Narrative:

Upon landing; sometime after having the first officer hold the yoke; we received an EICAS caution message. I am not sure what speed exactly we were traveling at the time but it was right around 60 KTS and we were actively braking the aircraft. I made a quick reactionary glance and returned my attention to the rollout. As it turned out; as I later analyzed the situation; I had received a 'steering inoperative' message. Before I had even recognized and processed the information I had placed my hand on the tiller to begin my transfer of steering control from the rudder pedals to the tiller. Sometime after I did so; the steering reengaged and caused an un-commanded turn to the right (the tiller was straight ahead and not to the right.) fortunately this occurred just as we were coming up on the taxiway. I immediately released the tiller and disengaged the steering and was able to control the airplane using rudders and brakes. When I had slowed; I was facing towards the taxiway and rolled off the runway and stopped on the taxiway. After we stopped and the steering engaged normally; we proceeded to the gate; called maintenance and wrote up the occurrence. The mechanic that came out found that the connector above the nosewheel was loose. He reproduced the event at the gate by loosening the connector for me and then tightened it back down. When the connection was made the steering engaged and made the nosewheel turned to the right with no one touching the tiller. I am writing this report because after running this through my head numerous times it is a plausible scenario that I may have caused swerving by not recognizing to need to run a memory item. Due to the speed at which this all occurred I did not perceive and process fast enough the indications requiring the use of the steering system inoperative or un-commanded swerving on the ground memory item; which one of the first steps is to not use the tiller. By not quickly recognizing this; I may have in fact caused the swerving to happen. I am not sure completely though because the mechanic got the nosewheel to turn by just tightening down on the connector and no one was touching the tiller. For the sake of analyzing; assuming it was my response; I have tried to figure out how I could have prevented this from happening. 1) the obvious answer is to have been able to in a split second perceive; process; and react. The problem I face is that during landing it seems there is a certain type of hyper concentration or tunnel vision that seems to happen where your sole attention seems to be locked on the runway ahead. I was unable to diagnose the situation fast enough to overcome the motor memory of pushing down on the tiller as I planned to exit the runway. 2) there is another factor; that while is not an excuse; it is often the case upon landing. We always get a caution message after landing about no to data; so to hear a caution message is not out of the realm of normalcy. Also; we frequently get other caution messages like 'lg air fail' if the landing was very soft; so once again a caution message is not unusual. 3) one suggestion I guess would be to stress in training a target speed when to engage the tiller. 4) another factor that may have been in play is the checklist memory item itself. I equated that memory item with what must be done once the aircraft has already begun to swerve; not as a checklist to prevent a swerve from happening. It may be beneficial to separate the two so that a steering inoperative message would trigger a memory item of not to use the tiller. 5) as a maintenance suggestion; some sort of locking mechanism for this connector could be of great use.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB 145 CAPT EXPERIENCES A NOSEWHEEL STEERING FAILURE ON LANDING; AND AFTER ENGAGING THE TILLER; EXPERIENCES A HARD RIGHT TURN. THE ASSOCIATED EICAS MESSAGE DID NOT FULLY REGISTER WITH REPORTER FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS TO INCLUDE: HIGH WORKLOAD; MEMORY ITEM CONFUSION; AND COMMONLY RECEIVING A VARIETY OF CAUTION MESSAGES UPON LNDG.

Narrative: UPON LANDING; SOMETIME AFTER HAVING THE FO HOLD THE YOKE; WE RECEIVED AN EICAS CAUTION MESSAGE. I AM NOT SURE WHAT SPD EXACTLY WE WERE TRAVELING AT THE TIME BUT IT WAS RIGHT AROUND 60 KTS AND WE WERE ACTIVELY BRAKING THE ACFT. I MADE A QUICK REACTIONARY GLANCE AND RETURNED MY ATTENTION TO THE ROLLOUT. AS IT TURNED OUT; AS I LATER ANALYZED THE SITUATION; I HAD RECEIVED A 'STEERING INOP' MESSAGE. BEFORE I HAD EVEN RECOGNIZED AND PROCESSED THE INFO I HAD PLACED MY HAND ON THE TILLER TO BEGIN MY TRANSFER OF STEERING CONTROL FROM THE RUDDER PEDALS TO THE TILLER. SOMETIME AFTER I DID SO; THE STEERING REENGAGED AND CAUSED AN UN-COMMANDED TURN TO THE RIGHT (THE TILLER WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD AND NOT TO THE RIGHT.) FORTUNATELY THIS OCCURRED JUST AS WE WERE COMING UP ON THE TXWY. I IMMEDIATELY RELEASED THE TILLER AND DISENGAGED THE STEERING AND WAS ABLE TO CONTROL THE AIRPLANE USING RUDDERS AND BRAKES. WHEN I HAD SLOWED; I WAS FACING TOWARDS THE TXWY AND ROLLED OFF THE RWY AND STOPPED ON THE TXWY. AFTER WE STOPPED AND THE STEERING ENGAGED NORMALLY; WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE; CALLED MAINT AND WROTE UP THE OCCURRENCE. THE MECHANIC THAT CAME OUT FOUND THAT THE CONNECTOR ABOVE THE NOSEWHEEL WAS LOOSE. HE REPRODUCED THE EVENT AT THE GATE BY LOOSENING THE CONNECTOR FOR ME AND THEN TIGHTENED IT BACK DOWN. WHEN THE CONNECTION WAS MADE THE STEERING ENGAGED AND MADE THE NOSEWHEEL TURNED TO THE RIGHT WITH NO ONE TOUCHING THE TILLER. I AM WRITING THIS REPORT BECAUSE AFTER RUNNING THIS THROUGH MY HEAD NUMEROUS TIMES IT IS A PLAUSIBLE SCENARIO THAT I MAY HAVE CAUSED SWERVING BY NOT RECOGNIZING TO NEED TO RUN A MEMORY ITEM. DUE TO THE SPD AT WHICH THIS ALL OCCURRED I DID NOT PERCEIVE AND PROCESS FAST ENOUGH THE INDICATIONS REQUIRING THE USE OF THE STEERING SYSTEM INOP OR UN-COMMANDED SWERVING ON THE GROUND MEMORY ITEM; WHICH ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS IS TO NOT USE THE TILLER. BY NOT QUICKLY RECOGNIZING THIS; I MAY HAVE IN FACT CAUSED THE SWERVING TO HAPPEN. I AM NOT SURE COMPLETELY THOUGH BECAUSE THE MECHANIC GOT THE NOSEWHEEL TO TURN BY JUST TIGHTENING DOWN ON THE CONNECTOR AND NO ONE WAS TOUCHING THE TILLER. FOR THE SAKE OF ANALYZING; ASSUMING IT WAS MY RESPONSE; I HAVE TRIED TO FIGURE OUT HOW I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM HAPPENING. 1) THE OBVIOUS ANSWER IS TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IN A SPLIT SECOND PERCEIVE; PROCESS; AND REACT. THE PROBLEM I FACE IS THAT DURING LANDING IT SEEMS THERE IS A CERTAIN TYPE OF HYPER CONCENTRATION OR TUNNEL VISION THAT SEEMS TO HAPPEN WHERE YOUR SOLE ATTENTION SEEMS TO BE LOCKED ON THE RWY AHEAD. I WAS UNABLE TO DIAGNOSE THE SITUATION FAST ENOUGH TO OVERCOME THE MOTOR MEMORY OF PUSHING DOWN ON THE TILLER AS I PLANNED TO EXIT THE RWY. 2) THERE IS ANOTHER FACTOR; THAT WHILE IS NOT AN EXCUSE; IT IS OFTEN THE CASE UPON LANDING. WE ALWAYS GET A CAUTION MESSAGE AFTER LANDING ABOUT NO TO DATA; SO TO HEAR A CAUTION MESSAGE IS NOT OUT OF THE REALM OF NORMALCY. ALSO; WE FREQUENTLY GET OTHER CAUTION MESSAGES LIKE 'LG AIR FAIL' IF THE LANDING WAS VERY SOFT; SO ONCE AGAIN A CAUTION MESSAGE IS NOT UNUSUAL. 3) ONE SUGGESTION I GUESS WOULD BE TO STRESS IN TRAINING A TARGET SPD WHEN TO ENGAGE THE TILLER. 4) ANOTHER FACTOR THAT MAY HAVE BEEN IN PLAY IS THE CHKLIST MEMORY ITEM ITSELF. I EQUATED THAT MEMORY ITEM WITH WHAT MUST BE DONE ONCE THE ACFT HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO SWERVE; NOT AS A CHKLIST TO PREVENT A SWERVE FROM HAPPENING. IT MAY BE BENEFICIAL TO SEPARATE THE TWO SO THAT A STEERING INOP MESSAGE WOULD TRIGGER A MEMORY ITEM OF NOT TO USE THE TILLER. 5) AS A MAINTENANCE SUGGESTION; SOME SORT OF LOCKING MECHANISM FOR THIS CONNECTOR COULD BE OF GREAT USE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.