Narrative:

I was called for a quick call at XA25 for an XB35 departure. I told the scheduler that I could be to the airport at XB10. I was assigned the B757 trip for ZZZZ1. I arrived to the aircraft and accomplished the preflight as expeditiously as I could; while still accomplishing all required checks; flows; oceanic planning requirements (including a dispatch re-brief); and reviewed the aircraft log. We had several MEL's; including the captain's boom microphone which required the uncustomary use of the hand microphone instead of the yoke push-to-talk button. We also had 'heavy.' I asked the first officer if he had been flying long on the B757/767 which he responded yes. The ink on my own type ride was just barely dry and I had only flown 3 legs since july. I then asked the first officer and relief pilot if they felt comfortable just before push. Since the first officer had loaded the flight plan; I told him that it was his leg and that I would fly it back from XZZZ1. We taxied out and with very slight delay; we were cleared for takeoff. It was intermittent rain at the time and IMC shortly after takeoff. I again queried the crew to see if everyone was comfortable and to see if we had forgotten anything. Everyone felt ready. It was a flaps 15 degree takeoff. During flap retraction we got the EICAS message for trailing edge flap asymmetry. The first officer called for the QRH and we discussed staying slow so not to overspeed the flaps. I grabbed the QRH and we continued to climb out. The flaps had stopped between 5-20 degrees. We determined that we would have to return to the field. We had the relief pilot coordination with the flight attendants; company and inform the passenger that we would have to return to ZZZ. The first officer wanted to turn the aircraft over to me for the landing; due to the emergency. I declared an emergency due to the fact that it not only was a partial flap landing but we were also an overweight landing on a wet runway. We weighed almost 250000 pounds at takeoff and the placard landing weight was 198000 pounds. We informed the passenger that we would be met by the trucks but not to be alarmed because it was just a precautionary procedure. We asked for vectors at 12000 ft and eventually we were cleared to hold over the VOR. I continued to review the QRH for the trailing edge flap asymmetry; trailing edge flap asymmetry descent/approach; and trailing edge flap asymmetry landing checklists along with the non-normal flap landing tables. I also reviewed performance section of the pilot's handbook and looked for additional guidance. I also felt that it was an advantage to burn fuel down for the overweight landing. I then went to the QRH overweight landing checklists and overweight landing tables. The need to use the hand microphone instead of the boom microphone was a bit of a distraction. I briefed the ILS for the longest; grooved runway. I took over the flying duties and then asked the first officer and relief pilot to confirm my landing data and to use if I had missed anything in the QRH checklists. I was in no hurry and figured on landing at 220000 pounds and had computed landing data for that weight. After the other pilots confirmed the data and checklist; I asked them if they felt comfortable. The relief pilot brought up that we might want to tell the controllers that our airspeed on final would be higher than normal (a very good point; as we didn't want to overrun other aircraft on final) and the first officer mentioned that we might overspeed the flaps on GS intercept. I said that we would request an extended pattern and that I would slow down early and put the gear down early. We wanted to burn fuel anyhow and the GS was steeper than normal at 3.1 degrees. I asked the relief pilot if the passenger and flight attendant were ok and if the company was aware of our situation again. The first officer rechked the WX and we exited holding. The landing went as planned. We broke out 1000 ft in the rain. We touched down at about 100 FPM (soft) and didn't float. I let the energy dissipate on the rollout by rolling to the end; but we could have easily have stopped with 4000 ft remaining. We requested that the fire trucks check the gear with the ir camera but they seemed unprepared to do so even though we had requested it in the air. I had not used the brakes heavily; so we taxied to the gate and entered the overweight landing and flap write-up in the aircraft logbook. Initial maintenance check indicated that there was a problem with the flap jackscrew. Side note: I was surprised that our block time was 1 hour 42 mins. It seemed like much less. Also; I couldn't remember the other pilots' names due to our cursory intro upon arrival at the airport and I couldn't have picked them out of a lineup after we arrived at the gate; due to the darkness of the cockpit and my concentration on the preflight duties during our intro; but I thought that it was excellent CRM. Kudos to an excellent training department -- the best in the industry. We departed again 4 hours late in a B767 with 10 additional passenger.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 FLT CREW EXPERIENCED TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY AFTER TAKEOFF. THEY DECLARED AN EMERGENCY; RAN THE QRH; AND RETURNED TO THEIR DEP ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS CALLED FOR A QUICK CALL AT XA25 FOR AN XB35 DEP. I TOLD THE SCHEDULER THAT I COULD BE TO THE ARPT AT XB10. I WAS ASSIGNED THE B757 TRIP FOR ZZZZ1. I ARRIVED TO THE ACFT AND ACCOMPLISHED THE PREFLT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS I COULD; WHILE STILL ACCOMPLISHING ALL REQUIRED CHKS; FLOWS; OCEANIC PLANNING REQUIREMENTS (INCLUDING A DISPATCH RE-BRIEF); AND REVIEWED THE ACFT LOG. WE HAD SEVERAL MEL'S; INCLUDING THE CAPT'S BOOM MIKE WHICH REQUIRED THE UNCUSTOMARY USE OF THE HAND MIKE INSTEAD OF THE YOKE PUSH-TO-TALK BUTTON. WE ALSO HAD 'HVY.' I ASKED THE FO IF HE HAD BEEN FLYING LONG ON THE B757/767 WHICH HE RESPONDED YES. THE INK ON MY OWN TYPE RIDE WAS JUST BARELY DRY AND I HAD ONLY FLOWN 3 LEGS SINCE JULY. I THEN ASKED THE FO AND RELIEF PLT IF THEY FELT COMFORTABLE JUST BEFORE PUSH. SINCE THE FO HAD LOADED THE FLT PLAN; I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS HIS LEG AND THAT I WOULD FLY IT BACK FROM XZZZ1. WE TAXIED OUT AND WITH VERY SLIGHT DELAY; WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. IT WAS INTERMITTENT RAIN AT THE TIME AND IMC SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. I AGAIN QUERIED THE CREW TO SEE IF EVERYONE WAS COMFORTABLE AND TO SEE IF WE HAD FORGOTTEN ANYTHING. EVERYONE FELT READY. IT WAS A FLAPS 15 DEG TKOF. DURING FLAP RETRACTION WE GOT THE EICAS MESSAGE FOR TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY. THE FO CALLED FOR THE QRH AND WE DISCUSSED STAYING SLOW SO NOT TO OVERSPEED THE FLAPS. I GRABBED THE QRH AND WE CONTINUED TO CLB OUT. THE FLAPS HAD STOPPED BTWN 5-20 DEGS. WE DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN TO THE FIELD. WE HAD THE RELIEF PLT COORD WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS; COMPANY AND INFORM THE PAX THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN TO ZZZ. THE FO WANTED TO TURN THE ACFT OVER TO ME FOR THE LNDG; DUE TO THE EMER. I DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT NOT ONLY WAS A PARTIAL FLAP LNDG BUT WE WERE ALSO AN OVERWT LNDG ON A WET RWY. WE WEIGHED ALMOST 250000 LBS AT TKOF AND THE PLACARD LNDG WT WAS 198000 LBS. WE INFORMED THE PAX THAT WE WOULD BE MET BY THE TRUCKS BUT NOT TO BE ALARMED BECAUSE IT WAS JUST A PRECAUTIONARY PROC. WE ASKED FOR VECTORS AT 12000 FT AND EVENTUALLY WE WERE CLRED TO HOLD OVER THE VOR. I CONTINUED TO REVIEW THE QRH FOR THE TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY; TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY DSCNT/APCH; AND TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY LNDG CHKLISTS ALONG WITH THE NON-NORMAL FLAP LNDG TABLES. I ALSO REVIEWED PERFORMANCE SECTION OF THE PLT'S HANDBOOK AND LOOKED FOR ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE. I ALSO FELT THAT IT WAS AN ADVANTAGE TO BURN FUEL DOWN FOR THE OVERWT LNDG. I THEN WENT TO THE QRH OVERWT LNDG CHKLISTS AND OVERWT LNDG TABLES. THE NEED TO USE THE HAND MIKE INSTEAD OF THE BOOM MIKE WAS A BIT OF A DISTR. I BRIEFED THE ILS FOR THE LONGEST; GROOVED RWY. I TOOK OVER THE FLYING DUTIES AND THEN ASKED THE FO AND RELIEF PLT TO CONFIRM MY LNDG DATA AND TO USE IF I HAD MISSED ANYTHING IN THE QRH CHKLISTS. I WAS IN NO HURRY AND FIGURED ON LNDG AT 220000 LBS AND HAD COMPUTED LNDG DATA FOR THAT WT. AFTER THE OTHER PLTS CONFIRMED THE DATA AND CHKLIST; I ASKED THEM IF THEY FELT COMFORTABLE. THE RELIEF PLT BROUGHT UP THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO TELL THE CTLRS THAT OUR AIRSPD ON FINAL WOULD BE HIGHER THAN NORMAL (A VERY GOOD POINT; AS WE DIDN'T WANT TO OVERRUN OTHER ACFT ON FINAL) AND THE FO MENTIONED THAT WE MIGHT OVERSPEED THE FLAPS ON GS INTERCEPT. I SAID THAT WE WOULD REQUEST AN EXTENDED PATTERN AND THAT I WOULD SLOW DOWN EARLY AND PUT THE GEAR DOWN EARLY. WE WANTED TO BURN FUEL ANYHOW AND THE GS WAS STEEPER THAN NORMAL AT 3.1 DEGS. I ASKED THE RELIEF PLT IF THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANT WERE OK AND IF THE COMPANY WAS AWARE OF OUR SITUATION AGAIN. THE FO RECHKED THE WX AND WE EXITED HOLDING. THE LNDG WENT AS PLANNED. WE BROKE OUT 1000 FT IN THE RAIN. WE TOUCHED DOWN AT ABOUT 100 FPM (SOFT) AND DIDN'T FLOAT. I LET THE ENERGY DISSIPATE ON THE ROLLOUT BY ROLLING TO THE END; BUT WE COULD HAVE EASILY HAVE STOPPED WITH 4000 FT REMAINING. WE REQUESTED THAT THE FIRE TRUCKS CHK THE GEAR WITH THE IR CAMERA BUT THEY SEEMED UNPREPARED TO DO SO EVEN THOUGH WE HAD REQUESTED IT IN THE AIR. I HAD NOT USED THE BRAKES HEAVILY; SO WE TAXIED TO THE GATE AND ENTERED THE OVERWT LNDG AND FLAP WRITE-UP IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. INITIAL MAINT CHK INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE FLAP JACKSCREW. SIDE NOTE: I WAS SURPRISED THAT OUR BLOCK TIME WAS 1 HR 42 MINS. IT SEEMED LIKE MUCH LESS. ALSO; I COULDN'T REMEMBER THE OTHER PLTS' NAMES DUE TO OUR CURSORY INTRO UPON ARR AT THE ARPT AND I COULDN'T HAVE PICKED THEM OUT OF A LINEUP AFTER WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE; DUE TO THE DARKNESS OF THE COCKPIT AND MY CONCENTRATION ON THE PREFLT DUTIES DURING OUR INTRO; BUT I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS EXCELLENT CRM. KUDOS TO AN EXCELLENT TRAINING DEPT -- THE BEST IN THE INDUSTRY. WE DEPARTED AGAIN 4 HRS LATE IN A B767 WITH 10 ADDITIONAL PAX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.