Narrative:

Flight contacted dispatch upon climb out from ZZZ for ZZZ1. Crew indicated they had a landing gear indication problem. Advised they were not showing all 3 gear retracted and stowed. Maintenance control was contacted and joined the radio conversation. Maintenance asked for their indications and asked the crew if they felt anything was hanging out. Crew advised maintenance that they felt something was hanging out on the left side. Maintenance requested the crew slow to appropriate gear operating speed and cycle the gear and see if they resolved the issue. Crew cycled gear and advised maintenance that they had a gear door EICAS message. Maintenance advised they could not confirm whether any part of the gear was hanging out or whether it was the left gear door was not closing. At this point the captain; dispatcher; and maintenance controller agreed it would be safe to proceed observing the gear extended limitations of the aircraft. It was around this time that the captain requested the dispatcher ask maintenance to call the ZZZ mechanic and verify he pulled the gear pins prior to departure. Maintenance advised the mechanic had left for the day and that the gear pins are stored in the east&east compartment onboard the aircraft. Maintenance also advised that he did not believe the left gear was fully down and extended due to the fact that when the crew recycled the gear all 3 green gear down locked lights extinguished; supporting his theory that the pin most likely was not in the left main gear or the left main gear light would have remained green; indicating the down and locked position. Dispatcher gave the crew a burn to ZZZ1 at an altitude of FL290 and maximum airspeed 270 KIAS based on present position and fuel remaining. Dispatcher advised they should land at ZZZ1 with approximately 9900 pounds of fuel remaining. Dispatcher issued the crew the winds at FL290 for the next 4 waypoints along the flight plan as well as the projected fuel remaining at each waypoint. Crew advised a couple mins later that they entered winds given to them for FL290 and their FMC said they would arrive ZZZ1 with 6200 pounds of fuel and requested to divert to a closer airport. ZZZ WX was uplinked to the crew and present position and fuel remaining was verified to calculate new time/burn to ZZZ. Crew sent a message to dispatcher advising they had 2 large and 1 small onboard aircraft which dispatcher gathered were the 3 landing gear pins. Rerte was issued for a new destination of ZZZ with an en route time/fuel burn to ZZZ (new flight plan showed that aircraft would be landing with approximately 15000 pounds of fuel in ZZZ). Crew acknowledged rerte and headed for ZZZ. Dispatcher continued to monitor the WX and heard nothing else from the crew until dispatcher sent a message to them approximately 90 mins later (on the ground) asking if they had declared an emergency; as it was passed along to the dispatcher while flight was on approach that ZZZ had rolled the emergency equipment for their arrival. Crew advised they did not declare an emergency but that ATC did. Flight arrived with 6100 pounds of fuel. Soon after block in it was found that the left main landing gear pin was still installed on the aircraft. The mistake that was made by the dispatcher was not running the revised flight plans with the gear down fuel burn. The altitude/airspeed restrs were followed yet with any/all the gear hanging down the burn increases greatly. Factors that contributed to this mistake include the dispatcher's mindset that the gear was retracted because after it was recycled the crew had a left gear door EICAS message only. Also; the difference between the dispatcher's calculated burn to ZZZ1 and the crew's was approximately 3500 pounds (which for having 1 hour 45 mins left to fly did not seem alarming). As well; when crew advised they had 3 pins onboard this added to the dispatcher's rationality that gear was up. The corrective action for this event is for the dispatcher to always use the gear down fuel burn schedule when calculating a new flight plan with any kind of landing gear/door issue. It is better to err on the side of caution and give a greater fuel burn to destination than a lesser one. As far as action/inaction I have to wonder why the crew at no time contacted the dispatcher to advise of the extremely large discrepancy in planned fuel burn versus actual fuel burn. The crew flew approximately 1 hour 30 mins and landed ZZZ with 9000 pounds less fuel than they were supposed to have and never questioned the dispatcher's numbers. The crew has an FMC on board that shows actual fuel burn (flow) and ETA to destination. The crew should not have accepted a rerte for a new destination with a new ETA/fuel burn without verifying the numbers. Shortly after realizing the over-burn situation the crew should have contacted the dispatcher and advised of their current fuel situation and questioned the numbers given to them. Ultimately; all gear pins should be pulled before every flight!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER REPORTS B767 FLT CREW HAS GEAR INDICATION PROBLEMS ON TKOF. FLT CREW REJECTS INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTINUE TO DESTINATION; FOR INSUFFICIENT FUEL; AND RETURNS TO DEPARTURE ARPT.

Narrative: FLT CONTACTED DISPATCH UPON CLBOUT FROM ZZZ FOR ZZZ1. CREW INDICATED THEY HAD A LNDG GEAR INDICATION PROB. ADVISED THEY WERE NOT SHOWING ALL 3 GEAR RETRACTED AND STOWED. MAINT CTL WAS CONTACTED AND JOINED THE RADIO CONVERSATION. MAINT ASKED FOR THEIR INDICATIONS AND ASKED THE CREW IF THEY FELT ANYTHING WAS HANGING OUT. CREW ADVISED MAINT THAT THEY FELT SOMETHING WAS HANGING OUT ON THE L SIDE. MAINT REQUESTED THE CREW SLOW TO APPROPRIATE GEAR OPERATING SPD AND CYCLE THE GEAR AND SEE IF THEY RESOLVED THE ISSUE. CREW CYCLED GEAR AND ADVISED MAINT THAT THEY HAD A GEAR DOOR EICAS MESSAGE. MAINT ADVISED THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM WHETHER ANY PART OF THE GEAR WAS HANGING OUT OR WHETHER IT WAS THE L GEAR DOOR WAS NOT CLOSING. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT; DISPATCHER; AND MAINT CTLR AGREED IT WOULD BE SAFE TO PROCEED OBSERVING THE GEAR EXTENDED LIMITATIONS OF THE ACFT. IT WAS AROUND THIS TIME THAT THE CAPT REQUESTED THE DISPATCHER ASK MAINT TO CALL THE ZZZ MECH AND VERIFY HE PULLED THE GEAR PINS PRIOR TO DEP. MAINT ADVISED THE MECH HAD LEFT FOR THE DAY AND THAT THE GEAR PINS ARE STORED IN THE E&E COMPARTMENT ONBOARD THE ACFT. MAINT ALSO ADVISED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE L GEAR WAS FULLY DOWN AND EXTENDED DUE TO THE FACT THAT WHEN THE CREW RECYCLED THE GEAR ALL 3 GREEN GEAR DOWN LOCKED LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED; SUPPORTING HIS THEORY THAT THE PIN MOST LIKELY WAS NOT IN THE L MAIN GEAR OR THE L MAIN GEAR LIGHT WOULD HAVE REMAINED GREEN; INDICATING THE DOWN AND LOCKED POS. DISPATCHER GAVE THE CREW A BURN TO ZZZ1 AT AN ALT OF FL290 AND MAX AIRSPD 270 KIAS BASED ON PRESENT POS AND FUEL REMAINING. DISPATCHER ADVISED THEY SHOULD LAND AT ZZZ1 WITH APPROX 9900 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. DISPATCHER ISSUED THE CREW THE WINDS AT FL290 FOR THE NEXT 4 WAYPOINTS ALONG THE FLT PLAN AS WELL AS THE PROJECTED FUEL REMAINING AT EACH WAYPOINT. CREW ADVISED A COUPLE MINS LATER THAT THEY ENTERED WINDS GIVEN TO THEM FOR FL290 AND THEIR FMC SAID THEY WOULD ARRIVE ZZZ1 WITH 6200 LBS OF FUEL AND REQUESTED TO DIVERT TO A CLOSER ARPT. ZZZ WX WAS UPLINKED TO THE CREW AND PRESENT POS AND FUEL REMAINING WAS VERIFIED TO CALCULATE NEW TIME/BURN TO ZZZ. CREW SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCHER ADVISING THEY HAD 2 LARGE AND 1 SMALL ONBOARD ACFT WHICH DISPATCHER GATHERED WERE THE 3 LNDG GEAR PINS. RERTE WAS ISSUED FOR A NEW DEST OF ZZZ WITH AN ENRTE TIME/FUEL BURN TO ZZZ (NEW FLT PLAN SHOWED THAT ACFT WOULD BE LNDG WITH APPROX 15000 LBS OF FUEL IN ZZZ). CREW ACKNOWLEDGED RERTE AND HEADED FOR ZZZ. DISPATCHER CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE WX AND HEARD NOTHING ELSE FROM THE CREW UNTIL DISPATCHER SENT A MESSAGE TO THEM APPROX 90 MINS LATER (ON THE GND) ASKING IF THEY HAD DECLARED AN EMER; AS IT WAS PASSED ALONG TO THE DISPATCHER WHILE FLT WAS ON APCH THAT ZZZ HAD ROLLED THE EMER EQUIP FOR THEIR ARR. CREW ADVISED THEY DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER BUT THAT ATC DID. FLT ARRIVED WITH 6100 LBS OF FUEL. SOON AFTER BLOCK IN IT WAS FOUND THAT THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR PIN WAS STILL INSTALLED ON THE ACFT. THE MISTAKE THAT WAS MADE BY THE DISPATCHER WAS NOT RUNNING THE REVISED FLT PLANS WITH THE GEAR DOWN FUEL BURN. THE ALT/AIRSPD RESTRS WERE FOLLOWED YET WITH ANY/ALL THE GEAR HANGING DOWN THE BURN INCREASES GREATLY. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS MISTAKE INCLUDE THE DISPATCHER'S MINDSET THAT THE GEAR WAS RETRACTED BECAUSE AFTER IT WAS RECYCLED THE CREW HAD A L GEAR DOOR EICAS MESSAGE ONLY. ALSO; THE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE DISPATCHER'S CALCULATED BURN TO ZZZ1 AND THE CREW'S WAS APPROX 3500 LBS (WHICH FOR HAVING 1 HR 45 MINS LEFT TO FLY DID NOT SEEM ALARMING). AS WELL; WHEN CREW ADVISED THEY HAD 3 PINS ONBOARD THIS ADDED TO THE DISPATCHER'S RATIONALITY THAT GEAR WAS UP. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THIS EVENT IS FOR THE DISPATCHER TO ALWAYS USE THE GEAR DOWN FUEL BURN SCHEDULE WHEN CALCULATING A NEW FLT PLAN WITH ANY KIND OF LNDG GEAR/DOOR ISSUE. IT IS BETTER TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION AND GIVE A GREATER FUEL BURN TO DEST THAN A LESSER ONE. AS FAR AS ACTION/INACTION I HAVE TO WONDER WHY THE CREW AT NO TIME CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER TO ADVISE OF THE EXTREMELY LARGE DISCREPANCY IN PLANNED FUEL BURN VERSUS ACTUAL FUEL BURN. THE CREW FLEW APPROX 1 HR 30 MINS AND LANDED ZZZ WITH 9000 LBS LESS FUEL THAN THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE AND NEVER QUESTIONED THE DISPATCHER'S NUMBERS. THE CREW HAS AN FMC ON BOARD THAT SHOWS ACTUAL FUEL BURN (FLOW) AND ETA TO DEST. THE CREW SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A RERTE FOR A NEW DEST WITH A NEW ETA/FUEL BURN WITHOUT VERIFYING THE NUMBERS. SHORTLY AFTER REALIZING THE OVER-BURN SITUATION THE CREW SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER AND ADVISED OF THEIR CURRENT FUEL SITUATION AND QUESTIONED THE NUMBERS GIVEN TO THEM. ULTIMATELY; ALL GEAR PINS SHOULD BE PULLED BEFORE EVERY FLT!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.