Narrative:

Lax was landing east. Began arrival into lax without specific arrival procedure followed by multiple slowdowns and speed changes and at least 1 vector off course then back on course. At approximately 13000 ft we got clearance to intercept the baset 3 arrival. This arrival has 12000 ft or above restr at paradise VOR. We set 8000 ft for the arrival's final altitude and first officer worked quickly to get the FMC set up. When we were less than a mi from pdz I notice that our altitude was very close to 12000 ft and the aircraft would be very close to making/missing the restr. I crosschecked 2 items and then resumed monitoring our progress. We were at pdz under 12000 ft enough that socal asked us to verify our altitude and warn us about the next restr coming up at 10000 ft. Bottom line: PF (me) at that point shortly before pdz should have jettisoned all automation and hand flown the arrival. Contributing factors: socal was overworked and overwhelmed. They did not advise us which arrival to expect. They did not warn us they would dump us into the middle of the arrival. Nor did they warn us at which point they would dump us into the arrival. The aircraft had a non-pegasus FMC. They are old and slow. That should have been a consideration when I chose the level of automation that I did (VNAV). Apparently it was still computing when I thought it was capable of working to design levels. Next time I hope I have a few more seconds to make a decision and that I use those seconds to make a better decision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 WAS GIVEN THE LAX EAST BASET 3 STAR LATE IN THE DSCNT BY A BUSY SOCAL. THE ACFT WAS LOW ON DSCNT PROFILE AND MISSED AN ALT CONSTRAINT.

Narrative: LAX WAS LNDG E. BEGAN ARR INTO LAX WITHOUT SPECIFIC ARR PROC FOLLOWED BY MULTIPLE SLOWDOWNS AND SPD CHANGES AND AT LEAST 1 VECTOR OFF COURSE THEN BACK ON COURSE. AT APPROX 13000 FT WE GOT CLRNC TO INTERCEPT THE BASET 3 ARR. THIS ARR HAS 12000 FT OR ABOVE RESTR AT PARADISE VOR. WE SET 8000 FT FOR THE ARR'S FINAL ALT AND FO WORKED QUICKLY TO GET THE FMC SET UP. WHEN WE WERE LESS THAN A MI FROM PDZ I NOTICE THAT OUR ALT WAS VERY CLOSE TO 12000 FT AND THE ACFT WOULD BE VERY CLOSE TO MAKING/MISSING THE RESTR. I XCHKED 2 ITEMS AND THEN RESUMED MONITORING OUR PROGRESS. WE WERE AT PDZ UNDER 12000 FT ENOUGH THAT SOCAL ASKED US TO VERIFY OUR ALT AND WARN US ABOUT THE NEXT RESTR COMING UP AT 10000 FT. BOTTOM LINE: PF (ME) AT THAT POINT SHORTLY BEFORE PDZ SHOULD HAVE JETTISONED ALL AUTOMATION AND HAND FLOWN THE ARR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: SOCAL WAS OVERWORKED AND OVERWHELMED. THEY DID NOT ADVISE US WHICH ARR TO EXPECT. THEY DID NOT WARN US THEY WOULD DUMP US INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE ARR. NOR DID THEY WARN US AT WHICH POINT THEY WOULD DUMP US INTO THE ARR. THE ACFT HAD A NON-PEGASUS FMC. THEY ARE OLD AND SLOW. THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A CONSIDERATION WHEN I CHOSE THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION THAT I DID (VNAV). APPARENTLY IT WAS STILL COMPUTING WHEN I THOUGHT IT WAS CAPABLE OF WORKING TO DESIGN LEVELS. NEXT TIME I HOPE I HAVE A FEW MORE SECONDS TO MAKE A DECISION AND THAT I USE THOSE SECONDS TO MAKE A BETTER DECISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.