Narrative:

High crew workload resulting from an overloaded ATC situation in the sat area; compounded by additional stress on the flight crew resulting from a near miss and a TCAS RA event. The primary focus of this report is for probably landing without ATC clearance at sat. The crew responded to a TCAS RA approximately 5-10 mins prior to landing; so it is being included as a contributing factor. ZHU was working our flight as we descended on the marcs arrival into sat. Center issued our flight numerous heading; altitude; and speed changes and amendments. Because of all the changes being issued by ATC the crew got behind on our crew briefing; in-range checklist; and passenger briefing duties. ATC's and our workload was very high. Center descended us to 6000 ft. When we were level they handed us off to sat approach; without providing us with a TA for the VFR traffic which was about to cause our TCAS event. When we switched to approach frequency we could not make contact initially due to frequency congestion. Before we could establish communication with approach we received a TCAS TA; followed quickly by an RA to climb at 3000 FPM. The crew complied with the RA and climbed 300 ft before the RA stopped. At the top of our climb the conflict traffic passed 400 ft directly below our aircraft on our TCAS (6 mi display). The first officer caught a glimpse of the traffic as it passed under us as it was approaching from our 2 O'clock position. At top of climb we established contact with approach and advised we were climbing for a TCAS RA. The approach controller also had a very high workload and seemed to be overloaded. We were now rushed to complete our remaining duties; with adrenaline still pumping from the RA event we were quickly vectored on to a 12 mi final and cleared for a visual approach to runway 30L. Approach control forgot to hand us off to local tower control. We failed to notice and landed. We contacted ground control and taxied to the gate. At the end of the landing roll I realized that I was still listening to approach control and hadn't contacted the local control tower. We contacted ground control. They gave us no indication that we had landed without clearance and instructed us to taxi to our gate. I should have omitted the passenger briefing portion of my duties when it became apparent that our workload was getting high. I doubt if that alone could have prevented this event. The FAA needs to take some type of action to prevent their controllers from becoming as overloaded as the ZHU and sat approach controllers were that day.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 CREW REPORTS TCAS RA ON ARRIVAL TO SAT AND THEN FORGETTING TO CONTACT TOWER FOR CLEARANCE TO LAND.

Narrative: HIGH CREW WORKLOAD RESULTING FROM AN OVERLOADED ATC SITUATION IN THE SAT AREA; COMPOUNDED BY ADDITIONAL STRESS ON THE FLT CREW RESULTING FROM A NEAR MISS AND A TCAS RA EVENT. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THIS REPORT IS FOR PROBABLY LNDG WITHOUT ATC CLRNC AT SAT. THE CREW RESPONDED TO A TCAS RA APPROX 5-10 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG; SO IT IS BEING INCLUDED AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. ZHU WAS WORKING OUR FLT AS WE DSNDED ON THE MARCS ARR INTO SAT. CTR ISSUED OUR FLT NUMEROUS HDG; ALT; AND SPD CHANGES AND AMENDMENTS. BECAUSE OF ALL THE CHANGES BEING ISSUED BY ATC THE CREW GOT BEHIND ON OUR CREW BRIEFING; IN-RANGE CHKLIST; AND PAX BRIEFING DUTIES. ATC'S AND OUR WORKLOAD WAS VERY HIGH. CTR DSNDED US TO 6000 FT. WHEN WE WERE LEVEL THEY HANDED US OFF TO SAT APCH; WITHOUT PROVIDING US WITH A TA FOR THE VFR TFC WHICH WAS ABOUT TO CAUSE OUR TCAS EVENT. WHEN WE SWITCHED TO APCH FREQ WE COULD NOT MAKE CONTACT INITIALLY DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION. BEFORE WE COULD ESTABLISH COM WITH APCH WE RECEIVED A TCAS TA; FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY AN RA TO CLB AT 3000 FPM. THE CREW COMPLIED WITH THE RA AND CLBED 300 FT BEFORE THE RA STOPPED. AT THE TOP OF OUR CLB THE CONFLICT TFC PASSED 400 FT DIRECTLY BELOW OUR ACFT ON OUR TCAS (6 MI DISPLAY). THE FO CAUGHT A GLIMPSE OF THE TFC AS IT PASSED UNDER US AS IT WAS APCHING FROM OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS. AT TOP OF CLB WE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH APCH AND ADVISED WE WERE CLBING FOR A TCAS RA. THE APCH CTLR ALSO HAD A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD AND SEEMED TO BE OVERLOADED. WE WERE NOW RUSHED TO COMPLETE OUR REMAINING DUTIES; WITH ADRENALINE STILL PUMPING FROM THE RA EVENT WE WERE QUICKLY VECTORED ON TO A 12 MI FINAL AND CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30L. APCH CTL FORGOT TO HAND US OFF TO LCL TWR CTL. WE FAILED TO NOTICE AND LANDED. WE CONTACTED GND CTL AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. AT THE END OF THE LNDG ROLL I REALIZED THAT I WAS STILL LISTENING TO APCH CTL AND HADN'T CONTACTED THE LCL CTL TWR. WE CONTACTED GND CTL. THEY GAVE US NO INDICATION THAT WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC AND INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO OUR GATE. I SHOULD HAVE OMITTED THE PAX BRIEFING PORTION OF MY DUTIES WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT OUR WORKLOAD WAS GETTING HIGH. I DOUBT IF THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS EVENT. THE FAA NEEDS TO TAKE SOME TYPE OF ACTION TO PREVENT THEIR CTLRS FROM BECOMING AS OVERLOADED AS THE ZHU AND SAT APCH CTLRS WERE THAT DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.