Narrative:

I was the pilot flying and was configured at 210 KTS on base leg using partial spoilers to descend from 6;000 to 5;000. After I called for flap 1; we received the following EICAS messages; 'shaker anticipated;' 'spoiler fault;' 'aoa limit fail;' 'slat fail'. We decided to get vectors in order to run the appropriate checklists. I took the radios and my captain ran the 'slat fail' checklist first. Having had this problem before; I advised ATC that we would need vectors for about 10 minutes and would eventually need at least a 10 mile final. While I was vectored; the captain ran the checklist; set up the appropriate approach speed; calculated our necessary landing distance; verified fuel; and briefed the flight attendants. I requested that he also run the spoiler fault checklist because the last time I had the slat fail this additional message was not present. We decided that since the slat fail numbers were much higher; it was better to go with those and not add the two additives together for approach speed and landing distance. Due to the fact that we did not know if the ground spoilers would deploy; we declared an emergency on our way back towards final. On our extended final; ATC suggested that we change runways to 22L since it was the longest and we agreed since we had all runways in sight. The captain switched frequencies for me and we noticed we were not receiving the glideslope; but since this was a visual approach anyway; we continued. Due to the emergency; runway change; glideslope discussion; and lack of a usual verbal cue to run the checklist ('flaps 5; set vapp; landing check') we did not run the landing check and I neglected to request the gear. We were busy; but I did not feel at all rushed. After the aural warning went off; I immediately requested; 'gear down'. We briefed that a go-around would not involve any configuration changes and decided that we were stabilized on speed and configured and it was safe to land. After an efficient handling of CRM/checklist usage/emergency procedures; we were still busy with our high workload and overlooked an obvious issue. I am confident that even if the ground proximity warning had failed; we still would have mentally caught the gear issue; but it may have subsequently resulted in a go-around. Even our jumpseater mentioned that he missed it. However; aside from a mental check before landing; there was no normal cue to run the landing check. A note in the checklists that terminate with landings with abnormal configurations may be wise.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB170 First Officer experiences a Slats Fail EICAS message; with other associated EICAS messages; during approach. After complying with checklist procedures the flight returns for a visual landing but the crew over looks the landing gear; until reminded by the GPWS.

Narrative: I was the pilot flying and was configured at 210 KTS on base leg using partial spoilers to descend from 6;000 to 5;000. After I called for flap 1; we received the following EICAS messages; 'Shaker Anticipated;' 'Spoiler Fault;' 'AOA Limit Fail;' 'Slat Fail'. We decided to get vectors in order to run the appropriate checklists. I took the radios and my Captain ran the 'Slat Fail' checklist first. Having had this problem before; I advised ATC that we would need vectors for about 10 minutes and would eventually need at least a 10 mile final. While I was vectored; the Captain ran the checklist; set up the appropriate approach speed; calculated our necessary landing distance; verified fuel; and briefed the flight attendants. I requested that he also run the Spoiler Fault checklist because the last time I had the Slat Fail this additional message was not present. We decided that since the Slat Fail numbers were much higher; it was better to go with those and not add the two additives together for approach speed and landing distance. Due to the fact that we did not know if the ground spoilers would deploy; we declared an emergency on our way back towards final. On our extended final; ATC suggested that we change runways to 22L since it was the longest and we agreed since we had all runways in sight. The Captain switched frequencies for me and we noticed we were not receiving the glideslope; but since this was a visual approach anyway; we continued. Due to the emergency; runway change; glideslope discussion; and lack of a usual verbal cue to run the checklist ('flaps 5; set Vapp; Landing Check') we did not run the Landing Check and I neglected to request the gear. We were busy; but I did not feel at all rushed. After the Aural Warning went off; I immediately requested; 'Gear Down'. We briefed that a Go-Around would not involve any configuration changes and decided that we were stabilized on speed and configured and it was safe to land. After an efficient handling of CRM/checklist usage/emergency procedures; we were still busy with our high workload and overlooked an obvious issue. I am confident that even if the ground proximity warning had failed; we still would have mentally caught the gear issue; but it may have subsequently resulted in a go-around. Even our jumpseater mentioned that he missed it. However; aside from a mental check before landing; there was no normal cue to run the Landing Check. A note in the checklists that terminate with landings with abnormal configurations may be wise.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.