Narrative:

Pushback and engine start were uneventful; and all engine indications were normal. We were cleared to taxi to runway 30 at iad to accommodate field condition surface winds of 300 degrees 16 KTS gusting 30 KTS. Toga thrust was planned for the departure due to the prevailing wind/gust conditions. Engine anti-ice was selected for the taxi due to sporadic light rain and puddled water on the taxiway/ramp surfaces. Taxi time was exactly 10 mins from the time of block-out to taking the runway; and we deselected engine anti-ice upon taking the runway due to dry field (runway) conditions and the cessation of the very light sprinkles we experienced during the taxi. The first officer was executing the takeoff; and upon clearance advanced the thrust levers normally to the toga thrust position. At approximately 40 KTS; just as the takeoff EPR reached the toga setting (1.40); I noticed that the #1 engine was now experiencing a loss of thrust. The EPR associated with #1 engine was approximately halfway back to idle EPR when I decided to reject the takeoff. However; at this same time; we experienced an extremely loud and concussive 'bang' which was accompanied by a flash of light on aircraft-left. This caused the aircraft to lurch violently to the left and simultaneously was accompanied by an ECAM message of 'engine #1 fail.' at this point; we rejected the takeoff according to standard procedures and brought the aircraft to a stop. I set the parking brake and scanned ECAM; noticing that the upper ECAM displayed 'xx' in the RPM indicators for N1 and N2. With the combination of an engine failure ECAM; the strong leftward lurch; and the lack of any indication of compressor rotation; I assumed that we had indeed experienced a catastrophic failure resulting in the seizure of the #1 engine. There was no indication of fire; or any need of evacuate the aircraft. I elected to make a quick announcement to the cabin to advise the crew and passenger that the situation was under control and that we would be taxiing to the gate; eventually. I asked the first officer to request permission from ATC to remain on the runway in the present position as we sorted out the situation. This permission was granted; and we immediately accessed the QRH for guidance. The only engine failure guidance that was close to being applicable in this situation started with; 'if engine shutdown is required; then after accomplishing ECAM actions:' considering that we believed the engine to have experienced substantial damage; I elected to perform the shutdown as directed by ECAM. We accomplished the shutdown; including the release of the engine #1 fire button to stem any flow of fluids of the engine. I must admit that I had to hesitate when the ECAM directed us to 'discharge agent 1' if damage was suspected; given that we had no indication of fire detection. However; after considering that the ambient conditions were 44 degrees F; with moisture and high gusting winds making the wind-chill substantially lower (how much I do not know; but it was extremely uncomfortable outside). We elected to follow ECAM to the letter and discharge engine #1; agent 1 fire bottle. We completed ECAM as far as applicable for the situation and requested clearance to taxi off the runway. During this entire episode; the first officer attempted to contact dispatch with no success. Contact with iad operations was also difficult; and he finally made contact and requested them to contact dispatch for us and advise of our situation. ACARS contact with operations was attempted; but constantly interrupted by ATC communications; rendering its effectiveness in this situation moot; as we were already on our way to the gate and subsequent telephone contact opportunities. I cannot overemphasize the outstanding performance of my first officer throughout this incident. Every request for him to perform a needed function was met with 'it's done; here's the information' or 'that's done.' although we have never flown together before this trip; we operated extremely well in this non-normal situation; due in no small part to his professionalism and experience. Taxi-in to the gate was normal until arrival on the line; where we were met with a single marshaller signaling us to come into the gate without the requisite wing walkers. With the situation well under control; we felt no need to taxi in without the benefit of the necessary personnel; so we waited for the arrival of the additional rampers. Shutdown was uneventful; and followed immediately by the printout of a maintenance postflt report to aid in diagnosing the problem with engine #1. Deplaning of the 69 passenger took place without incident; and first officer performed a postflt inspection; checking engine #1's fan for its ability to spin. He reported that indeed the fan and compressor section was freely movable. Post flight report indicated the following faults: 1) engine #1 fadec. 2) engine #1 compressor vane. 3) engine #1 fail. 4) engine #1 fuel control fault. 5) engine #1 fadec alternator. 6) engine #1 shutdown. Subsequent discussions with maintenance control revealed that the aircraft suffered a fadec failure; possibly associated with other failures. Maintenance control indicated that due to the loss of fadec tachometer input; that the ECAM would give the crew indications of 'xx' for the associated N1 and N2; and led us to believe in this situation that the engine seized; even though in actuality the engine failed due to fadec failure and without seizure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES ENGINE FAILURE AT 40 KTS DURING TKOF ROLL AND REJECTS TKOF.

Narrative: PUSHBACK AND ENG START WERE UNEVENTFUL; AND ALL ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 30 AT IAD TO ACCOMMODATE FIELD CONDITION SURFACE WINDS OF 300 DEGS 16 KTS GUSTING 30 KTS. TOGA THRUST WAS PLANNED FOR THE DEP DUE TO THE PREVAILING WIND/GUST CONDITIONS. ENG ANTI-ICE WAS SELECTED FOR THE TAXI DUE TO SPORADIC LIGHT RAIN AND PUDDLED WATER ON THE TXWY/RAMP SURFACES. TAXI TIME WAS EXACTLY 10 MINS FROM THE TIME OF BLOCK-OUT TO TAKING THE RWY; AND WE DESELECTED ENG ANTI-ICE UPON TAKING THE RWY DUE TO DRY FIELD (RWY) CONDITIONS AND THE CESSATION OF THE VERY LIGHT SPRINKLES WE EXPERIENCED DURING THE TAXI. THE FO WAS EXECUTING THE TKOF; AND UPON CLRNC ADVANCED THE THRUST LEVERS NORMALLY TO THE TOGA THRUST POS. AT APPROX 40 KTS; JUST AS THE TKOF EPR REACHED THE TOGA SETTING (1.40); I NOTICED THAT THE #1 ENG WAS NOW EXPERIENCING A LOSS OF THRUST. THE EPR ASSOCIATED WITH #1 ENG WAS APPROX HALFWAY BACK TO IDLE EPR WHEN I DECIDED TO REJECT THE TKOF. HOWEVER; AT THIS SAME TIME; WE EXPERIENCED AN EXTREMELY LOUD AND CONCUSSIVE 'BANG' WHICH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A FLASH OF LIGHT ON ACFT-L. THIS CAUSED THE ACFT TO LURCH VIOLENTLY TO THE L AND SIMULTANEOUSLY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN ECAM MESSAGE OF 'ENG #1 FAIL.' AT THIS POINT; WE REJECTED THE TKOF ACCORDING TO STANDARD PROCS AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. I SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND SCANNED ECAM; NOTICING THAT THE UPPER ECAM DISPLAYED 'XX' IN THE RPM INDICATORS FOR N1 AND N2. WITH THE COMBINATION OF AN ENG FAILURE ECAM; THE STRONG LEFTWARD LURCH; AND THE LACK OF ANY INDICATION OF COMPRESSOR ROTATION; I ASSUMED THAT WE HAD INDEED EXPERIENCED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE RESULTING IN THE SEIZURE OF THE #1 ENG. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF FIRE; OR ANY NEED OF EVACUATE THE ACFT. I ELECTED TO MAKE A QUICK ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE CABIN TO ADVISE THE CREW AND PAX THAT THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CTL AND THAT WE WOULD BE TAXIING TO THE GATE; EVENTUALLY. I ASKED THE FO TO REQUEST PERMISSION FROM ATC TO REMAIN ON THE RWY IN THE PRESENT POS AS WE SORTED OUT THE SITUATION. THIS PERMISSION WAS GRANTED; AND WE IMMEDIATELY ACCESSED THE QRH FOR GUIDANCE. THE ONLY ENG FAILURE GUIDANCE THAT WAS CLOSE TO BEING APPLICABLE IN THIS SITUATION STARTED WITH; 'IF ENG SHUTDOWN IS REQUIRED; THEN AFTER ACCOMPLISHING ECAM ACTIONS:' CONSIDERING THAT WE BELIEVED THE ENG TO HAVE EXPERIENCED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE; I ELECTED TO PERFORM THE SHUTDOWN AS DIRECTED BY ECAM. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE SHUTDOWN; INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF THE ENG #1 FIRE BUTTON TO STEM ANY FLOW OF FLUIDS OF THE ENG. I MUST ADMIT THAT I HAD TO HESITATE WHEN THE ECAM DIRECTED US TO 'DISCHARGE AGENT 1' IF DAMAGE WAS SUSPECTED; GIVEN THAT WE HAD NO INDICATION OF FIRE DETECTION. HOWEVER; AFTER CONSIDERING THAT THE AMBIENT CONDITIONS WERE 44 DEGS F; WITH MOISTURE AND HIGH GUSTING WINDS MAKING THE WIND-CHILL SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER (HOW MUCH I DO NOT KNOW; BUT IT WAS EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE OUTSIDE). WE ELECTED TO FOLLOW ECAM TO THE LETTER AND DISCHARGE ENG #1; AGENT 1 FIRE BOTTLE. WE COMPLETED ECAM AS FAR AS APPLICABLE FOR THE SITUATION AND REQUESTED CLRNC TO TAXI OFF THE RWY. DURING THIS ENTIRE EPISODE; THE FO ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT DISPATCH WITH NO SUCCESS. CONTACT WITH IAD OPS WAS ALSO DIFFICULT; AND HE FINALLY MADE CONTACT AND REQUESTED THEM TO CONTACT DISPATCH FOR US AND ADVISE OF OUR SITUATION. ACARS CONTACT WITH OPS WAS ATTEMPTED; BUT CONSTANTLY INTERRUPTED BY ATC COMS; RENDERING ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN THIS SITUATION MOOT; AS WE WERE ALREADY ON OUR WAY TO THE GATE AND SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONE CONTACT OPPORTUNITIES. I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF MY FO THROUGHOUT THIS INCIDENT. EVERY REQUEST FOR HIM TO PERFORM A NEEDED FUNCTION WAS MET WITH 'IT'S DONE; HERE'S THE INFO' OR 'THAT'S DONE.' ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NEVER FLOWN TOGETHER BEFORE THIS TRIP; WE OPERATED EXTREMELY WELL IN THIS NON-NORMAL SITUATION; DUE IN NO SMALL PART TO HIS PROFESSIONALISM AND EXPERIENCE. TAXI-IN TO THE GATE WAS NORMAL UNTIL ARR ON THE LINE; WHERE WE WERE MET WITH A SINGLE MARSHALLER SIGNALING US TO COME INTO THE GATE WITHOUT THE REQUISITE WING WALKERS. WITH THE SITUATION WELL UNDER CTL; WE FELT NO NEED TO TAXI IN WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL; SO WE WAITED FOR THE ARR OF THE ADDITIONAL RAMPERS. SHUTDOWN WAS UNEVENTFUL; AND FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY THE PRINTOUT OF A MAINT POSTFLT RPT TO AID IN DIAGNOSING THE PROB WITH ENG #1. DEPLANING OF THE 69 PAX TOOK PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT; AND FO PERFORMED A POSTFLT INSPECTION; CHKING ENG #1'S FAN FOR ITS ABILITY TO SPIN. HE RPTED THAT INDEED THE FAN AND COMPRESSOR SECTION WAS FREELY MOVABLE. POST FLT RPT INDICATED THE FOLLOWING FAULTS: 1) ENG #1 FADEC. 2) ENG #1 COMPRESSOR VANE. 3) ENG #1 FAIL. 4) ENG #1 FUEL CTL FAULT. 5) ENG #1 FADEC ALTERNATOR. 6) ENG #1 SHUTDOWN. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH MAINT CTL REVEALED THAT THE ACFT SUFFERED A FADEC FAILURE; POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER FAILURES. MAINT CTL INDICATED THAT DUE TO THE LOSS OF FADEC TACHOMETER INPUT; THAT THE ECAM WOULD GIVE THE CREW INDICATIONS OF 'XX' FOR THE ASSOCIATED N1 AND N2; AND LED US TO BELIEVE IN THIS SITUATION THAT THE ENG SEIZED; EVEN THOUGH IN ACTUALITY THE ENG FAILED DUE TO FADEC FAILURE AND WITHOUT SEIZURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.