Narrative:

I did not properly respond to a 'caution terrain' message from the egpws. This occurred during a visual approach to runway 16R at reno. We were approaching from the south and after passing the mustang VOR; we were cleared to fly the visual approach. An inbound regional jet was told to slow to follow us to the runway. I extended to the north while extending the flaps; then began a left turn to the base leg to join the final between the takle (13 DME) and dicey (7.7 DME) fixes. While descending on the base leg; the 'caution terrain' message sounded. I was a bit surprised; added power; and reduced the rate of descent. I referred to the aircraft's terrain display and the visual picture of the airport; the caution message quickly ceased. As I continued toward the final; the caution message briefly sounded again. I corrected; joined the final; and landed. I work to ensure I operate properly and pay attention to the fact that while we can maneuver our aircraft to alleviate traffic flows; going to extremes often results in approachs that are out of parameters. I did not feel rushed when making the base turn. I did sense that a turn at that point seemed reasonable and that it would help the aircraft that was to follow us. Some critical factors seem apparent: maneuvering to join the final at the takle fix; with the MCP's altitude window set to 8500 ft; would have prevented this. I missed the published altitude at the dicey fix (6401 ft on the GS). Had I ensured this was set in the MCP's altitude window; this perhaps would not have occurred. Remembering that any audio message from the egpws requires a go around; unless in daylight and VMC; would have been the proper response. Egpws did not get my attention as it should have. This is not the fault of the egpws; but mine alone. I work to avoid complacency; but a simple correction seemed reasonable; and I failed completely to respond properly. Later; the nauseating realization of my failure became apparent. Many actions are already occurring. Our manual states the requirements plainly. Our instructors emphasize the importance of setting step-down altitudes during visual approachs when backed up by non-precision approachs. I do these things routinely. For my part; more frequent review of the non-normal maneuvers and procedures section of the manual will help ensure this is in the forefront of my attention. Our training center instructors emphasize the wave off requirement that results from any audible signal from the egpws. The commercial chart page for reno includes a note regarding egpws warnings (I reviewed it en route). Perhaps a mention of the go around requirement for a caution would help those who momentarily forget about this requirement. Ultimately it is my responsibility to operate properly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 GPWS SOUNDED A WARNING FOR TERRAIN; BUT FLT CREW DID NOT RESPOND WITH A GAR; AS REQUIRED BY COMPANY POLICY.

Narrative: I DID NOT PROPERLY RESPOND TO A 'CAUTION TERRAIN' MESSAGE FROM THE EGPWS. THIS OCCURRED DURING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16R AT RENO. WE WERE APCHING FROM THE S AND AFTER PASSING THE MUSTANG VOR; WE WERE CLRED TO FLY THE VISUAL APCH. AN INBOUND REGIONAL JET WAS TOLD TO SLOW TO FOLLOW US TO THE RWY. I EXTENDED TO THE N WHILE EXTENDING THE FLAPS; THEN BEGAN A L TURN TO THE BASE LEG TO JOIN THE FINAL BTWN THE TAKLE (13 DME) AND DICEY (7.7 DME) FIXES. WHILE DSNDING ON THE BASE LEG; THE 'CAUTION TERRAIN' MESSAGE SOUNDED. I WAS A BIT SURPRISED; ADDED PWR; AND REDUCED THE RATE OF DSCNT. I REFERRED TO THE ACFT'S TERRAIN DISPLAY AND THE VISUAL PICTURE OF THE ARPT; THE CAUTION MESSAGE QUICKLY CEASED. AS I CONTINUED TOWARD THE FINAL; THE CAUTION MESSAGE BRIEFLY SOUNDED AGAIN. I CORRECTED; JOINED THE FINAL; AND LANDED. I WORK TO ENSURE I OPERATE PROPERLY AND PAY ATTN TO THE FACT THAT WHILE WE CAN MANEUVER OUR ACFT TO ALLEVIATE TFC FLOWS; GOING TO EXTREMES OFTEN RESULTS IN APCHS THAT ARE OUT OF PARAMETERS. I DID NOT FEEL RUSHED WHEN MAKING THE BASE TURN. I DID SENSE THAT A TURN AT THAT POINT SEEMED REASONABLE AND THAT IT WOULD HELP THE ACFT THAT WAS TO FOLLOW US. SOME CRITICAL FACTORS SEEM APPARENT: MANEUVERING TO JOIN THE FINAL AT THE TAKLE FIX; WITH THE MCP'S ALT WINDOW SET TO 8500 FT; WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS. I MISSED THE PUBLISHED ALT AT THE DICEY FIX (6401 FT ON THE GS). HAD I ENSURED THIS WAS SET IN THE MCP'S ALT WINDOW; THIS PERHAPS WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. REMEMBERING THAT ANY AUDIO MESSAGE FROM THE EGPWS REQUIRES A GAR; UNLESS IN DAYLIGHT AND VMC; WOULD HAVE BEEN THE PROPER RESPONSE. EGPWS DID NOT GET MY ATTN AS IT SHOULD HAVE. THIS IS NOT THE FAULT OF THE EGPWS; BUT MINE ALONE. I WORK TO AVOID COMPLACENCY; BUT A SIMPLE CORRECTION SEEMED REASONABLE; AND I FAILED COMPLETELY TO RESPOND PROPERLY. LATER; THE NAUSEATING REALIZATION OF MY FAILURE BECAME APPARENT. MANY ACTIONS ARE ALREADY OCCURRING. OUR MANUAL STATES THE REQUIREMENTS PLAINLY. OUR INSTRUCTORS EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF SETTING STEP-DOWN ALTS DURING VISUAL APCHS WHEN BACKED UP BY NON-PRECISION APCHS. I DO THESE THINGS ROUTINELY. FOR MY PART; MORE FREQUENT REVIEW OF THE NON-NORMAL MANEUVERS AND PROCS SECTION OF THE MANUAL WILL HELP ENSURE THIS IS IN THE FOREFRONT OF MY ATTN. OUR TRAINING CTR INSTRUCTORS EMPHASIZE THE WAVE OFF REQUIREMENT THAT RESULTS FROM ANY AUDIBLE SIGNAL FROM THE EGPWS. THE COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE FOR RENO INCLUDES A NOTE REGARDING EGPWS WARNINGS (I REVIEWED IT ENRTE). PERHAPS A MENTION OF THE GAR REQUIREMENT FOR A CAUTION WOULD HELP THOSE WHO MOMENTARILY FORGET ABOUT THIS REQUIREMENT. ULTIMATELY IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO OPERATE PROPERLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.