Narrative:

We were in the middle of our last day of 6 days. We were doing our second CAT III approach. Upon our descent to olympia VOR; briefed the approach for runway 16C CAT III. After the briefing and confirmation of same missed approach in the FMS as on the chart; we deleted eoa's. I then called for descent checklist. Upon arrival at olympia; we were switched to initial approach controller; checked in. After turning to a 340 degree heading at fourt intersection; we were given a descent to 7000 ft. After 10000 ft chime; I asked first officer for approach checklist. This is earlier than I usually ask; but I was anticipating our workload to be increasing due to WX minimums; type of approach to be completed; and wanted the flight attendants to be seated. Also during this time; we observed initial approach controller slowing many aircraft down; which is to be expected regarding the WX. We believed our estimated time of arrival to be later than we told sea operations; so I asked first officer to update our time with sea operations. I then had #1 communication as first officer was talking to company. During that time we were switched to final approach controller. He told us to expect runway 16L. First officer came back from calling company. I informed him of the runway switch. I briefed runway 16L quickly. I believe we were then turned onto base. First officer was busy changing the FMS to show runway 16L waypoints and confirming with me things were correct; pfd's MDA were for runway 16L; missed approach matched; eoa deleted. First officer then crossfilled to my FMS. During our base turn; I disengaged the autoplt; began to hand fly. I observed first officer changing the frequencys in all navs. By then we were given a heading to intercept final. I believe our position was outside magnum. I was focused on HUD; map display and TCAS targets to make sure I maintained distance I needed. I think about 8-10 mi out; approach asked us to switch to tower at douglas. I remember thinking that was bad as we were going to be busy with the calls we had to make and still had 2-3 mi to go. I was concerned we might forgot to switch to tower. I did hear the things I needed to hear to continue the approach. First officer contacted tower at douglas; tower cleared us to land. I don't recall what runway tower said. I wasn't concerned either because the map showed us at the waypoint; and my hgs was good. First officer made all callouts at FAF; aiii selected; 500 ft to go; 100 ft to go. I had the approach lights and runway earlier than minimums; said as such and landed. Tower then instructed us to cross runway 16L at taxiway M; contact ground. First officer read back; we did as instructed. After we were clear of runways; we looked at each other and confusion ensued. We taxied; parked the airplane; completed all appropriate checklists; and tried to figure out what just happened. Navigation frequencys were tuned into both locs; runway 16C was on the actives; runway 16L was on standby on all 3 navs. FMS had runway 16L approach. I really am not sure if I landed on the wrong runway; or accepted clearance to land on runway 16L but tower really meant for us to land on runway 16C. Approach and tower never indicated we did anything wrong. It was business as usual. There are so many things I have learned from this one approach. I should have not been hand flying with the workload so high on first officer. I should have re-engaged autoplt until all flight deck duties were accomplished. I should have asked for another approach checklist to have been completed; we would have caught the runway 16L localizer was in the standby mode on navigation receivers. I should have asked for delay vectors until we were caught up with flight deck responsibilities. Factors that help these cheese holes line up: fatigue. 6 days straight; early morning shows; 6 legs on last day. WX requiring approachs to right above minimums at both airports. My predisposition on hearing what I need to hear; not actually listening to what is said. My expectations of always going to runway 16C on a CAT III. In my recollections; I have only landed on runway 16L in visual conditions or in the simulator; my expectations that approach and tower will notify me if I am lined up on the wrong approach. Self induced pressure of being late and trying to make up time. The legs repeated between the same city pairs; I believe; results in complacency. Having too much of a tunnel vision nature when fatigued. I; like first officer; sincerely hope we did not land on the wrong runway. I hope the confusion was the result of seattle using both runways for landing; issuing instructions for different airplanes; and they meant us for runway 16C. It seems this was the scenario since neither approach nor tower notified us of being west of course; and treated us after we landed like normal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLIGHT CREW REPORTS POSSIBLY LANDING ON WRONG RUNWAY DURING CAT III AT SEA.

Narrative: WE WERE IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR LAST DAY OF 6 DAYS. WE WERE DOING OUR SECOND CAT III APCH. UPON OUR DSCNT TO OLYMPIA VOR; BRIEFED THE APCH FOR RWY 16C CAT III. AFTER THE BRIEFING AND CONFIRMATION OF SAME MISSED APCH IN THE FMS AS ON THE CHART; WE DELETED EOA'S. I THEN CALLED FOR DSCNT CHKLIST. UPON ARR AT OLYMPIA; WE WERE SWITCHED TO INITIAL APCH CTLR; CHKED IN. AFTER TURNING TO A 340 DEG HDG AT FOURT INTXN; WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT TO 7000 FT. AFTER 10000 FT CHIME; I ASKED FO FOR APCH CHKLIST. THIS IS EARLIER THAN I USUALLY ASK; BUT I WAS ANTICIPATING OUR WORKLOAD TO BE INCREASING DUE TO WX MINIMUMS; TYPE OF APCH TO BE COMPLETED; AND WANTED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO BE SEATED. ALSO DURING THIS TIME; WE OBSERVED INITIAL APCH CTLR SLOWING MANY ACFT DOWN; WHICH IS TO BE EXPECTED REGARDING THE WX. WE BELIEVED OUR ESTIMATED TIME OF ARR TO BE LATER THAN WE TOLD SEA OPS; SO I ASKED FO TO UPDATE OUR TIME WITH SEA OPS. I THEN HAD #1 COM AS FO WAS TALKING TO COMPANY. DURING THAT TIME WE WERE SWITCHED TO FINAL APCH CTLR. HE TOLD US TO EXPECT RWY 16L. FO CAME BACK FROM CALLING COMPANY. I INFORMED HIM OF THE RWY SWITCH. I BRIEFED RWY 16L QUICKLY. I BELIEVE WE WERE THEN TURNED ONTO BASE. FO WAS BUSY CHANGING THE FMS TO SHOW RWY 16L WAYPOINTS AND CONFIRMING WITH ME THINGS WERE CORRECT; PFD'S MDA WERE FOR RWY 16L; MISSED APCH MATCHED; EOA DELETED. FO THEN CROSSFILLED TO MY FMS. DURING OUR BASE TURN; I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT; BEGAN TO HAND FLY. I OBSERVED FO CHANGING THE FREQS IN ALL NAVS. BY THEN WE WERE GIVEN A HDG TO INTERCEPT FINAL. I BELIEVE OUR POS WAS OUTSIDE MAGNUM. I WAS FOCUSED ON HUD; MAP DISPLAY AND TCAS TARGETS TO MAKE SURE I MAINTAINED DISTANCE I NEEDED. I THINK ABOUT 8-10 MI OUT; APCH ASKED US TO SWITCH TO TWR AT DOUGLAS. I REMEMBER THINKING THAT WAS BAD AS WE WERE GOING TO BE BUSY WITH THE CALLS WE HAD TO MAKE AND STILL HAD 2-3 MI TO GO. I WAS CONCERNED WE MIGHT FORGOT TO SWITCH TO TWR. I DID HEAR THE THINGS I NEEDED TO HEAR TO CONTINUE THE APCH. FO CONTACTED TWR AT DOUGLAS; TWR CLRED US TO LAND. I DON'T RECALL WHAT RWY TWR SAID. I WASN'T CONCERNED EITHER BECAUSE THE MAP SHOWED US AT THE WAYPOINT; AND MY HGS WAS GOOD. FO MADE ALL CALLOUTS AT FAF; AIII SELECTED; 500 FT TO GO; 100 FT TO GO. I HAD THE APCH LIGHTS AND RWY EARLIER THAN MINIMUMS; SAID AS SUCH AND LANDED. TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS RWY 16L AT TXWY M; CONTACT GND. FO READ BACK; WE DID AS INSTRUCTED. AFTER WE WERE CLR OF RWYS; WE LOOKED AT EACH OTHER AND CONFUSION ENSUED. WE TAXIED; PARKED THE AIRPLANE; COMPLETED ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS; AND TRIED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT JUST HAPPENED. NAV FREQS WERE TUNED INTO BOTH LOCS; RWY 16C WAS ON THE ACTIVES; RWY 16L WAS ON STANDBY ON ALL 3 NAVS. FMS HAD RWY 16L APCH. I REALLY AM NOT SURE IF I LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY; OR ACCEPTED CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 16L BUT TWR REALLY MEANT FOR US TO LAND ON RWY 16C. APCH AND TWR NEVER INDICATED WE DID ANYTHING WRONG. IT WAS BUSINESS AS USUAL. THERE ARE SO MANY THINGS I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS ONE APCH. I SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN HAND FLYING WITH THE WORKLOAD SO HIGH ON FO. I SHOULD HAVE RE-ENGAGED AUTOPLT UNTIL ALL FLT DECK DUTIES WERE ACCOMPLISHED. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR ANOTHER APCH CHKLIST TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED; WE WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE RWY 16L LOC WAS IN THE STANDBY MODE ON NAV RECEIVERS. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR DELAY VECTORS UNTIL WE WERE CAUGHT UP WITH FLT DECK RESPONSIBILITIES. FACTORS THAT HELP THESE CHEESE HOLES LINE UP: FATIGUE. 6 DAYS STRAIGHT; EARLY MORNING SHOWS; 6 LEGS ON LAST DAY. WX REQUIRING APCHS TO RIGHT ABOVE MINIMUMS AT BOTH ARPTS. MY PREDISPOSITION ON HEARING WHAT I NEED TO HEAR; NOT ACTUALLY LISTENING TO WHAT IS SAID. MY EXPECTATIONS OF ALWAYS GOING TO RWY 16C ON A CAT III. IN MY RECOLLECTIONS; I HAVE ONLY LANDED ON RWY 16L IN VISUAL CONDITIONS OR IN THE SIMULATOR; MY EXPECTATIONS THAT APCH AND TWR WILL NOTIFY ME IF I AM LINED UP ON THE WRONG APCH. SELF INDUCED PRESSURE OF BEING LATE AND TRYING TO MAKE UP TIME. THE LEGS REPEATED BTWN THE SAME CITY PAIRS; I BELIEVE; RESULTS IN COMPLACENCY. HAVING TOO MUCH OF A TUNNEL VISION NATURE WHEN FATIGUED. I; LIKE FO; SINCERELY HOPE WE DID NOT LAND ON THE WRONG RWY. I HOPE THE CONFUSION WAS THE RESULT OF SEATTLE USING BOTH RWYS FOR LNDG; ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS FOR DIFFERENT AIRPLANES; AND THEY MEANT US FOR RWY 16C. IT SEEMS THIS WAS THE SCENARIO SINCE NEITHER APCH NOR TWR NOTIFIED US OF BEING W OF COURSE; AND TREATED US AFTER WE LANDED LIKE NORMAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.