Narrative:

The first officer had programmed the wrong arrival into the FMC on the ground at ZZZ. I did not catch the error. ZAB asked us if we were on the kooly arrival. I said no; 'we are on the sunss.' center said go direct sunss; cross 5 mi east at 11000 ft; 250 KIAS; then fly the kooly arrival. We complied. When center switched us to approach control; I thanked the controller for his help and switched frequencys. After checking in with phx approach; the controller said; 'company number; ZAB called and wanted to know if you were filed on the kooly arrival.' I said yes that we were originally filed on the kooly. Approach said ok and that was the end of it. These series of errors are directly caused by crew fatigue. After a very long 4-DAY trip; a very long last day; WX; approachs; ground time; aircraft swap; ATC delays; line check; new airport; the cumulative effect of all of this degraded our performance below acceptable levels. I did not realize this until it was too late. My first officer was excellent; one of the best pilots I have flown with. We are both very experienced; competent pilots. The building of this type of pairing is both foolish and dangerous. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: because responsibility for receipt of the clearance is assigned to the first officer; reporter -- the captain of the flight -- was unsure whether the airways clearance was received over the radio or via datalink pre departure clearance; which is available at the departure airport. He thinks it might have been pre departure clearance because he doesn't remember actually hearing the assigned arrival.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-500 CAPTAIN BELIEVES FATIGUE WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN A TRACK DEVIATION CAUSED BY A MISPROGRAMMED FMS.

Narrative: THE FO HAD PROGRAMMED THE WRONG ARR INTO THE FMC ON THE GND AT ZZZ. I DID NOT CATCH THE ERROR. ZAB ASKED US IF WE WERE ON THE KOOLY ARR. I SAID NO; 'WE ARE ON THE SUNSS.' CTR SAID GO DIRECT SUNSS; CROSS 5 MI E AT 11000 FT; 250 KIAS; THEN FLY THE KOOLY ARR. WE COMPLIED. WHEN CTR SWITCHED US TO APCH CTL; I THANKED THE CTLR FOR HIS HELP AND SWITCHED FREQS. AFTER CHKING IN WITH PHX APCH; THE CTLR SAID; 'COMPANY NUMBER; ZAB CALLED AND WANTED TO KNOW IF YOU WERE FILED ON THE KOOLY ARR.' I SAID YES THAT WE WERE ORIGINALLY FILED ON THE KOOLY. APCH SAID OK AND THAT WAS THE END OF IT. THESE SERIES OF ERRORS ARE DIRECTLY CAUSED BY CREW FATIGUE. AFTER A VERY LONG 4-DAY TRIP; A VERY LONG LAST DAY; WX; APCHS; GND TIME; ACFT SWAP; ATC DELAYS; LINE CHK; NEW ARPT; THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL OF THIS DEGRADED OUR PERFORMANCE BELOW ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. I DID NOT REALIZE THIS UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. MY FO WAS EXCELLENT; ONE OF THE BEST PLTS I HAVE FLOWN WITH. WE ARE BOTH VERY EXPERIENCED; COMPETENT PLTS. THE BUILDING OF THIS TYPE OF PAIRING IS BOTH FOOLISH AND DANGEROUS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: BECAUSE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC IS ASSIGNED TO THE FO; REPORTER -- THE CAPTAIN OF THE FLT -- WAS UNSURE WHETHER THE AIRWAYS CLRNC WAS RECEIVED OVER THE RADIO OR VIA DATALINK PDC; WHICH IS AVAILABLE AT THE DEP ARPT. HE THINKS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PDC BECAUSE HE DOESN'T REMEMBER ACTUALLY HEARING THE ASSIGNED ARRIVAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.