Narrative:

While reviewing the aircraft logbook prior to departure; I noted two write ups concerning smoke and fumes in the passenger cabin. The previous revenue flight had returned to ZZZ after takeoff with smoke in the cabin. Maintenance had fixed an APU oil leak and the aircraft had flown a test flight just prior to our departure. My first officer had met the test flight first officer at the aircraft who told him there were no discrepancies. The first officer and I discussed the write ups and I briefed the flight attendants about the aircraft's history with smoke and fumes. I told them that a test flight had been flown earlier with no problems; but that I wanted them to call me immediately if they noted any smoke or fumes in the cabin during flight. I took the opportunity prior to departure to review all the QRH procedures for smoke and fumes in the aircraft; use of oxygen; etc; and checked their locations in the QRH so I could find them quickly if need be. During boarding; the entire crew was distracted by a passenger situation. This of course was completely unrelated to the aircraft's prior maintenance history; but was a stressful distraction and resulted in our departing 36 mins after the already rescheduled departure time. During this situation I completely forgot about the aircraft's history with smoke and fumes. We departed ZZZ with the first officer flying the airplane. Very shortly after selecting climb power; I began to notice a smell that I thought was possibly electrical in nature. Our frequency was switched to departure control. At about this same time I heard chimes in the cabin. I later found out that it was the flight attendants calling each other to confirm among themselves that they were indeed smelling fumes and seeing smoke building up in the cabin. As I was checking in with the departure controller; a right AC 'temperature hi' light came on. At this time I told the first officer that he had the radios and that I was getting out the QRH. This was per my pre departure briefing back at the gate. Almost simultaneously with this the flight attendants called the cockpit to report smoke and fumes building up in the cabin. I confirmed with them that they were actually seeing smoke. They replied yes; they were seeing smoke. The first officer overhearing this suggested we turn off the right pack; which I did. Turning to the QRH; I ran through the procedures for the right AC temperature hi light. I noted that it called for turning the pack switch to the hp bleed off position. As the light had extinguished I turned the pack to hp bleed off to comply with the checklist and called the flight attendants to check the situation in the cabin. They stated that there was still smoke and fumes in the cabin and they appeared to be building. At almost the same time; the right AC temperature hi light came back on. At this point the first officer and I said at virtually the same time that we needed to go back to ZZZ. We were climbing through 10000 ft to 13000 ft. The first officer said that he had just been instructed to switch to center but hadn't checked in yet. I took the radios back and informed ZZZ departure that we had smoke and fumes in the cabin; that we were declaring an emergency and that we wanted to return immediately. They immediately turned us west toward the field and asked us if we could maintain an altitude; I instructed the first officer to stop his climb as we approached 12000 ft. At some point between declaring an emergency and making my initial PA to the passenger; I put on my oxygen mask and turned on the intercom and overhead speaker to communicate with the first officer. I stopped reaching for my smoke goggles as there was a very loud feedback squeal from the intercom speaker. I briefly attempted to clear the squeal by checking all my microphone switches. I remembered that I had commented to the tug driver during push back and engine start that I thought he had a stuck or open microphone as there was a lot of noise and I could hear him breathing over the intercom. So not being able to communicate with the first officer or crew and no smoke being evident in the cockpit I set my oxygen mask aside; turned off my speaker and returned to using my headset and boom microphone. I don't believe the first officer ever got his oxygen mask on as it became evident we had a problem with the intercom system. By this time we were in a high base about 10 miles from the field. I called the field in sight as we were instructed to descend to 4000 ft. Approach control cleared us for a visual approach. We set up the ILS in our radios; accomplished the before landing mechanical checklist and confirmed that the airport had the crash fire rescue equipment equipment ready to meet the aircraft. At some point during the return to the field and before the landing gear extension the AC temperature hi light went out as it was not on when I checked the annunciator panel during the landing checklist. On final; below 500 ft AGL; I again called the flight attendants to check the situation in the cabin. They stated that the smoke was beginning to dissipate. At that point I told them I didn't plan to do an emergency evacuation; but that we would stop the aircraft and have the fire department check the aircraft over. The first officer landed the aircraft with a normal touchdown (we were slightly overweight for landing at 130500 pounds). I took the aircraft during roll out exiting the runway at taxiway and stopping in the pad. We were in communication with the fire chief and asked them to examine the aircraft. I made a PA to the passenger telling them that a fire truck would be approaching the aircraft to examine it and to please remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. I called the flight attendants again to check the state of the cabin. They felt that the smoke and fumes had continued to dissipate and had stopped building. I quietly reviewed the emergency evacuation checklist on my yoke to myself and made sure the aircraft was properly configured with the spoilers retracted and the flaps positioned in the now unlikely event we needed to evacuate the aircraft. The fire chief stated that they noted nothing unusual with the aircraft during their examination of the exterior. We requested that they accompany us as we taxied to our gate. We taxied back to the gate; parked; and deplaned the passenger. The total time of this flight from takeoff to landing was 12 mins. After the flight; feeling exhausted and distracted; I asked the chief pilot on duty to relieve the crew from further flying duties. Thinking back the only thing I would have done differently is to pay more attention to the intercom problems during push back. What I took to be a problem with the push crew's microphone was actually a system problem. The interphone failed us at a very critical time. If the smoke had been heavier and had forced us to use our oxygen masks; we would have been unable to communicate both inside and outside the aircraft.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he has received no additional feedback from his air carrier about this aircraft's problem. He did say that the airport fire chief boarded the aircraft wanting to know what the problem was because they had seen this aircraft return with an emergency several days before. The reporter suspected that because of the pack ovht light; this event's smoke and fumes were from overheated ducts and pack material/oil.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 EXPERIENCED SMOKE AND FUMES WITH AN AC OVHT LIGHT. AFTER TKOF AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A RETURN TO LAND.

Narrative: WHILE REVIEWING THE ACFT LOGBOOK PRIOR TO DEP; I NOTED TWO WRITE UPS CONCERNING SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE PAX CABIN. THE PREVIOUS REVENUE FLT HAD RETURNED TO ZZZ AFTER TKOF WITH SMOKE IN THE CABIN. MAINT HAD FIXED AN APU OIL LEAK AND THE ACFT HAD FLOWN A TEST FLT JUST PRIOR TO OUR DEP. MY FO HAD MET THE TEST FLT FO AT THE ACFT WHO TOLD HIM THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE WRITE UPS AND I BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT THE ACFT'S HISTORY WITH SMOKE AND FUMES. I TOLD THEM THAT A TEST FLT HAD BEEN FLOWN EARLIER WITH NO PROBS; BUT THAT I WANTED THEM TO CALL ME IMMEDIATELY IF THEY NOTED ANY SMOKE OR FUMES IN THE CABIN DURING FLT. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO DEP TO REVIEW ALL THE QRH PROCS FOR SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE ACFT; USE OF OXYGEN; ETC; AND CHKED THEIR LOCATIONS IN THE QRH SO I COULD FIND THEM QUICKLY IF NEED BE. DURING BOARDING; THE ENTIRE CREW WAS DISTRACTED BY A PAX SITUATION. THIS OF COURSE WAS COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO THE ACFT'S PRIOR MAINT HISTORY; BUT WAS A STRESSFUL DISTRACTION AND RESULTED IN OUR DEPARTING 36 MINS AFTER THE ALREADY RESCHEDULED DEP TIME. DURING THIS SITUATION I COMPLETELY FORGOT ABOUT THE ACFT'S HISTORY WITH SMOKE AND FUMES. WE DEPARTED ZZZ WITH THE FO FLYING THE AIRPLANE. VERY SHORTLY AFTER SELECTING CLB POWER; I BEGAN TO NOTICE A SMELL THAT I THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLY ELECTRICAL IN NATURE. OUR FREQ WAS SWITCHED TO DEP CTL. AT ABOUT THIS SAME TIME I HEARD CHIMES IN THE CABIN. I LATER FOUND OUT THAT IT WAS THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLING EACH OTHER TO CONFIRM AMONG THEMSELVES THAT THEY WERE INDEED SMELLING FUMES AND SEEING SMOKE BUILDING UP IN THE CABIN. AS I WAS CHKING IN WITH THE DEP CTLR; A RIGHT AC 'TEMP HI' LIGHT CAME ON. AT THIS TIME I TOLD THE FO THAT HE HAD THE RADIOS AND THAT I WAS GETTING OUT THE QRH. THIS WAS PER MY PRE DEP BRIEFING BACK AT THE GATE. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THIS THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED THE COCKPIT TO REPORT SMOKE AND FUMES BUILDING UP IN THE CABIN. I CONFIRMED WITH THEM THAT THEY WERE ACTUALLY SEEING SMOKE. THEY REPLIED YES; THEY WERE SEEING SMOKE. THE FO OVERHEARING THIS SUGGESTED WE TURN OFF THE RIGHT PACK; WHICH I DID. TURNING TO THE QRH; I RAN THROUGH THE PROCS FOR THE RIGHT AC TEMP HI LIGHT. I NOTED THAT IT CALLED FOR TURNING THE PACK SWITCH TO THE HP BLEED OFF POSITION. AS THE LIGHT HAD EXTINGUISHED I TURNED THE PACK TO HP BLEED OFF TO COMPLY WITH THE CHKLIST AND CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO CHK THE SITUATION IN THE CABIN. THEY STATED THAT THERE WAS STILL SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE CABIN AND THEY APPEARED TO BE BUILDING. AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME; THE RIGHT AC TEMP HI LIGHT CAME BACK ON. AT THIS POINT THE FO AND I SAID AT VIRTUALLY THE SAME TIME THAT WE NEEDED TO GO BACK TO ZZZ. WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 10000 FT TO 13000 FT. THE FO SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SWITCH TO CTR BUT HADN'T CHKED IN YET. I TOOK THE RADIOS BACK AND INFORMED ZZZ DEP THAT WE HAD SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE CABIN; THAT WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER AND THAT WE WANTED TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY. THEY IMMEDIATELY TURNED US WEST TOWARD THE FIELD AND ASKED US IF WE COULD MAINTAIN AN ALT; I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO STOP HIS CLB AS WE APCHED 12000 FT. AT SOME POINT BETWEEN DECLARING AN EMER AND MAKING MY INITIAL PA TO THE PAX; I PUT ON MY OXYGEN MASK AND TURNED ON THE INTERCOM AND OVERHEAD SPEAKER TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE FO. I STOPPED REACHING FOR MY SMOKE GOGGLES AS THERE WAS A VERY LOUD FEEDBACK SQUEAL FROM THE INTERCOM SPEAKER. I BRIEFLY ATTEMPTED TO CLEAR THE SQUEAL BY CHKING ALL MY MIC SWITCHES. I REMEMBERED THAT I HAD COMMENTED TO THE TUG DRIVER DURING PUSH BACK AND ENG START THAT I THOUGHT HE HAD A STUCK OR OPEN MIC AS THERE WAS A LOT OF NOISE AND I COULD HEAR HIM BREATHING OVER THE INTERCOM. SO NOT BEING ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE FO OR CREW AND NO SMOKE BEING EVIDENT IN THE COCKPIT I SET MY OXYGEN MASK ASIDE; TURNED OFF MY SPEAKER AND RETURNED TO USING MY HEADSET AND BOOM MIC. I DON'T BELIEVE THE FO EVER GOT HIS OXYGEN MASK ON AS IT BECAME EVIDENT WE HAD A PROB WITH THE INTERCOM SYSTEM. BY THIS TIME WE WERE IN A HIGH BASE ABOUT 10 MILES FROM THE FIELD. I CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT AS WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 4000 FT. APCH CTL CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH. WE SET UP THE ILS IN OUR RADIOS; ACCOMPLISHED THE BEFORE LNDG MECHANICAL CHKLIST AND CONFIRMED THAT THE ARPT HAD THE CFR EQUIP READY TO MEET THE ACFT. AT SOME POINT DURING THE RETURN TO THE FIELD AND BEFORE THE LNDG GEAR EXTENSION THE AC TEMP HI LIGHT WENT OUT AS IT WAS NOT ON WHEN I CHKED THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL DURING THE LNDG CHKLIST. ON FINAL; BELOW 500 FT AGL; I AGAIN CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO CHK THE SITUATION IN THE CABIN. THEY STATED THAT THE SMOKE WAS BEGINNING TO DISSIPATE. AT THAT POINT I TOLD THEM I DIDN'T PLAN TO DO AN EMER EVACUATION; BUT THAT WE WOULD STOP THE ACFT AND HAVE THE FIRE DEPT CHK THE ACFT OVER. THE FO LANDED THE ACFT WITH A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN (WE WERE SLIGHTLY OVERWT FOR LNDG AT 130500 LBS). I TOOK THE ACFT DURING ROLL OUT EXITING THE RWY AT TXWY AND STOPPING IN THE PAD. WE WERE IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE FIRE CHIEF AND ASKED THEM TO EXAMINE THE ACFT. I MADE A PA TO THE PAX TELLING THEM THAT A FIRE TRUCK WOULD BE APPROACHING THE ACFT TO EXAMINE IT AND TO PLEASE REMAIN SEATED WITH THEIR SEATBELTS FASTENED. I CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AGAIN TO CHK THE STATE OF THE CABIN. THEY FELT THAT THE SMOKE AND FUMES HAD CONTINUED TO DISSIPATE AND HAD STOPPED BUILDING. I QUIETLY REVIEWED THE EMER EVACUATION CHKLIST ON MY YOKE TO MYSELF AND MADE SURE THE ACFT WAS PROPERLY CONFIGURED WITH THE SPOILERS RETRACTED AND THE FLAPS POSITIONED IN THE NOW UNLIKELY EVENT WE NEEDED TO EVACUATE THE ACFT. THE FIRE CHIEF STATED THAT THEY NOTED NOTHING UNUSUAL WITH THE ACFT DURING THEIR EXAMINATION OF THE EXTERIOR. WE REQUESTED THAT THEY ACCOMPANY US AS WE TAXIED TO OUR GATE. WE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE; PARKED; AND DEPLANED THE PAX. THE TOTAL TIME OF THIS FLT FROM TKOF TO LNDG WAS 12 MINS. AFTER THE FLT; FEELING EXHAUSTED AND DISTRACTED; I ASKED THE CHIEF PLT ON DUTY TO RELIEVE THE CREW FROM FURTHER FLYING DUTIES. THINKING BACK THE ONLY THING I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY IS TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERCOM PROBS DURING PUSH BACK. WHAT I TOOK TO BE A PROB WITH THE PUSH CREW'S MIC WAS ACTUALLY A SYSTEM PROB. THE INTERPHONE FAILED US AT A VERY CRITICAL TIME. IF THE SMOKE HAD BEEN HEAVIER AND HAD FORCED US TO USE OUR OXYGEN MASKS; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ACFT.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO ADDITIONAL FEEDBACK FROM HIS ACR ABOUT THIS ACFT'S PROB. HE DID SAY THAT THE ARPT FIRE CHIEF BOARDED THE ACFT WANTING TO KNOW WHAT THE PROB WAS BECAUSE THEY HAD SEEN THIS ACFT RETURN WITH AN EMER SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE. THE RPTR SUSPECTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE PACK OVHT LIGHT; THIS EVENT'S SMOKE AND FUMES WERE FROM OVERHEATED DUCTS AND PACK MATERIAL/OIL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.