Narrative:

Aircraft was grounded in ZZZ for a dvi (detailed visual inspection) of floor structure from fs x-fs Y for use of alternate ballast in aircraft interior instead as per amm as per engineering order from bombardier. We arrived in ZZZ and I called maintenance control to inform them of our arrival and then ask them. My understanding was to pull floor boards up for inspection as per the amm reference that was attached with the engineering order. Maintenance control then informed me to get inspector to call the director of quality control on how and what inspection was to be done on the aircraft. There were concerns about the engineering order because it did not reference any amm or how the inspection was to be done. Mr X called his department and explained the situation and we waited for a phone call back. We got the phone call back and were told to do the inspection through the avionics compartment and sign it off per the engineering order. We completed the inspection; I signed it off; and the inspector rii'ed it. I'm not sure how the ballast incident came about but the inspection was questioned by the FAA on how we accomplished the inspection. We did the inspection the way we were told by director of quality control or quality control. Aircraft grounded for improper use of ballast and inspection required to make sure stress or damage did not occur. Somebody in management or the company needs to make a decision on what and how this inspection is to be accomplished by engineering order; work card or amm reference. Supplemental information from acn 754560: performed a dvi (detailed visual inspection) of the floor structure on aircraft for possible stress damage per the CRJ700 engineering order. This engineering order was not clear on how to access the affected area to perform a dvi. The inspector called the director of quality control for approval to perform the dvi through the avionics door access as per the maintenance control instructions. The director of quality control gave approval to perform the dvi through the avionics door access; no defects were noted. I called the CRJ700 representative about the event; and he sent me a revised engineering order that allowed for access through the avionics door to the affected area for the dvi. No further actions were taken. The CRJ700 engineering order was unclr; such as how to access the affected area. Maintenance control was directing us not to pull up floor boards and seats; that we should gain access through the avionics bay door; this led to confusion. I suggest that bombardier; and our air carrier provide technicians with complete tech data so that performing a task can be done without questioning what method to gain access to an affected area. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the detailed visual inspection (dvi) was called out by the mfg; bombardier; as a result of a temporary ballast installation in the fwd cabin floor area during replacement of both engines. The issue arose as a result of the different requirements being asked of the mechanic to accomplish the dvi. The aircraft amm (bombardier's MM); required the cabin floor boards to be removed; which required removing cabin passenger seats (rows) in order to access the frame station floor beams to accomplish the dvi. His company's engineering order directed the inspection to be accomplished by gaining access to the floor beams via the lower avionics compartment. Reporter stated that he and the inspector used the avionics access procedure to accomplish the dvi of the cabin floor beams. The issue has since been resolved. The mfg has accepted the avionics compartment access as sufficient to accomplish the inspection being called out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-700 ACFT RECEIVED A DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION (DVI) OF FWD CABIN FLOOR FRAMES FROM THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT INSTEAD OF PULLING UP CABIN FLOOR BOARDS.

Narrative: ACFT WAS GNDED IN ZZZ FOR A DVI (DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION) OF FLOOR STRUCTURE FROM FS X-FS Y FOR USE OF ALTERNATE BALLAST IN ACFT INTERIOR INSTEAD AS PER AMM AS PER ENGINEERING ORDER FROM BOMBARDIER. WE ARRIVED IN ZZZ AND I CALLED MAINT CTL TO INFORM THEM OF OUR ARR AND THEN ASK THEM. MY UNDERSTANDING WAS TO PULL FLOOR BOARDS UP FOR INSPECTION AS PER THE AMM REF THAT WAS ATTACHED WITH THE ENGINEERING ORDER. MAINT CTL THEN INFORMED ME TO GET INSPECTOR TO CALL THE DIRECTOR OF QUALITY CTL ON HOW AND WHAT INSPECTION WAS TO BE DONE ON THE ACFT. THERE WERE CONCERNS ABOUT THE ENGINEERING ORDER BECAUSE IT DID NOT REF ANY AMM OR HOW THE INSPECTION WAS TO BE DONE. MR X CALLED HIS DEPT AND EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND WE WAITED FOR A PHONE CALL BACK. WE GOT THE PHONE CALL BACK AND WERE TOLD TO DO THE INSPECTION THROUGH THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT AND SIGN IT OFF PER THE ENGINEERING ORDER. WE COMPLETED THE INSPECTION; I SIGNED IT OFF; AND THE INSPECTOR RII'ED IT. I'M NOT SURE HOW THE BALLAST INCIDENT CAME ABOUT BUT THE INSPECTION WAS QUESTIONED BY THE FAA ON HOW WE ACCOMPLISHED THE INSPECTION. WE DID THE INSPECTION THE WAY WE WERE TOLD BY DIRECTOR OF QUALITY CTL OR QUALITY CTL. ACFT GNDED FOR IMPROPER USE OF BALLAST AND INSPECTION REQUIRED TO MAKE SURE STRESS OR DAMAGE DID NOT OCCUR. SOMEBODY IN MGMNT OR THE COMPANY NEEDS TO MAKE A DECISION ON WHAT AND HOW THIS INSPECTION IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ENGINEERING ORDER; WORK CARD OR AMM REF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 754560: PERFORMED A DVI (DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION) OF THE FLOOR STRUCTURE ON ACFT FOR POSSIBLE STRESS DAMAGE PER THE CRJ700 ENGINEERING ORDER. THIS ENGINEERING ORDER WAS NOT CLR ON HOW TO ACCESS THE AFFECTED AREA TO PERFORM A DVI. THE INSPECTOR CALLED THE DIRECTOR OF QUALITY CTL FOR APPROVAL TO PERFORM THE DVI THROUGH THE AVIONICS DOOR ACCESS AS PER THE MAINT CTL INSTRUCTIONS. THE DIRECTOR OF QUALITY CTL GAVE APPROVAL TO PERFORM THE DVI THROUGH THE AVIONICS DOOR ACCESS; NO DEFECTS WERE NOTED. I CALLED THE CRJ700 REPRESENTATIVE ABOUT THE EVENT; AND HE SENT ME A REVISED ENGINEERING ORDER THAT ALLOWED FOR ACCESS THROUGH THE AVIONICS DOOR TO THE AFFECTED AREA FOR THE DVI. NO FURTHER ACTIONS WERE TAKEN. THE CRJ700 ENGINEERING ORDER WAS UNCLR; SUCH AS HOW TO ACCESS THE AFFECTED AREA. MAINT CTL WAS DIRECTING US NOT TO PULL UP FLOOR BOARDS AND SEATS; THAT WE SHOULD GAIN ACCESS THROUGH THE AVIONICS BAY DOOR; THIS LED TO CONFUSION. I SUGGEST THAT BOMBARDIER; AND OUR ACR PROVIDE TECHNICIANS WITH COMPLETE TECH DATA SO THAT PERFORMING A TASK CAN BE DONE WITHOUT QUESTIONING WHAT METHOD TO GAIN ACCESS TO AN AFFECTED AREA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION (DVI) WAS CALLED OUT BY THE MFG; BOMBARDIER; AS A RESULT OF A TEMPORARY BALLAST INSTALLATION IN THE FWD CABIN FLOOR AREA DURING REPLACEMENT OF BOTH ENGINES. THE ISSUE AROSE AS A RESULT OF THE DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS BEING ASKED OF THE MECHANIC TO ACCOMPLISH THE DVI. THE ACFT AMM (BOMBARDIER'S MM); REQUIRED THE CABIN FLOOR BOARDS TO BE REMOVED; WHICH REQUIRED REMOVING CABIN PASSENGER SEATS (ROWS) IN ORDER TO ACCESS THE FRAME STATION FLOOR BEAMS TO ACCOMPLISH THE DVI. HIS COMPANY'S ENGINEERING ORDER DIRECTED THE INSPECTION TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY GAINING ACCESS TO THE FLOOR BEAMS VIA THE LOWER AVIONICS COMPARTMENT. REPORTER STATED THAT HE AND THE INSPECTOR USED THE AVIONICS ACCESS PROCEDURE TO ACCOMPLISH THE DVI OF THE CABIN FLOOR BEAMS. THE ISSUE HAS SINCE BEEN RESOLVED. THE MFG HAS ACCEPTED THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT ACCESS AS SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH THE INSPECTION BEING CALLED OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.