Narrative:

On rotation; we got 2 caution messages that distraction me (windshear fail and GPWS fail). As we climbed out; we forgot to bring up the gear. With the gear down and locked; the thrust rating cannot be changed from takeoff to climb until 1700 pressure altitude. This was further distracting. When we finally did bring up the gear; we were still at 200 KTS (the maximum gear retraction speed). The gear hesitated for several seconds; and we got a master warning landing gear disagree. The aircraft was buffeting lightly for about 30 seconds while the gear was hanging down mid-transit; then the gear finished its cycle and we felt 3 distinct bumps as the gear locked up. By this point; my attention span was saturated. I decided to break the chain of events by declaring an emergency for priority handling back into the airport. Furthermore; I wanted the emergency vehicles standing by in case the gear collapsed. We ran the applicable emergency checklist (which called for a return to field); ran the in-range and approach checklist; and landed without event. We stopped the aircraft on the runway; set the brake and contacted maintenance control to make sure we were ok to taxi into the gate without danger of collapsing the gear. Maintenance said it was alright if we taxied; which we did without further event. I have learned immensely from this event. In the future; I will try to bring others into the decision making process; specifically dispatch and maintenance (via SELCAL frequency). I think it is very important to have a number of people in the decision making process. At the time; my thinking was that we already had problems with the ahrs (the reason we were a ferry flight to begin with); and were traveling into known IFR conditions. I felt that having a potential gear problem was too much to deal with; given the other circumstances. Further; we had been sitting in the heat and humidity for several hours at the airport; and were not as sharp as we could have been for this ferry flight. Too many distrs had brought me away from SOP and 'the normal groove.' I think it was a good decision to nip this potential landslide of bad circumstances to a close. Again; at this time I felt that my decision was a bit of a snap decision. I made the emergency call fairly quickly; and without bringing the first officer into the decision. Though the first officer agreed with my decision; it was poor CRM on my part to act hastily and unilaterally. I think we should have worked the problem a little bit more; and run the checklist. However; it is tough to keep things sorted out when you are saturated. I was already saturated by distrs from the 2 caution messages on rotation; and having forgotten the thrust setting logic I was distraction by not being able to set climb thrust until 1700 pressure altitude. Another issue here is a demonstration of why detailed system knowledge is so important. Had I remembered that some ieca messages are not inhibited during takeoff; or that the thrust ratings had logic; I would not have been so saturated when the gear had the problems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 PILOT REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING AN EICAS DISTRACTION DURING TKOF THE LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE SPD. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A RETURN TO LNDG.

Narrative: ON ROTATION; WE GOT 2 CAUTION MESSAGES THAT DISTR ME (WINDSHEAR FAIL AND GPWS FAIL). AS WE CLBED OUT; WE FORGOT TO BRING UP THE GEAR. WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED; THE THRUST RATING CANNOT BE CHANGED FROM TKOF TO CLB UNTIL 1700 PRESSURE ALT. THIS WAS FURTHER DISTRACTING. WHEN WE FINALLY DID BRING UP THE GEAR; WE WERE STILL AT 200 KTS (THE MAX GEAR RETRACTION SPD). THE GEAR HESITATED FOR SEVERAL SECONDS; AND WE GOT A MASTER WARNING LNDG GEAR DISAGREE. THE ACFT WAS BUFFETING LIGHTLY FOR ABOUT 30 SECONDS WHILE THE GEAR WAS HANGING DOWN MID-TRANSIT; THEN THE GEAR FINISHED ITS CYCLE AND WE FELT 3 DISTINCT BUMPS AS THE GEAR LOCKED UP. BY THIS POINT; MY ATTN SPAN WAS SATURATED. I DECIDED TO BREAK THE CHAIN OF EVENTS BY DECLARING AN EMER FOR PRIORITY HANDLING BACK INTO THE ARPT. FURTHERMORE; I WANTED THE EMER VEHICLES STANDING BY IN CASE THE GEAR COLLAPSED. WE RAN THE APPLICABLE EMER CHKLIST (WHICH CALLED FOR A RETURN TO FIELD); RAN THE IN-RANGE AND APCH CHKLIST; AND LANDED WITHOUT EVENT. WE STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE RWY; SET THE BRAKE AND CONTACTED MAINT CTL TO MAKE SURE WE WERE OK TO TAXI INTO THE GATE WITHOUT DANGER OF COLLAPSING THE GEAR. MAINT SAID IT WAS ALRIGHT IF WE TAXIED; WHICH WE DID WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT. I HAVE LEARNED IMMENSELY FROM THIS EVENT. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL TRY TO BRING OTHERS INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS; SPECIFICALLY DISPATCH AND MAINT (VIA SELCAL FREQ). I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. AT THE TIME; MY THINKING WAS THAT WE ALREADY HAD PROBS WITH THE AHRS (THE REASON WE WERE A FERRY FLT TO BEGIN WITH); AND WERE TRAVELING INTO KNOWN IFR CONDITIONS. I FELT THAT HAVING A POTENTIAL GEAR PROB WAS TOO MUCH TO DEAL WITH; GIVEN THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHER; WE HAD BEEN SITTING IN THE HEAT AND HUMIDITY FOR SEVERAL HRS AT THE ARPT; AND WERE NOT AS SHARP AS WE COULD HAVE BEEN FOR THIS FERRY FLT. TOO MANY DISTRS HAD BROUGHT ME AWAY FROM SOP AND 'THE NORMAL GROOVE.' I THINK IT WAS A GOOD DECISION TO NIP THIS POTENTIAL LANDSLIDE OF BAD CIRCUMSTANCES TO A CLOSE. AGAIN; AT THIS TIME I FELT THAT MY DECISION WAS A BIT OF A SNAP DECISION. I MADE THE EMER CALL FAIRLY QUICKLY; AND WITHOUT BRINGING THE FO INTO THE DECISION. THOUGH THE FO AGREED WITH MY DECISION; IT WAS POOR CRM ON MY PART TO ACT HASTILY AND UNILATERALLY. I THINK WE SHOULD HAVE WORKED THE PROB A LITTLE BIT MORE; AND RUN THE CHKLIST. HOWEVER; IT IS TOUGH TO KEEP THINGS SORTED OUT WHEN YOU ARE SATURATED. I WAS ALREADY SATURATED BY DISTRS FROM THE 2 CAUTION MESSAGES ON ROTATION; AND HAVING FORGOTTEN THE THRUST SETTING LOGIC I WAS DISTR BY NOT BEING ABLE TO SET CLB THRUST UNTIL 1700 PRESSURE ALT. ANOTHER ISSUE HERE IS A DEMO OF WHY DETAILED SYS KNOWLEDGE IS SO IMPORTANT. HAD I REMEMBERED THAT SOME IECA MESSAGES ARE NOT INHIBITED DURING TKOF; OR THAT THE THRUST RATINGS HAD LOGIC; I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO SATURATED WHEN THE GEAR HAD THE PROBS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.