 2 DAYS. THE LOAD WAS REDISTRIBUTED BTWN BOTH FORWARD AND AFT CARGO HOLDS. THE FLT DEPARTED SAFELY; BUT ALL CONNECTIONS (INCLUDING INTL) WERE NOT MET BECAUSE OF THIS BAD DECISION TO AFT LOAD THE B767-300. I WONDER WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD WE BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF BEFORE THE CALL FROM TWR. GIVEN THE MAINT STATUS OF THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN WT AND BAL; THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE HAD APPROVAL FOR A ONE TIME ONLY FLT TO A MAINT BASE AS SOON AS THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED. THE LACK OF TIMELY MAINT TO THE CARGO DOOR CONTRIBUTED TO EXTREMELY DANGEROUS LOAD PLANNING DECISIONS BY GND PERSONNEL. NEITHER SITUATION IS ACCEPTABLE TO A SAFE AIRLINE OP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.